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James G. Blaine

Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania

A Connected and Chronological Record of the
Commercial, Industrial and Educational Ad-
vancement of Pennsylvania, and the Inner
History of all Political Movements since the
adoption of the Constitution of 1838.

BY

A. K. McCLURE, LL.D.

Illustrated with Portraits of over one hundred
distinguished men of Pennsylvania, including
all the Governors, Senators, Judges of the
Courts of to-day, leading Statesmen, Railroad
Presidents, Business Men and others of note.

VOLUME II

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LXXX.

GRAND JURORS PROTECT BALLOT
THIEVES.

Interesting Story of the Failure to Bring to Trial Parties Guilty of Open and Violent Frauds—District Attorney Mann's Honest Effort to Convict Two of the Guilty Parties—Two Grand Juries Set Up to Ignore All Bills—The Prosecution Delayed for One Term Hoping to Get a Better Jury—The Next Jury Worse Than the Last, and the Author Forced the Prosecutions, Knowing That the Bills Would be Ignored—The Testimony Taken before the Magistrate That Had Been Given to the Grand Jury Presented to the Court—Court Remands the Bill Back to the Grand Jury—The Bills Held Until the Last Day and Then Again Ignored—Henry C. Lea Renewed the Prosecution, and the Next Grand Jury Ignored the Bill and Made Him Pay the Cost—Struggle in the Senate for a Better Election Law—The Party Leaders Decided to Have No Discussion in the Senate, and the Author's Bill Passed Unanimously—How Senator White Was Brought to Renew the Battle, and How the New Election Law Was Finally Enacted.

THE special senatorial election held in the Fourth Philadelphia district on the 30th of January, 1872, was such an open and sweeping carnival of fraud, portrayed to the public from day to day by the leading newspapers of the city, that honest public opinion was aroused to aggressive action, and on the day after the election the Citizens' Municipal Reform Association issued a call, signed by R. Rundle Smith as president, and Henry C. Lea as chairman of the executive committee, for a public meeting to be held on the evening of February 7 in Horticultural Hall, to protest against the growing election frauds of the city and take measures for convicting and punishing those who had been guilty of ballot pollution at the



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special election. The hall was crowded to suffocation, and addresses were delivered by Benjamin Harris Brewster, E. Joy Morris, Richard Vaux, John Price Wetherill, Dr. William Elder and myself. I stated to the meeting that the evidence was entirely ready for prosecution against scores of individuals, and that in each case it was overwhelming and unanswerable.

I had on repeated occasions given notice from the platform during the campaign that prosecutions would certainly follow the frauds arranged to be perpetrated at the election, and when the Municipal Reform Association voluntarily came to the front to take charge of the prosecutions I was hopeful that something might be accomplished. A committee of the Reform Association advised me to proceed in my own way, and they would pay all the necessary expenses. I had then in my possession the complete and detailed information of every important fraud that had been perpetrated at the special election, and the names of the guilty parties, with all the facts as to when, where and how the ballot had been corrupted. I first called upon Colonel Mann, then district attorney, who was my sincere personal friend, but who could not show his hand in any way in support of my aggressive assaults upon the party leaders of the city, of whom he was the chief. The prosecution of any cases would be in his own hands, and I stated that I had called to have a confidential conference with him on the subject, informing him that I did not expect that there could be successful prosecutions for the many frauds which had been perpetrated, but that if he would agree to prosecute to conviction two of the prominent leaders in the frauds I would be content, and would permit him to name the persons to be prosecuted. It was the most I could hope to accomplish, as many of the guilty parties had such relations with the district attorney's political

leaders that he could not prosecute them without impairing his own political organization. He agreed that he would prosecute to conviction two men, and asked me to select twelve of the most guilty parties against whom the evidence was absolutely conclusive, and he would select from the twelve two men whom he would have indicted and convicted.

I presented to him a list of twelve names, leaving out a number of equally guilty parties who I knew had very close relations with the district attorney, but with all the care that had been taken to relieve him from embarrassment, he found it exceedingly difficult to select two persons whom he could afford to prosecute. He said that he had given his word to prosecute and convict the persons chosen for trial, and that he meant to act with entire fidelity to me. Our personal relations were such that I knew he would not attempt to deceive me, but it was distressing to see him search through the dozen names to find two that he could afford to place in the dock and convict for carrying out the general policy of the party that was governed by himself. Some of the twelve men whose names were on the list have since filled important city and State positions, and one of the men finally chosen for arrest and trial held an important municipal office. Mann went over the list time and again, and paused at one time to say that prosecuting any of the men named was "like eating my own children without salt." He finally selected the men who were to be sacrificed for the wholesale frauds perpetrated by the many guilty parties, and I proceeded at once to have warrants issued for their arrest.

Special care was taken to have a magistrate issue the warrants who could not be manipulated by the political leaders. It was a matter of vital importance to get the evidence against the arrested parties before the

public, so that witnesses would be reasonably safe against being coerced into falsehood. The arrested parties appeared before the magistrate, and offered to give bail for appearance at court, obviously to avoid the evidence against them getting before the public, but that was resisted, and the magistrate decided that the case should be heard. The witnesses were present, and their testimony made out the clearest case of guilt against both. All the details of their acts in perpetrating the frauds were given, and the testimony was reported in full and published in the leading newspapers of the city.

A new term of court began a few weeks later, and on Saturday before the beginning of the new term, District Attorney Mann called at my office and informed me in confidence that it would be utterly useless for him to send bills of indictment to the grand jury at the next term, as it was set up and would ignore every bill charging parties with election offenses. He gave me the name of the man who would be foreman of the grand jury, one of the prominent business men of the city, who assumed that Mann was desirous of having the parties acquitted, and informed him that the grand jury was absolutely set up to ignore the bills. He advised that the bills be withheld, and I could not do less than assent to it.

When another term came around Mann again informed me that the new grand jury was even worse than the former one, and that it would be utterly hopeless to obtain a true bill against any person charged with election frauds. I am quite sure that District Attorney Mann acted in entire good faith, and that he believed prosecutions might be successfully conducted if allowed to rest for two or three terms. I said to him that there was only one way to meet such a condition, and that was to face it and throttle it, and I directed him to send the bills to the grand jury.

He was thus relieved of all responsibility by my positive order and the bills went to the grand jury, where precisely the same testimony that had been given before the magistrate was given, and after holding the bills for a week or ten days, they were returned ignored. William H. Ruddiman, then a prominent Republican member of the house, and a man of high character, was called into the case with the assent of the Municipal Association, and asked to go before the court, present the testimony in open court that had been given to the grand jury, and ask the court to return the bills to the grand jury for reconsideration. Every material point of testimony was given in open court, and the court at once ordered the bills to be returned to the grand jury, with instructions to give proper consideration to the testimony. The bills were thus recommitted and were held by the grand jury until the last day of court, when they were again returned ignored.

The active members of the Municipal Association were aroused to great earnestness of purpose in prosecuting the election frauds by the action of the grand jury, and Henry C. Lea, who was the leading spirit of the association, called upon me and said that he himself would become the prosecutor if I would furnish him a case where the testimony was absolutely conclusive as to the guilty parties. It was very easy to furnish such a case, and I took care to select a man for arrest of as little political importance as possible. Witnesses were brought before Mr. Lea and his counsel, whose testimony established the guilt of the accused parties beyond the possibility of doubt. Mr. Lea believed that his appearance as personal prosecutor in the court and chairman of the executive committee of the Municipal Reform Association would compel the grand jury to pay some respect to the law and the

evidence in cases of election frauds. The arrest was promptly made and witnesses, whose testimony made a conclusive case against the prisoner, appeared before the grand jury. The bill was held by the jury until near the close of the term of the court, when it was returned ignored and the prosecutor to pay the costs. So far from commanding the respect of the grand jury for the high position Mr. Lea occupied, not only as one of the foremost citizens of Philadelphia, but as the representative of the Municipal Reform Association, he simply provoked the Machine leaders to the most arrogant assertion of their authority, and they aimed directly to humiliate him by requiring him to pay the costs of the prosecution in a case where every juror knew that the accused party was guilty of the crime charged.

The aroused popular feeling against permitting a continuance of the systematic corruption of the ballot in Philadelphia was intensified by the evidence presented from day to day before the senate committee in the trial of the McClure-Gray case, and the public press of the city was practically unanimous in calling a halt in this blistering shame, and also in demanding the repeal of the registry law. My contest for senator was not decided until the last week of the session, too late to attempt the passage of any reform measures, but I carefully prepared a new election law during the summer, uniform throughout the entire State, containing every reasonable safeguard against corruption of the ballot. Soon after the session of 1873 opened, I read the bill in place. It was so fair in its provisions that it was difficult for senators to meet the question in debate, and the Republican leaders finally secretly decided that they would make no objection whatever to the consideration of the bill at any time I called for it, and would permit its passage in that

Henry C. Lea

body by a unanimous vote. The chief purpose in refraining from any hostile discussion was to prevent the exposure of the Philadelphia frauds that would be inevitable if debate was provoked; and, as they had entire confidence that the house would not pass any election bill, they felt quite safe in permitting it to pass the senate without opposition.

Copies of the bill had been furnished to the leading journals of the State, and called out very general and earnest approval from most of the influential newspapers. After ample time had been given for the consideration of the measure by senators and for public criticism I asked the senate to fix a special evening session for the consideration of the bill, and it was unanimously adopted. When the special session met the first section of the bill was read, and I addressed the senate, simply pointing out the leading features of the bill and the errors they were intended to correct. It was proper in thus explaining the bill at the outset to do it without violent assault upon any, but I hoped that debate would follow to give me an opportunity to review the general methods of Philadelphia elections. I discovered, however, that that was just what the party leaders did not want, and intended not to permit. When I had closed the brief address explanatory of the bill it was read section by section, and passed unanimously, and it was the intention of the party leaders to have the rules suspended, pass the bill finally that night and thus dispose of it.

It was common under the old Constitution when bills were passed up to third reading without opposition, for the speaker to put the question to the senate whether the rules should be suspended and the bill read a third time by its title for final passage, and the speaker of the senate followed the rule, I arose and suggested that I wished to give further consideration to one or two

features of the bill, and asked that it lie over until that evening a week, when a special session should be called for its final consideration, and it was unanimously agreed to. As a further peace offering a motion came from one of the party leaders that 10,000 copies of the bill, with my address in support of it, be printed for the use of the senate.

It was then obvious that debate on the bill in the senate was not to be permitted, and I was greatly disappointed, as none of the varied corrupt methods employed in Philadelphia elections had even been referred to before the senate.

When the senate adjourned I called on Mr. Pedrick, then connected with the Associated Press, and asked him to write a despatch for the Associated Press, stating that Senator McClure's election bill had been considered at a special session of the senate, and after an explanatory speech from the senator was passed to third reading, when it was postponed for final consideration at a special session to be held a week later, and Senator White, of Indiana, was expected then to reply to Senator McClure. White was a candidate for Governor and had great hopes of securing the machine organization of Philadelphia to bring a solid delegation for him from the city, and while the senatorial party leaders had generally understood the importance of avoiding debate on the election bill in the senate, and especially avoiding giving me an opportunity to portray the appalling frauds practised in the city, the machine leaders in Philadelphia generally believed that such a policy was cowardly, and insisted that the attitude of the party should be openly and defiantly defended.

When the newspapers of the next morning reached the senate, all of them containing the notice that Senator White was to defend the Philadelphia election

system of the party, they at once excited very general interest, and White was visibly disturbed, as he knew the policy of his senatorial associates was against permitting any discussion on the question in the senate, but the zeal of party leaders outside of the senate greatly outran their discretion, and they very heartily congratulated White, assuming that he had decided to come to the defense of the corrupt political system of the city. White and I sat in adjoining seats in the front row of senators, but the subject was never referred to by either of us, and I had no knowledge of his purpose until the special session met on the evening appointed, when, after the title of the bill was read, White took the floor in opposition. The senate was crowded, and the entire Machine delegation from the house was present to cheer the Indiana senator in his defense of their election system. White's speech was able, ingenious and plausible, as he was a debater of much more than ordinary ability, but he was specially vulnerable on the issue then at hand, as he had, in my own presence on more than one occasion, conferred with the potent political leaders of Philadelphia on the subject of revising the registry law and earnestly advised it because the act could not be justified.

His speech naturally called out the facts that he had knowledge, and publicly confessed knowledge, of the infamous features of the registry law, and had advised the revision of the law to eliminate some of its most objectionable features. White had thus opened wide the door for me to arraign the election system of Philadelphia, and present all its sickening infamies, and it was done with all the earnestness and ardor I could command. White left the hall of the senate before I closed, and when I sat down there was dead silence in the hall, as the expectation was

general that White or some other senator would reply, but as none claimed the floor the speaker put the question on the final passage of the bill and it passed without dissent.

The party leaders felt no special concern about the passage of the bill in the senate, as they had absolute confidence that it would never reach even a respectable hearing in the house; but conditions arose which finally enabled me to command enough Republican votes in the house to pass the measure, and very largely through the men who were counted on as most certain to oppose it. In point of fact, the bill was passed in the house largely by the votes of men who owed their election entirely to the frauds made possible by the registry law. Under the old Constitution there was little or no restraint upon private legislation, and nine-tenths of all the bills passed were merely local measures. Philadelphia had rather a unique Machine delegation in the house, in which were Handy Smith, Bob Tittermary, Jack McCullough, Ad Albright, Joe Ashe, Sam Daniels and others of like devotion to the theory of carrying elections by machinery. The Philadelphia representatives did not, as a rule, serve in the Legislature for the benefit of their health, and every member from the city who was of a speculative turn of mind brought with him a number of local bills, opening or vacating streets, changing grades, enlarging or otherwise amending local charters, etc., all of which were of individual interest to business men, who had learned that the only way to get their bills passed was to make a lump cash contract with their representatives, and generally they did not then have to give any further attention to the matter. The rates for the passage of such bills ranged from \$500 up to five times that amount.

Strang was speaker of the senate, and, much to the

disappointment of the party leaders, made me chairman of municipal affairs, with a committee of my own selection. A host of these private bills relating to Philadelphia had been passed by the members of the house interested in them, and when they reached the senate they were referred to my committee, where I held them all until near the close of the session, expecting that they might become an important factor in some wholesome legislation. I knew all of the members well, and they did not conceal from me the pecuniary interest they had in the passage of their bills. Most of them were entirely harmless and should have passed entirely on their merits. I was often and earnestly importuned by the representatives interested in them to report them for passage, and I answered that all would be reported in time for consideration before the close of the session.

There were a number of manly Republicans in the house who believed that the new election law should be accepted, and were ready to give it their support if its passage could be assured, and I finally ascertained that with the aid of the Philadelphia members interested in the speculative bills the new election bill could be carried through the house, and I saw the opportunity for utilizing those who had large pecuniary interests in local Philadelphia bills. I summoned several of them to a private conference and informed them that all of their bills would be reported and promptly passed if they complied with two conditions, both of which were entirely just. First, they must pass the new election law, and, second, they must vote to John A. Faunce full salary as a member of the house, as he had been elected and had been fraudulently ejected in a contest by one who was very largely interested in these local bills. This proposition was given to them as an ultimatum, and they had to choose between

compliance and losing their scores of speculative measures. They readily agreed to vote the salary to Mr. Faunce, but the idea of voting for the reform election bill was appalling. I was resolute, however, and they finally agreed to the terms proposed. The result was the passage of the new election law in disregard of the orders of leaders, and Mr. Faunce was voted his salary. When they had fulfilled every part of the contract the municipal committee reported and promptly passed the entire list of speculative private bills. With very few exceptions the local bills referred to were unobjectionable, and in no instance was one of them specially offensive or unjust. Such is the story of the battle for the overthrow of the registry law of Philadelphia, the most infamous election system ever adopted in any of the States of the Union.

LXXXI.

THE GRANT-GREELEY CONTEST.

Grant's Special Efforts to Harmonize the Curtin Elements in Pennsylvania—The Author Twice Urged to Visit Grant with a View of Harmonizing the Party on a New Cabinet Appointment—Organization of the Liberal Republican Movement in the State—The Author Chairman of the State Committee, and of the Delegation to the Cincinnati Convention—Greeley's Visit to Philadelphia to Secure the Support of the Delegation for President—Final Agreement on Davis for President with Greeley for Vice-President—The Brief Greeley Tidal Wave—Business Interests Aroused and Suddenly Halted It—The Sad End of the Life of the Great Philanthropist.

THE year 1872 narrowly escaped being one of the distinct revolutionary periods in the political annals of the Republic, and had the revolution succeeded, the political history of the country would have been radically changed, and the Republican mastery of the Nation either overthrown or so seriously broken as to place it in the attitude of an opposition party. Grant's first administration was a serious failure; a failure in nearly every important feature of the governmental authority. Grant was slow to learn that military and civil authority were two very distinct prerogatives, and he made no effort to popularize himself, or to reconcile the opposing elements until he saw the threatened tempest as the serious agitation for the succession to the Presidency was generally discussed after the elections of 1871. When Congress assembled in December, 1871, the opposition to Grant became aggressive, and embraced in its leadership a number of the ablest of the Republi-

can Senators, including Sumner, of Massachusetts; Trumbull, of Illinois; Fenton, of New York; Schurz, of Missouri, and others, and for the first time Grant seemed to realize that he might have a serious contest for re-election.

It is due to President Grant to say that he made several efforts to harmonize political conditions in Pennsylvania by movements that were not known to the public. Governor Curtin, then Minister to Russia, had given notice of his purpose to retire and return to his home in Pennsylvania, and when he was on his journey homeward he was met in Paris by a man of National prominence, who stated to Curtin that he was distinctly authorized to offer him his choice of either the French or English missions if he would remain in the diplomatic service. Curtin declined the offer, stating that his business interests required him to return to his home. When he arrived in London, after spending some time in Paris, he was met there by another very prominent official of our government, and earnestly urged to accept the English mission. The assurance was given that President Grant had directly authorized the proposition to be made to Curtin. He could only repeat his declination, as long before he left Russia he had definitely decided to return home and to make exhaustive effort to oppose the renomination or re-election of Grant.

Some time in the late fall of 1871 Mr. Borie, of Philadelphia, who had been Secretary of the Navy under Grant, called at my office, and, learning that I was at Colonel Forney's "Press" office, he came there, and, after the usual salutations, he said that he was glad to find Colonel Forney present, as what he had to say was a matter that could be discussed very freely in his presence. He said that he was directed by the President to tender me the office of United States Dis-

trict Attorney, and earnestly urged my acceptance of it. Independent of all political considerations, I could not have accepted the office, as it would have lessened rather than increased my professional income at that time, and greatly increased my labors. Colonel Forney heard the proposition, and made no suggestion until after I had given my reply. I stated that my acceptance of the office would be very unfair to District Attorney McMichael, who then held the position and discharged the duties with credit, and that it could be regarded in no other light than as an effort to bring into the support of Grant the Curtin elements of the party, which had been relentlessly ostracised for three years. I informed Mr. Borie that my appointment would not in any measure harmonize the party; that there could be no party harmony until there should be actual, open and positive change in the prospective policy of the administration, and the distinct recognition of the Republicans of the State on their merits, regardless of factional interests. Mr. Borie insisted that such was the purpose of the administration, but I reminded him that it would be utterly impossible for any such policy to be inaugurated when Cameron was in the Senate and held in his hands the confirmation of Pennsylvania appointments. Mr. Borie was a novice in politics, kind and generous in disposition, and was very desirous to have the party harmonized in support of Grant's re-election. Forney entirely agreed with me that under no circumstances could I accept the office proposed, without an openly proclaimed change of policy by which the proscription of Curtin's friends should be ended, and in that event there would be no necessity to tender me any public position.

A few weeks thereafter it became known that a change was about to be made in the cabinet by the

retirement of Attorney General Ackerman, who was succeeded by Mr. Williams, of Oregon, on the 10th of January, 1872, and a prominent administration official, residing in Washington, called on me and informed me that the President desired to confer with me in relation to the political situation in Pennsylvania, and especially in reference to the appointment of a new cabinet officer. I asked him whether the President had sent him specially to inform me that the President desired me to visit him in Washington, as a personal request from the President would be accepted by any citizen as a command. •

He answered frankly that he could not say that he had been sent to deliver that message to me from the President, but that the President had expressed a desire to have a conference, and upon that he had acted upon his own responsibility. I answered that I could not visit the President on such a mission without his personal request. I had not been in the White House during the entire period of his administration and could not hope to make such a visit without attracting some attention from the newspaper men, with whom I was very intimately associated. If I made such a visit, and thereafter did not support the President, it would be naturally assumed that I had obtruded myself upon him to ask political conditions that he could not accept, and I would be classed as opposing him because I could not obtain what was desired.

Ten days later I was in New York engaged on some business, where I was detained two or three days, and received a despatch from Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, stating that he had called at my office and would proceed to New York and dine with me at the Hoffman House that evening, as he had important matters to present. I had known Wilson intimately for many years, and, like all who knew him, had great

affection for him and confidence in all that he did and said. He told me frankly that he had no message from the President for me, but that he had left the President the evening before and had discussed the political situation very freely, presenting the perils which confronted Grant in his contest for re-election. He suggested to Grant that with Grant's permission he would call upon me and bring me to Washington to confer on the subject of a cabinet appointment that should be given to Pennsylvania, satisfactory to the friends of Curtin. Wilson was very earnest in urging me to accompany him to Washington the following day, but when I fully explained the peculiar conditions existing in Pennsylvania and how the appointment of a Curtin cabinet officer would only multiply embarrassments and lead to enlarged estrangements, he admitted that he could not complain of my refusal to accompany him to Washington.

I reminded him that with a Curtin man in the cabinet from Pennsylvania there would be direct conflict between the cabinet officers and Senator Cameron on every important appointment relating to the State, and as Cameron could not be displaced as Senator, while a cabinet officer could be displaced at any time, the result must inevitably be that the Curtin cabinet officer must bow to the continued ostracism and proscription of his friends or cause a new factional eruption that must result in his dismissal. These facts are mentioned to show that Grant was not indifferent to the terrible mutterings which arose against him at the close of the year 1871, but he was without political tact and evidently had few advisers possessed of that quality. So far as Curtin and myself were concerned he certainly meant to make a generous tender of recognition, but he was forgetful of the fact that neither Curtin nor myself was seeking positions of any kind, and that

it was the vindictive policy of factional proscription that forced us into the ranks of opposition to the administration. Grant evidently believed that I was unreasonably obstinate and that doubtless led to his vindictive hostility to my election to the senate on the 30th of January, 1872, and to my admission to that body after I had been counted out.

At the time of the occurrence before referred to, the idea of a Liberal Republican organization had not been seriously considered, and the Republicans opposed to Grant's renomination were entirely without definite purpose beyond their desire to make an effort to defeat his renomination. A peculiar issue had arisen in Missouri, where sectional passion precipitated murder between neighbors throughout the State, resulting in most sweeping disfranchisement of every citizen who had directly or indirectly aided rebellion. It was so monstrously unjust that it produced a reaction, and a Liberal movement was made to revise the Constitution and won an easy victory, in which Carl Schurz was a prominent leader. The Liberals of Missouri were not in sympathy with the administration of Grant, and early in January, 1872, a number of the leaders of that element met in Jefferson City and startled the country by calling a National convention of Liberal Republicans to meet at Cincinnati on the first of May to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President. It was generally regarded at first as a mere political flash in the pan, but it speedily crystallized a number of the ablest Republican leaders of the country in an effort to make it a great representative body and thus assure the defeat of Grant, believing that the action of the Liberals would be supported by the Democrats.

I had given little attention to this movement until Mr. Greeley visited me and earnestly urged an immediate Liberal organization in the State, with a view to

sending a delegation to Cincinnati. He was not then prominently discussed as a Presidential candidate, nor did he intimate that he desired or expected to be a candidate. I had known Greeley well for many years, cherished the warmest personal affection for him and was in entire sympathy with him in his opposition to Grant's re-election. I agreed to confer with a number of men in the State and see what response they would make, and I was utterly surprised to find how serious was the defection against Grant among many of the ablest and most influential of the Republican leaders. From the response that I received from such men as ex-Congressman Galusha A. Grow, J. K. Moorehead, Henry L. Cake, David Barclay and William Stewart, with ex-Senators Mason, of Bradford; Benson, of Potter; Lowrey, of Erie, and active campaigners like Thomas M. Marshall, of Allegheny; William H. Ruddiman, of Philadelphia; M. C. Boyer, of Montgomery, and many others, it was evident that the Pennsylvania Republicans were ready for revolutionary action, and a conference of a number of leaders was convened in Philadelphia at an early day, a State committee organized and a delegation selected to attend the Cincinnati convention, of which I was made chairman.

The State committee was made up of the most active and influential old-time Republicans in every county in the State, and the delegation to Cincinnati would have compared favorably with any Republican delegation in the regular National convention. As chairman of the Liberal State committee I opened up correspondence with prominent Republicans generally throughout the State, and the answers clearly proved the general unrest and distrust throughout the ranks of the party and the readiness for revolutionary action if there was hope that it could be successfully accomplished. At the close of that campaign I destroyed

the letters by hundreds and hundreds of Republicans in the State of local prominence, and many of them even of State distinction, who expressed their entire sympathy with the Liberal movement and their purpose to fall in with the procession as the campaign progressed.

Greeley soon became prominently discussed as a candidate for President, along with David Davis, B. Gratz Brown, Charles Francis Adams and others, but with all my affection for Greeley I could not entertain the question of crucifying him by making him a Presidential candidate to face inevitable defeat. Some three weeks before the meeting of the Cincinnati convention, Greeley made an appointment to meet me at the Colonnade Hotel in Philadelphia, and he there frankly told me that he believed he could be nominated for President and appealed to me to give him the support of the Pennsylvania delegation as far as might be in my power. It was a painful interview, for there was no man living whom to serve would have given me greater pleasure, but I frankly told him that a Liberal Republican nomination would be valueless without the support of the Democrats, and as he had been their most stinging critic for thirty years, he could not hope to command their support. I reminded him that there was but one who was in a position to command the support of the Democratic party in its entirety, and also to command the support of the Republicans who desired to end the reign of Grant, and that was David Davis. Greeley was greatly disappointed and deeply grieved, but he knew that I was sincere, and he felt that my judgment was entitled to respect. He finally said, "Well, if the Democrats won't take me head foremost, perhaps they will take me boots foremost," meaning that he might be nominated for Vice-President with Davis. I told him that could be done,

and he left me apparently reconciled to the nomination of Davis for the Presidency and himself for the Vice-Presidency.

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Soon after I met United States Senator Fenton, who was the leader of the Greeley delegation in the Cincinnati convention, and found that he and Greeley had conferred on the subject, and that he was heartily in favor of Davis and Greeley. The Pennsylvania delegation was made up of about one-third of the radical element of the party that did not want Davis, because of his conservatism, but two-thirds of them promptly and heartily agreed to the support of Davis and Greeley. A conference was held in Cincinnati the night before the convention met, at which many of the leaders of the convention attended, and plans were perfected, as we supposed, for the nomination of Davis and Greeley on the following day. Believing that everything was arranged, we tarried over a late supper, and while we were thus enjoying ourselves, Frank Blair, of Missouri, whose candidate for the Presidency was Gratz Brown, seeing that the combination left Brown entirely out, proposed to make a combination with Greeley for President and Brown for Vice-President, and on the following morning it was discovered that the friends of Greeley, who were a very important element of the Davis strength, were forced out of our line and compelled to fall back to the support of Greeley for President. Senator Fenton earnestly protested against it as a wrong to Greeley, but without avail.

The conservative forces were somewhat divided between David Davis and Charles Francis Adams, and as the defection of the Greeley men had left the Davis forces much smaller than the Adams forces, we dropped Davis as a hopeless candidate and joined in the support of Adams. Two-thirds of the Pennsylvania delegation voted for Adams after the first ballot, when they

voted for Curtin. On the sixth ballot Greeley lacked only a few votes of the nomination, and changes were promptly made in several of the delegations to give him the requisite ballot. Not until he had received a majority of the votes did I propose to our delegation to change the vote of the State, and it was then changed and the vote cast for Greeley. I regarded it as a practical surrender of the battle, as I did not believe it possible that the Democrats could be brought to the support of Greeley, but their condition was one of utter hopelessness, and I was surprised to find before midnight that a number of the Democratic leaders there sent out instructions to their States to hold themselves in readiness to accept the Liberal Republican ticket, and, as is well known, the Democratic National convention gave a practically unanimous vote to Greeley and Brown as their candidates.

At that time, when Greeley had apparently the united support of the Democrats and was enthusiastically supported by most of the Liberals, the re-election of Grant seemed to be absolutely impossible. From that time until midsummer it seemed to be simply a tidal wave North and South for Greeley, and his election was generally accepted by his supporters and by very many of his opponents as absolutely assured, but when the revulsion came it was overwhelming in its power, and from causes which were entirely reasonable. The country was then in a state of fearful inflation, extravagance prevailed in all classes and conditions, speculation ran riot, and all thinking men knew that liquidation must come sooner or later, and soon at the latest, with fearful disaster in its trail. The question of resumption of specie payments was agitated by those who regarded sound credit as more important than inflated prosperity, and Greeley's only utterance on the financial question was that "the way to resume is

to resume," clearly indicating that he thought the matter of resuming specie payments was a mere question of directing it to be done.

Business interests of the country were awakened to the peril that confronted them, and when the revulsion started in business circles it was the swiftest and most far-reaching of any revulsion I have ever seen in political contests. Prominent business Democrats of Philadelphia came to the Republican headquarters and voluntarily paid liberal subscriptions to secure the election of Grant. They knew that disaster must come, but they hoped by the election of Grant to postpone it for another four years, and while the Democratic leaders as a rule supported Greeley with great fidelity the rank and file remembered him only as the man who poured out his keenest invective against them for thirty years, and they stubbornly refused to support the ticket. More than enough Republicans voted for the Greeley State ticket in Pennsylvania to elect it by a large majority if the Democrats had given it cordial support, but in nearly or quite every county of the State the combined Democratic and Liberal Republican vote was less than the full Democratic vote. They would very heartily have supported Davis and Greeley with him for second on the ticket; and, viewing that contest from the most dispassionate standpoint, I do not doubt that had Davis been nominated he would have been elected by a very large majority, with the probability that the new party would have maintained its power for many years. Davis would have greatly tempered the passions of the Reconstruction period, would have commanded the absolute confidence of the entire business and industrial interests of the country, and sectional strife would have practically perished by the close of his administration.

Although I regarded the contest as an utterly hope-

less one at the beginning after Greeley's nomination, I felt that I could not do less than accept the chairmanship of the State committee and devote my entire time and energy to the contest. My affection for Greeley made that a necessity, and after his nomination by the Democrats, when his election seemed more than probable, I shared the anxiety of Greeley's closest friends as to what might be the result of his administration as President. About that time I was summoned to a confidential council in New York, at which Whitelaw Reid, Waldo Hutchins, General Cochrane and a number of others were present, to consider the question of having Greeley forewarned against committing himself on the question of his cabinet, as all seemed to agree that in the event of his election the safety of his administration would depend upon having an able and conservative body of constitutional advisers. They charged me with the duty of conferring with him on the subject, and I was directed to find him at his private headquarters in Brooklyn, where he was not accessible to the public. His finely chiseled, benevolent face brightened as he spoke of his assured election, and when I ventured to suggest to him that if called to the Presidency with such a combination of political supporters the choice of his cabinet would be a very grave duty, and that he should avoid all complications on the subject, he assumed that I was desiring to forestall him in the interests of Pennsylvania. and he promptly replied that of course no one would be appointed to the cabinet from Pennsylvania without my approval. He was surprised when I told him that that was just what I did not want; that it was most important that he should not be in any way committed to any one on the subject of the cabinet, as the success of his administration would depend upon it, and that such a cabinet as he would need could be determined upon only after his election. He assented

to the proposition and gave the assurance that he would be entirely free to advise with his most trusted friends if elected President, and make up the cabinet of the best men the existing conditions presented. He asked me to go to North Carolina and spend a week there, which I did, and when I left him I shook him by the hand for the last time, as we never met again. I had much correspondence with him, and after his defeat, that was made doubly distressing by the death of his wife, I wrote him expressing the sincerest sympathy, and had in reply a letter written the last day he ever held a pen in his hand. The full text of the letter was as follows: "I am a man of many sorrows, and doubtless have deserved them, but I beg to say that I do not forget the gallant though luckless struggle you made in my behalf. I am not well." His physical power was hopelessly broken, and soon thereafter it was found that his sorrows had unsettled his reason, and in a few days, in an asylum for the insane, Horace Greeley, one of the noblest and best of American philanthropists, passed to his final account

LXXXII.

DEMOCRATS NOMINATE CURTIN.

Peculiar Political Complications in the Contest of 1872—The Evans Scandal—Some \$300,000 Awarded a Clerk for Collecting Government Claims—Investigation Moved in the Senate—How It Ended—Hartranft and Buckalew Nominated for Governor by Their Respective Parties—Curtin Nominated by the Liberal Republicans for the Constitutional Convention—Governor Bigler Retired from Democratic Ticket, and Curtin Taken in His Place—State Contest Unusually Desperate—Leaders Would Have Withdrawn Hartranft But for the Younger Cameron—Geary Forced to Grant Pardon to Yerkes and Marcer—Attempt of the Roosters to Make Cameron Pay for His Re-election—How the Governor's Salary Was Increased from \$5,000 to \$10,000.

THERE were many and unusually strange complications in Pennsylvania politics in 1872. Before the Republican State convention met to nominate candidates for Governor, Auditor General, three candidates for Congressmen-at-Large and twelve candidates for delegates-at-large to the constitutional convention, Curtin and many of his followers had already cast their lot with the Liberal Republicans, and were therefore unseen and unfelt in the Republican organization of the State. General Hartranft, who would have been the Curtin candidate for Governor in 1866, had he not been forced to accept the nomination for auditor general in 1865 to defeat Cameron's attempt to control the convention and organization of that year, had served continuously in the office of auditor general, having been re-elected in 1868. In the meantime Robert W. Mackey had been several years in the office of State treasurer, and his exceptional ability as a

political leader made him altogether the master organizer and general director of the Cameron forces of the State, and they had undisputed possession of the party organization.

Hartranft had served as auditor general with Mackey in the State treasury, and he would have gradually drifted away from the party element that originally supported him even if Curtin had remained within the party breastworks. A serious scandal was developed a short time before the campaign of 1872 opened because of the payment to an entirely obscure man and without influence the sum of \$300,000, ostensibly for services as State agent to collect some unsettled military claims against the National government. In point of fact there was no difficulty whatever about the collection of the money. The claims had been distinctly defined by Governor Curtin and State Treasurer Henry D Moore, and the collection of the money was not in any degree doubtful, but by a combination of prominent State officials a bill was passed by the Legislature authorizing the payment of a large percentage to the State agent for the collection of military claims against the general government. Evans was appointed, secured the money without any difficulty, and the accounting officers of the State apparently paid him \$300,000 for his services. It developed a terrible scandal in the State and involved Governor Hartranft, among other officials, but notwithstanding the efforts made in the courts and in the Legislature to get at the close combination that had been made to plunder the treasury, the movement was defeated in every instance by the combined power of the State authorities.

It was well known that Evans had not received more than a mere moiety of the percentage paid, as he continued to live obscurely and frugally and died practically without estate. During the campaign of 1872,

when I was chairman of the Liberal State committee, and employed the best detective force to get into the inner citadel of the State frauds, I obtained positive and indisputable information where \$52,000 of the Evans' \$300,000 had been received by a prominent man, where he had invested it and how the securities were then held. When the senate met in 1873, we had a judiciary committee, composed of senators of the highest character and legal attainments, and I moved that the committee be instructed to investigate the payment of \$300,000 to Agent Evans, with power to send for persons and papers and to report by bill or otherwise. The motion was unanimously adopted, and the committee met immediately upon the adjournment of the senate. The information was furnished to the committee in detail, and it was decided that the following week subpoenas should be issued for the witnesses who were ready to prove where part of the Evans money had gone. It was decided also by the committee that none should be advised of its meeting to hear the witnesses excepting the witnesses themselves and a single officer of the senate. The senate adjourned on Friday until the following Monday, and on Saturday morning the person against whom the investigation was specially directed suddenly dropped dead in his own home. No subpoenas were issued, and when the committee met the next week, according to appointment, it was decided that no investigation should be made unless positive information could be had affecting other parties. The result was that the committee never met again and made no report whatever to the senate. Most of the senators understood the situation, and the scandal was dropped by general consent.

Hartranft was nominated for Governor by what was then the Cameron organization of the State under the

immediate management of Mackey, the most brilliant State leader any party ever produced in Pennsylvania. Hartranft had won great distinction as a volunteer officer during the war, and he was in fact the ideal volunteer soldier of the State. He was an officer in the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment at Manassas just before the opening of the first battle of Bull Run, when the term of the regiment expired. Instead of remaining and joining their brethren in battle, as Hartranft earnestly urged them to do, the Fourth regiment, as stated by General McDowell in his official report of the action, marched away from the field "to the music of the enemy's cannon." Hartranft at once severed his relations with his regiment, volunteered as a staff officer, served through the action, and was soon again in the field as colonel of a new regiment. He made no effort to exploit himself as a soldier through the newspapers, but in his quiet, unassuming way most faithfully performed every military duty, and finally won special distinction by his recapture of Fort Steadman, one of the advance defenses of Grant's line near Petersburg, that had been captured in a gallant dash made by General Gordon.

Hartranft was ordered with his command to reconnoiter and ascertain the situation, but was not ordered to attempt to carry the fort by assault. His men had great confidence in him as a commander, and when they moved near enough to reconnoiter the position Hartranft simply did not halt his soldiers, and by a sudden inspiration they rushed in upon Steadman and regained it. Hartranft's modesty forbade his claiming any special credit for the victory that really made him famous, but it was his soldierly training of the command that made the recapture of Fort Steadman possible even without specific orders. He thus stood before the people of Pennsylvania as confessedly the

foremost of our many gallant volunteer officers in the State, and his high character and modest personal qualities made him a favorite with all who knew him. He was the logical candidate of the party for Governor, and he was nominated practically without a contest, with Senator Harrison Allen, of Warren, for auditor general, and Lemuel Todd, Charles Albright and Glenni W. Scofield for Congressmen-at-Large, and twelve candidates for delegates-at-large to the constitutional convention, the head of whom was William M. Meredith, of Philadelphia.

The Democrats appreciated the necessity of placing themselves in the strongest possible position before the people of Pennsylvania, believing that by the combination with the Liberals they could win. They nominated ex-Senator Charles R. Buckalew for Governor, who was confessedly the ablest of the Democratic champions in the State. Wallace was then in the State senate, and training for United States Senator that he attained two years later. There was no factional opposition made by Wallace or any of his followers against Buckalew's nomination, and he was presented to the people by the united Democratic organization of the State. William Hartley was nominated for auditor general and James H. Hopkins, Richard Vaux and Hendrick B. Wright were chosen as candidates for Congressmen-at-Large, with twelve delegates-at-large to the constitutional convention headed by ex-Governor Bigler. Cameron was United States Senator, and his re-election depended upon carrying a Republican Legislature at the fall election.

The Liberal Republicans did not hold a State convention, but some time after Governor Curtin's return from Russia the Liberal State committee nominated him as delegate-at-large to the constitutional convention, he being the only distinctive Liberal Republican

presented for a State office. The nomination was made after a full conference and understanding with the Democratic leaders. Mr. Randall, as chairman of the Democratic State committee, and I, as chairman of the Liberal Republican State committee, had repeated conferences on the subject, and after it had been fully considered by the Democratic leaders they decided that if the Liberals nominated Curtin as delegate-at-large they would withdraw one of their twelve candidates and accept Curtin in his place, whereby Curtin's election would be absolutely assured, as each voter voted for twelve delegates-at-large to the constitutional convention, and the twenty-four receiving the highest votes were elected. Governor Bigler, who was at the head of the Democratic ticket, had taken very active part in bringing about the nomination of Curtin, assuming that there would be no difficulty in making a vacancy in the list of Democratic nominations. After Curtin's nomination had been made by the Liberals, however, Bigler found that all of his associates were very reluctant to retire, although a number of them were willing to do so under orders, and Bigler promptly solved the problem by sending his own declination to the Democratic committee, and Curtin was unanimously nominated in his stead.

With Curtin on the Democratic ticket, and the Democrats supporting the Liberal candidates for President and Vice-President, it was only reasonable for the Liberals of Pennsylvania to accept the Democratic candidates for all the other State offices and the Democratic electoral ticket. The two lines of battle were thus distinctly drawn; the Democrats and Liberals on one side, and the Republican organization, under the immediate command of Cameron, on the other side. Both Democrats and Liberals were generally embittered against Cameron, and believing, as they did in the early

part of the campaign, that they were going to win alike in State and Nation by a large majority, they pressed the fight most aggressively, and Cameron was severely arraigned from the stump before the people of the State, while Hartranft's alleged complications with the Evans swindle and with Yerkes, who was then in prison along with ex-Treasurer Marcer for the misuse of city funds, brought down upon him a floodtide of merciless criticism. So fierce were the assaults upon Hartranft, Cameron and the party organization that Mackey and Cameron finally yielded and called a private conference of a number of the leading party men of the State to decide upon withdrawing Hartranft from the ticket. I speak advisedly when I say that Hartranft's name would have been withdrawn from the ticket but for the heroic and defiant attitude assumed at that meeting by J. Donald Cameron, who had then become quite prominent as a leader, but rarely participated in party management except when grave emergencies arose. He peremptorily declared that the party could save itself only by assuming the aggressive and standing by its State ticket. While a majority of those in the conference were not really convinced as to the wisdom of the younger Cameron's policy, the divided judgment of the counselors made all obey, and from that time Cameron was abreast with Mackey and conducted one of the most aggressive campaigns ever made in the history of the State.

Governor Geary was forced to pardon Yerkes and Marcer some time before the election, in return for which they furnished statements which relieved Hartranft from any guilty complication with or without personal profit in the Evans swindle, and they were only just in doing so. The pardon reached Philadelphia about noon, and the chairman of the State committee immediately repaired to Cherry Hill, delivered

the pardon and brought Yerkes and Marcer back to their freedom. In the meantime the business interests of the country had become profoundly disturbed over the possible election of Greeley, whose financial policy was unknown, and who was regarded as impetuous and visionary without the well-balanced qualities of statesmanship. Never was a struggle fought more desperately before the people of the State, and the Republicans of Philadelphia, under the registry law, exhausted their power to increase the party majority by frauds in which they had the ripest experience. "Nick", English, the leader of the "lightning calculators," presided at the meeting of the return judges, when it was known that Hartranft was elected by 35,000 majority. He knew also that many bets had been made that Hartranft would carry Philadelphia by 20,000, and he lacked several thousand of that number, but English solved the problem by simply manipulating the figures, and officially certifying a majority for Hartranft in the city of over 20,000. The disastrous defeat of Greeley left both Democrats and Liberals without heart or hope, and they made no attempt to bring to justice those who had been guilty of the most flagrant frauds.

With the Democratic-Liberal combination defeated by nearly 40,000 at the October election, there was simply a landslide for Grant in November, when he carried the State over Greeley by nearly 150,000. Cameron had not only a large Republican majority in the Legislature, but for the first time he had almost the solid support of the Republican senators and representatives, and his re-election to the Senate was accepted as absolutely assured.

Such a campaign naturally brought into the Legislature an unusually large commercial element, and especially from the city of Philadelphia and the mining

regions. Cameron regarded his election as absolutely certain, and he congratulated himself that he would be able, for the first time, to command the nomination of his party without a struggle, and secure his election by the voluntary votes of the legislators. He was devoted to thrift, and never expended money in politics unless the necessity was imperious. When the commercial men of the Legislature began to look over the field they saw that there was nothing for them in the Senatorial fight, and after a number of conferences they decided to appeal to the ambition of some man of large wealth by assuring him of the support of the majority of the Philadelphia delegation. After the movement had been thoroughly matured the proposition was made to the elder Charlemagne Tower, a man of large wealth, residing in the anthracite region, and who was not without political ambition, but was altogether too shrewd to be robbed in a hopeless contest. He never gave his consent to the proposition, but apparently held it under advisement, and Cameron became very much alarmed at the new peril that confronted him. He believed that the Democrats and the few Liberals in the Legislature would gladly join in any combination to defeat his re-election, and with the majority of the Philadelphia delegation ready to deal for revolutionary action against Cameron he saw that he might become involved in a very severe contest. He well understood what the Philadelphia movement meant; that it was inspired solely by the hope that he would give a large amount of money to have them abandon it and fall back into the regular ranks, but while he could not afford to lose the Senatorship, he was quite unwilling to win it at a high cost if it could be avoided.

I had been active in the fight and had made Cameronism the issue from the beginning to the close of

the campaign, but my personal relations with Cameron in all our many bitter conflicts had never been strained, and I was not greatly surprised when I called at the office of Colonel Thomas A. Scott in response to a summons from him to find Cameron there with him, and to learn that I had been sent for to confer with Cameron and Scott on the Senatorial question. Cameron presented the question with entire frankness; said that he had won the Legislature and his election in an open fight; that he was entitled to it without being forced to lavish money on legislators elected in his interest, and that I had been sent for to inquire whether I intended to join the Philadelphia blackmailers in a combination to defeat him for Senator. I told him that I could not vote for him for Senator, but that he was entitled to a re-election to the Senate without debauching the Legislature, and that if a corrupt combination was made to defeat his election or to compel him to pay blackmail to the corruptionists I would openly and earnestly oppose any such movement in the Legislature. Cameron thanked me and closed the consideration of the subject by remarking, "They can go to hell now."

The Senatorship became a matter of public discussion, and in an interview that I was asked to give I stated distinctly that Cameron for the first time in his life was entitled to the votes of a majority of the Legislature without the usual debauchery that had attended Senatorial contests in the State. I added that I would oppose his election by any and every honest method, but would not join in any corrupt combination against him for the benefit of Legislative mercenaries. The result was that the opposition started by those who expected to blackmail Cameron was compelled to yield, and Cameron received the entire vote of his party for re-election to the Senate without the cost of a dollar

beyond what he had expended in the campaign. I cast my vote in the senate for William D. Kelley.

When the Legislature met in January, 1873, Governor-elect Hartranft proposed to come to my room one evening to confer on several matters. I was glad to welcome him, for I knew that whatever political environment he had met with he was thoroughly honest in purpose and would want to make a clean and creditable administration. He called at the time appointed and said that he desired me to understand his position; that he realized the fact that he was very largely, if not wholly, indebted to the Cameron organization for his election and that he did not mean ever to be justly charged with ingratitude, but he added that, first of all, he meant to make a thoroughly clean, straightforward administration of the State government, and as I had yet two sessions to serve in the senate he hoped that he would be able to command not only my support but that of all reasonable Democrats. He stated distinctly that he might be called upon at times to give offense to those who might assume that they owned him, but if necessary he would give offense rather than dishonor himself, and it is due to the memory of Hartranft to say that he faithfully fulfilled that promise.

On several occasions during his two terms as Governor he was urged to perform more than questionable official duties to serve personal or partisan interests at the sacrifice of his own sense of right, and he resolutely refused to obey. During the two sessions of his first administration I never had occasion to criticise any act of the Governor before the senate and generally gave him very cordial and hearty support. Before leaving me at the private conference he suggested that if I could see my way clear to propose the increase of the salary of the Governor from \$5,000 to \$10,000 a year, and have it passed before his inauguration, it


would be regarded as a personal favor. I told him that I appreciated the fact that the present salary for the Governor was disgracefully inadequate and that I would gladly take the responsibility of proposing the measure if it did not conflict with the Constitution. I soon found that the subject had been quietly discussed by leading Republicans and Democrats in the senate, all of whom agreed that the salary should be increased, but neither party wished to take the responsibility of proposing the measure. After a conference with such able Democratic lawyers as Wallace, Dill and others, and Strang, Rutan and other Republicans, I found that nearly or quite all were willing to support the measure if their particular party was not to be responsible for it. As I was the only member of my own party in the senate I was entirely independent and at once took charge of the bill. The Governor's salary was increased from \$5,000 to \$10,000 before Hartranft was inaugurated. I did not regard the question as entirely free from doubt under the provisions of the Constitution, but it was a case in which I believed that doubt should be resolved in favor of common justice.

LXXXIII.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1874 ADOPTED.

Desperate Efforts Made to Defeat Its Approval by the People—Mayor Stokley Halts a Stupendous Fraud in Philadelphia When It Was Found to be Unavailing—Earnest Legislative Work to Carry Into Effect the New Fundamental Law—A New Liberal Salary Bill for City Offices Vetoed without Benefit to Those Who Accomplished It—Ballot Reform Accomplished, and Many Machine Leaders Overthrown.

THE political conditions in Pennsylvania in 1873 aroused the Republican reform sentiment of the State to great activity, notwithstanding the overwhelming disaster the Liberals had suffered with the Democrats when Grant carried the State by nearly 140,000 the year before. There were scores of thousands of very reluctant votes cast for Grant by Republicans who were sincerely in favor of reforming the domination of the party. The Republican leaders, then wholly in harmony with Cameron, slated Judge Paxson, of the common pleas court of Philadelphia, as a candidate for supreme judge. There were no protests against Paxson either as to his character or ability for the high office of supreme judge, but the fact that he was the predetermined candidate of the leaders of the organization called out aggressive hostility to him and the opposition concentrated in support of Judge Butler, of Chester, who afterward served as United States district judge until he was entitled to retirement by reason of more than ten years' service and being over seventy years of age. It was an open, strenuous battle, not against Judge Paxson in person, but against the political power that had dictated his nomination by



William H. Armstrong

the State convention. Mackey was State treasurer and general political manager of the State. The State treasurer was to be elected by the people that year for the first time. When the convention met Mackey was amazed to discover that he was unable to force the nomination of Paxson over Butler, and he rescued himself and his organization from defeat by taking Judge Isaac G. Gordon, of Fayette County, who had some personal strength, as a side candidate, and with the Paxson vote thrown to him his nomination was accomplished. Mackey was nominated for State treasurer without opposition.

At the time the convention was held the work of the constitutional convention, then in session, had not been completed, and no expression was given on the question of constitutional reform. The Democrats exhibited little vigor when their State convention met, as the overwhelming defeat of the year before seemed to leave the party in an utterly hopeless condition in the State, but as the reform Republicans developed great activity, not only in the battle against the slated candidate for supreme judge, but in the support of the new Constitution after it had been completed, the Democrats were somewhat inspired and one of the most active off-year contests of the State was the result.

The fight for the adoption of the new Constitution became the absorbing issue. It was specially offensive to the debauched political elements of the State because it destroyed the fee system that was a source of almost unlimited plunder in Philadelphia, and tore up by the roots the registry election law that was the parent of monstrous frauds. The speculative and mercenary political interests of the State were naturally adverse to the new fundamental law, and as the campaign neared its close they were greatly strengthened by the decision delivered by the supreme court setting

aside the method of holding the election on the adoption of the new Constitution under an honest election system in Philadelphia, provided by the convention itself. The decision of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Agnew, exhibited an unusual degree of prejudice against the general reform movement, and, while it immediately quickened and encouraged the worst political elements to oppose the Constitution, it did much more to arouse the reform elements; and the court was so fiercely criticised by the press and on the stump that Chief Justice Agnew felt compelled, in justice to himself and the court, to publish a letter denying the unfriendly construction that had been put upon the dicta that figured somewhat prominently in the opinion, and declared that, notwithstanding his objection to some important features of the new Constitution, he would vote for it. This letter eliminated the court from the partisan discussion during the remainder of the campaign and greatly encouraged the friends of the new Constitution, who had been struggling so tirelessly and earnestly to give it victory.

The most dangerous element in opposition to the new Constitution was clearly developed only a few weeks before the election. It was a combination of prominent corporation interests in the State to accomplish the rejection of the new fundamental law. This movement became plainly visible, as able representatives of great corporate interests took the stump to call upon the people to reject the work of the convention. The contest was regarded as fairly doubtful, as it was impossible to make any calculation from a political standpoint as to the result of the vote for the Constitution. Never in the history of Pennsylvania elections were such strange complications presented by counties of the same political faith and apparently sharing the same general interests. Adams County voted four

to one against it and Allegheny ten to one in its favor. Bedford voted three to one in favor of it, and Blair nearly two to one against it. Berks, the Democratic Gibraltar, voted four to one against it, and Columbia, another Democratic stronghold, voted four to one in its favor. Dauphin and Lebanon, both strong Republican counties, voted against it by decided majorities, and Indiana, a county two-thirds Republican, voted two to one against, while Lancaster voted two to one in favor. Somerset, a strong Republican county, voted three to one against, and York, a Democratic stronghold, voted nearly two to one in favor.

With such confused conditions throughout the State it was impossible for the party leaders to make reasonably safe calculations as to the result in the State, and it was finally decided by the Philadelphia party leaders that the city should give an overwhelming majority against the Constitution, regardless of the vote cast. The plan was conceived by those who held the city offices, whose hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal fees would be ended by the new fundamental law, and the scheme was thoroughly organized in all its details to assure a return of not less than 50,000 against the Constitution, which was regarded as sufficient to defeat it. I do not speak from rumor or circumstantial evidence on this point, as two of the men who were actively engaged in the movement to make the false return in Philadelphia gave me the full details immediately after the election.

An almost tragic incident occurred in the office of Mayor Stokley on election night. The returns from the city were coming in precisely according to arrangement, as under the registry law there was no limit upon the power of the dominant party in manufacturing returns, but soon after ten o'clock overwhelming majori-

ties in favor of the Constitution came in from leading counties of the State, and it became evident that 50,000 majority in the city would not affect the result. A number of the city leaders were in the mayor's office, and it became evident that the Constitution would be adopted regardless of the frauds in Philadelphia. Stokley, who was nothing if not heroic, called the boys down in a manner much more emphatic than elegant, and gave peremptory orders that the Philadelphia returns should be corrected and returned as the vote had been cast. One of the men among the most active in the work, who gave me the information in detail, informed me that while they had no difficulty in carrying out the fraud to return a large majority against the Constitution, the most difficult task they had ever been called upon to perform was that of changing the returns to make them appear reasonably honest, but it was finally accomplished, and the official vote as returned in Philadelphia was two to one in favor of the Constitution, giving some 25,000 majority for it instead of 50,000 against it.

The majority in the State in favor of the adoption of the Constitution was 145,150. Mayor Stokley did not attempt to conceal the action he had taken in halting those who were engaged in making a fraudulent return in Philadelphia. He was heartily in favor of defeating the Constitution, and though a man entirely free from venality in public and private life, he believed that in politics the end justifies the means, and when a patent fraud was about to be played without accomplishing any substantial result beyond the disgrace it brought upon the actors, he publicly declared that he and his administration would not be "put in a hole," and was peremptory in forcing a fairly honest return of the vote.

The earnest and somewhat embittered battle on the

adoption of the Constitution overshadowed the contest for State treasurer and supreme judge. Gordon was a man of fair attainments, who had served in the Legislature with unusual credit, had made a very acceptable record as a common pleas judge, and was a man of unquestioned integrity. He was not an important political factor, and he simply drifted with the current, while Mackey, who was absolutely in charge of the organization, managed his own contest, and to avoid accidents was careful to arrange with those in charge of the election affairs in Philadelphia to give him an increased majority of some 10,000 over his colleague on the State ticket. Under the registry law, that was then in its dying agonies with the advent of the new Constitution, it was not only possible, but easy of accomplishment if the proper combinations were made and the necessary cash supplied. The result was Mackey's election by 25,000 majority over Hutchison, the Democratic candidate, while Judge Gordon's majority over Judge Ludlow, of Philadelphia, was 14,286. Mackey's election was accomplished solely, by the majority in Philadelphia, as Hutchison had fifty-nine majority in the State outside of the city. The Republicans carried both branches of the Legislature, the senate having twenty Republicans, twelve Democrats and one Liberal Republican; the house forty-three Democrats and fifty-seven Republicans. The adoption of the Constitution did not affect the Legislature chosen that year, but after the session of 1874 the senate was increased to fifty and the house to over 200, with biennial sessions.

The adoption of the new Constitution imposed very important and responsible duties upon the Legislature that sat during the session of 1874. All private legislation was practically ended, and corporate charters could be obtained only under general laws. It became

necessary therefore for the Legislature to enact such general laws as would give proper encouragement to the varied corporate interests of the State and to the further development of our wealth by increased corporate combinations, and it was necessary also to empower the courts to meet the countless emergencies which often arose and called for private legislation relating to matters of limited and local interest.

A committee of twelve was created in the senate, specially charged with the preparation and presentation of the bills necessary to carry into effect the new Constitution, in which Senator Wallace proved himself to be a master legislator. He was the author of the corporate system then inaugurated, and it has been little changed until this day. It was necessary also to district the State into fifty instead of thirty-three senatorial districts, and also to fashion the representative districts, a work in which there was great room for partisan strategy, and under the leadership of Mackey the Republicans got away with about all there was in sight. He was substantially the author of every apportionment bill that was passed, and fashioned not only the senatorial and representative districts, but also the judicial districts, and in defining what districts should elect senators for two years, and what districts should elect for four years, as was necessary for the following elections, he fixed the heavy Republican senatorial districts to elect in Presidential years, while the debatable districts were left for the off year when political manipulation was much more easy than in the white heat of a Presidential struggle. In point of fact, while Mackey was in the leadership of the party organization he was practically the Legislature, for he framed or revised every important bill, and never suffered a defeat in his own political household. He possessed the important quality of a party political

leader that is seldom found—that is the ability to hold his own followers in solid column, and divide the Democrats when necessary to win out. His influence in the Democratic lines was not so much with the commercial element as with the responsible leadership of the Democratic organization. While he and Wallace had many desperate political tilts, there never was a time that either would not help the other if he could do so without sacrificing his own personal or political interests.

As I was a senator during the session of 1874 it was natural that I was most desirous to carry into full effect the reforms of the Constitution that I had so long and earnestly advocated. I knew the trouble that would arise about passing a salary bill for the Philadelphia offices. It was an open secret then that the leading Row offices, as they were then called, paid the incumbent from \$50,000 to \$100,000 a year, depending upon the measure of unscrupulous exaction of illegal fees, and not only those in office, but those expecting soon to come into these positions, would naturally resist the passage of a salary bill, as until such a bill was passed by the Legislature the old fee system would remain. Colonel Mann was then district attorney, having been elected in 1871 after having been compelled to retire from the ticket in 1868, and he was entirely confident that he would be re-elected in the fall of 1874. General Collis was city solicitor and expected to be re-elected. My close personal relations with both of them made me feel warranted in calling them into conference and proposing that they should assent to the passage of a very liberal salary bill, as was required by the Constitution. They were very reluctant about assenting to it, but after several conferences they finally agreed upon a scale of salaries for the different officers of the city ranging just about as the salaries are now, with the exception of the clerk of quarter sessions, that was

made \$10,000 a year, and I framed the bill in accordance with our agreement, and passed it through both branches of the Legislature.

It was before the Legislature for some weeks, and during that time I never saw an indication of organized opposition to the measure. There was obvious reluctance on the part of the Philadelphians who trained with the organization, but they accepted the situation and permitted the measure to pass. It was held in the house and not passed until within ten days of the adjournment, which gave the Governor the right to hold the bill for a considerable period. Soon after the adjournment it was whispered that the bill would be vetoed by the Governor, and that in addition to technical objections to the measure, he thought the salaries were excessive, as none of the city offices were rated below the salary of the Governor, and one or more exceeded his. Mann and Collis, who had assented to the bill, became fully satisfied that they would be re-elected, and that if re-elected without the passage of a salary bill the old fee system would remain during their entire term, as the Constitution forbade the increase or diminution of the pay of public officers during the term for which they were elected. They earnestly pressed the Governor to veto the measure, and I was not greatly surprised one morning to find in the papers the announcement that the Governor had vetoed the salary bill. The result was that Mann was nominated for re-election with little or no opposition, but was defeated by some 4,000 by Furman Sheppard under the new election law enforced by the Constitution, and the fee system continued for three years in the district attorney's office for the benefit of Mann's competitor. Collis failed to obtain a nomination for another term, and his successor reaped the profits he had hoped to attain by the defeat of the salary bill. That experi-

ment cured the opposition to a salary bill, and the next Legislature enacted one that was substantially a copy of the measure that had been passed and vetoed in 1874.

The Constitution tore up the registry law by the roots and the last election held under it was the February election of 1874, when a mayor, city treasurer and city solicitor were chosen, as at that time the election officers to hold future elections were chosen, and the overthrow of the registry law was the beginning of the end of the Republican domination that so long ruled in Philadelphia. The defeat of Mann for district attorney and Ashe for coroner in 1874 was followed by the election of a Democratic sheriff in 1876, by the election of a Democratic district attorney and controller in 1877, and finally by the election of a Democratic mayor. The Committee of One Hundred came into power and found it possible to enforce something approaching honest elections, and they thoroughly revolutionized the city. It was the best-directed reform movement of modern times. It was made up of practical business men, who understood that idealism in politics was good in theory, but utterly valueless in practice, and they not only defeated the notoriously corrupt machine men of the city, but they defeated men of the highest standing who adhered to and sustained the organization, thereby giving it the benefit of their reputations. Such men as James Dobson, the elder Reyburn, men whose integrity none could question, were defeated as Republican candidates in strong Republican wards, solely because they tolerated or excused the profligate and corrupt measures of the party organization to which they adhered. During that season of reform nearly every important office in the city of Philadelphia from mayor down was filled by Democrats or Independent Reform Republicans, and Democrats were thrice elected

to the important office of controller, who, as McMullen quaintly but expressively said, "sits on the chist."

For a full decade the Republican leaders were under fair notice that Machine candidates would be made to bite the dust, and the result was the defeat of many candidates of questionable character, and the nomination and election of many men of the highest character and ability, but the labor of the reformer is a thankless task. It is all work and no pay beyond the gratification of having performed a duty to the public, while the work of the partisan who makes politics a trade and lives thereby is untiring. Gradually, as the reform veterans retired from the struggle, the Machine men came to the front, but it was many years before they regained the power to pollute the ballot box and to pollute municipal authority to an extent approaching that which had been common before the adoption of the new Constitution. There has been a steady battle for and against a thoroughly honest electoral system, and it will doubtless continue until the people shall be goaded to revolution and adopt the only honest method of regulating elections by requiring every voter to register and making the official ballot one that compels the voter to choose each individual candidate for every office. Until that shall be done organized and corrupt political power will always be able to debauch the ballot, differing only in degree.

LXXXIV.

THE STOKLEY-McCLURE MAYORALTY
BATTLE.

Formidable Revolt Against Stokley's Administration—The Author Peremptorily Declines to Become a Candidate for Mayor—James S. Biddle Nominated by the Democrats, but soon Thereafter Declined—Democrats and Citizens Nominate the Author without Consulting Him—His Acceptance Seemed to Be an Imperious Necessity—Remarkable Galaxy of Republican Leaders Who Supported Him—Interesting Episodes of the Campaign—The Author Advised Four Days before the Election of the Majority that would be Returned Against Him—Stokley Returned Elected by over 10,000 Majority.

THE year 1874 was a revolutionary period in politics. The revolutionary efforts so earnestly and fruitlessly made in 1872 gathered a liberal harvest in 1874, alike in city, State and nation. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Democrats elected a majority of the popular branch of Congress; the entire Republican State ticket was defeated in Pennsylvania, and Mann and Ashe, Republican candidates for district attorney and coroner in Philadelphia, were beaten in square contests by Democratic competitors. When the Greeley campaign failed so disastrously in 1872, it was generally assumed by the Republican leaders, and, indeed, confessed by many of the opposition, that only new conditions could organize a successful party to oppose the Republicans; but the reform seeds which had been strewn in 1872 gradually ripened, and brought many serious disasters to the Republicans.

It was a year of unusual political interest in Pennsyl-

vania, as one of the most desperate political struggles ever witnessed in Philadelphia was precipitated at the February election, when Mayor Stokley was nominated for a second term. Stokley was a man of unusually strong mental and physical force, generally clear in judgment, and scrupulously faithful to all his personal obligations in political life, and always exhibited a measure of courage that commanded the respect of friend and foe. As a member of select council he had championed the cause of a paid fire department when he was jeered and hissed from the lobby of the council chamber by volunteer firemen, and politicians, as a rule, feared to incur the displeasure of that powerful political and often riotous element. In politics he believed that all was fair that would obtain the desired result, but in all his official relations he never was accused of venality, even by his bitterest foes.

He was a man of unusually strong intellectual qualities, with little opportunity for their culture, and while his political record as mayor was often open to severe and just criticism, in the most serious trial in which the city had been placed for many years, in 1877, with its peace fearfully endangered, he proved to be pre-eminently equipped for his high official trust. He had long been ambitious to reach the office of mayor, but had met with repulse after repulse. The Union League on more than one occasion refused his fellowship, and a large portion of the business men of the city opposed his nomination for mayor because they felt that he was not of the type of men upon whom the highest honors of the city had been conferred, but Stokley was nothing if not heroic, and he persisted in his candidacy until 1871, when it was found necessary to accept him to avoid repetition of the Republican defeat of 1868, when Tyndale, Republican, was de-

feated by Mayor Fox, and he was elected by over 9,000 majority.

Stokley believed in party rule, and he was a severe partisan in every feature of his official acts as mayor of the city. His police force was made an organized political machine and subject to political assessments whenever needed, and all the power of the city government, so far as he had control, was directed to serve political interests. He was trained to that method of public and private action, and he never concealed his contempt for all who attempted to enforce non-partisan business methods in municipal administration. He would not participate in the profits of any corrupt abuse of municipal power, but when political interests were to be served by contracts to favorites at excessive cost, or when the pollution of the ballot was assumed by the party leaders to be a necessity to assure party success, his active or passive approval was always ready. He believed that the land belonged to the saints and that his party were the saints, and he was always ready to bend official power to promote political schemes which commanded his favor. Corruption ran riot in some of the important departments of the city, and it was often circumstantially and clearly exposed, though safe from executive reproof so long as it served political purposes, but with the general unrest that prevailed throughout the city, State and nation in the early part of 1874, it was only natural that there should be very formidable opposition to Stokley's re-election from influential men within his own political household.

The succeeding mayoralty term was to cover the Centennial period, and anxiety was felt by prominent business men to have a man of different type to welcome the officials and people of the world to our great Centennial Exposition, but Stokley was an accom-

plished master, and absolutely controlled the primary elections of his party. Earnestly as his renomination was opposed by many prominent Republicans, he was nominated for the Centennial term without serious opposition. The desire was general among that class to unite on a Citizens' ticket for the several municipal offices in co-operation with the Democratic organization, and at a conference held between prominent Democrats and prominent Reform Republicans just before the meeting of the Democratic City convention they were unanimous in demanding my nomination as Stokley's competitor. A committee of delegates from the Democratic convention called upon me on the morning before the body met, and informed me of their purpose to nominate me for mayor, and to accept me as the Citizens' candidate for that office. I told them that I could not entertain the question of accepting the nomination or the office, and that if nominated by the convention I would peremptorily decline. The strongest personal reasons forbade my acceptance of either the nomination or the office. I was bankrupt in property, having been made so by the destruction of Chambersburg during the war, and my private business interests demanded all my attention and care, while the hopelessly ill health of my wife made it impossible for us to accept the exacting social duties of the Centennial year.

The committee refused to accept my declination, and I then wrote a letter addressed to the president of the convention, stating that if nominated by the body I would certainly decline. This letter was handed to the committee with instructions to have it read in the convention. When the convention reached the question of nominating a candidate for mayor, the letter was read and the refusal to permit the use of my name was so emphatic that it was not presented to

the convention, and James S. Biddle, a gentleman of the highest character and accomplished attainments, was unanimously nominated.

I felt greatly relieved when, as I supposed, I was finally eliminated from the mayoralty contest. Clean and accomplished as was Mr. Biddle, the reform organization of the city failed to accept him, and nominated William E. Littleton, who was then president of select council, and had made an unusually clean record as a city legislator. This action was a serious disappointment to Mr. Biddle, and within a week or ten days he published a letter declining the Democratic nomination for mayor, and the Democratic convention was reconvened two days thereafter to select a successor. I was in Harrisburg attending to senatorial duties when the convention met, happy in the belief that I was no longer thought of as a candidate for mayor, and was greatly surprised to find that the Democratic convention had nominated me as the Citizens' candidate and adjourned without day. The same evening a call was issued signed by a number of leading Republicans for a Citizens' meeting in Horticultural Hall, to ratify my nomination as the Citizens' candidate for mayor. I was greatly distressed by this action of the convention and the Citizens' committee. I knew how desperate the contest would be, and however acceptable such a high honor from the people of Philadelphia would have been under ordinary conditions, the strongest business, personal and domestic reasons made me most anxious to escape the struggle. I returned from Harrisburg on Friday evening and met a number of personal friends in conference to whom the situation was frankly presented, but while they admitted that I had the best of reasons for seeking to avoid the contest, they insisted that it was no longer a matter of discretion with me, and that I must respond to the

call that had been made upon me. I reminded them that I had no money to expend in the contest, that on a salary of \$5,000 a year and no other property interests but debts, I certainly could not maintain the hospitality that was expected from the Centennial mayor, and one of the gentlemen present, the late Allison White, who was then a large coal operator residing in the city, stated that he was prepared to give the assurance on his own responsibility that within three days an ample fund would be subscribed to enable me to accept the position of Centennial mayor without apprehension of financial embarrassment, and before the three days expired he exhibited to me a paper signed by ten or twelve citizens of large means creating a fund of \$100,000 that was to be expended by a committee in renting and furnishing properly a house for the mayor and defraying all the expenses of maintaining it, and \$50,000 of the fund was to be appropriated for official entertainments during the Centennial season. Among the names signed to that paper with Mr. White's were those of J. Edgar Thompson, Thomas A. Scott, William Welsh, John P. Veree, and others.

Amos R. Little, a retired merchant of large means and great earnestness in the cause of reform, became chairman of the Citizens' committee to conduct the campaign, and by the time that the immense mass meeting was held in Horticultural Hall there seemed to be no choice for me but to accept the battle or lie down in front of a challenging foe. I well understood what such a contest meant. I knew the resources of the city administration, and well knew how unscrupulously and desperately those means were to be employed to the uttermost. I did not doubt that the battle could be won if the integrity of the ballot could be preserved, but unfortunately while we had a new election



William S. Stakley

law that imposed severe restraints upon many features of ballot frauds, the registry law election officers yet lingered. Although the law had been repealed by the supreme law of the State, the election officers elected the previous year remained and would perform their last duties under the registry law at the mayor's election of 1874, thus giving to every division of the city an election board, every member of which was chosen by the Republican party leaders, although a minority of the officers were nominally Democratic. In the districts where frauds could not be safely attempted, thoroughly reputable election boards were appointed, but in all the divisions where fraud was possible unscrupulous Republicans were chosen and either corrupt or utterly ignorant Democrats.

The election was just three weeks distant when I accepted the nomination, and certainly the most earnest campaign ever witnessed in Philadelphia was crowded into the brief period between that time and the election. Such Republicans as the venerable Horace Binney, who cast his last vote at that election; ex-Mayor Alexander Henry, William Henry Rawle, Henry Armitt Brown, E. Joy Morris, John W. Forney, William Welsh, John P. Veree, John J. Ridgway, Amos R. Little and many others, came to the front, and most of them along with such representative Democrats as George W. Biddle, Daniel Dougherty and others, were heard on the stump every night during the campaign. It was a battle royal from start to finish, and I spoke to from two to four large meetings every night. The popular wave of reform was unmistakable, and until within four days of the election, bets were freely offered at 100 to 80 on the defeat of Stokley.

In that contest I had opportunity to learn the ingenuity, the power and the desperation of the party organization that was leading the fight most aggres-

sively against us. Fortunately I had thoroughly reliable and courageous men even within the inner circle of the consultations of our opponents, and they never were permitted to surprise us by any of their many cleverly conceived plans to make a break in the tide that was against them. A captain of police, and one of the most intelligent and faithful officers of the body, had been my sincere friend for years, as I had once aided him in attaining a profitable position under Governor Curtin. He was as discreet as he was faithful to his friendships. He made an appointment to meet me at a place where notice was quite improbable, and frankly presented the situation to me, and the general orders under which the police were acting. I had publicly stated whenever the subject was referred to that if elected mayor no competent and faithful policeman would be removed for political or personal reasons.

He asked me to authorize him to give that assurance in the most positive manner to any of the policemen who might be employed to serve him in his desire to render service to me. A confidential council was held in the office of the mayor every day. What transpired there was made known to this captain of police, and when he had information that was important for me to have he had several faithful citizen friends who were entrusted with the mission from time to time, and I was thus kept fully advised of everything that was being done and with all the plans made for future political movements.

At one of these meetings an apparent countryman was brought in by one of the police who was unscrupulous in his efforts to serve the mayor, and the countryman told the story that he lived in Trenton, that he was a drover, that I had stopped in Trenton overnight a year or two before, engaged him and others in a

game of cards and had cheated him out of \$1,700. When I state that I had never stopped in Trenton in my life, the falsity of the story will be understood; but it was decided that an elaborate affidavit should be drawn setting forth my whole fraudulent operations as a card sharp and have it given to the newspapers on the following day. In the several speeches I delivered that evening I stated the fact that a man, giving his name, had been employed to sign such an affidavit; that it had been prepared and was to be given to the public on the following day, adding that I had never been in Trenton in my life excepting to pass through it in a train of cars. This premature publicity of the invented scandal made them abandon it, but when election day approached they found it necessary to do something to counteract the revolutionary feeling that prevailed throughout the city, and it was deliberately decided at a political council in the mayor's office that certain police officers who understood that sort of duty should be detailed to New York and others to Baltimore and furnished funds to bring to the city a few days before the election from fifty to one hundred toughs who were trained in all manner of ballot frauds, to scatter over the city, boisterously hurrah for McClure until Sunday or Monday before the election, when a number of them should be arrested by the police as professional repeaters and be let off when confessing that they had come to repeat for me, but would abandon the project and go home. Within two hours after that was decided upon in the office of the mayor, I was fully informed of it, and that night in several speeches the whole programme was given in detail, with the names of the policemen who had been chosen at the council to perform the duty. As the whole scheme was so circumstantially given, it was impossible for them to attempt the execution of the programme. These an-

nouncements naturally caused serious trouble in the mayor's confidential council. Somebody was evidently talking out of school and suspicion was so clearly directed against two gentlemen present, who, while very sincerely and heartily supporting Stokley, were known to be in friendly personal relations with me, that they retired from further political conferences at the mayor's office.

The week before the election the party leaders saw that unless the tidal wave that was running against them could be halted in some way they were inevitably defeated, and they sent for Quay and Mackey, then the two ablest party leaders of the State. I had then, and always had before and since during their lives, close personal friendly relations with both of them, although often compelled to lock horns with them in political conflicts. My relations with Quay were more than friendly, indeed they had been relations of close intimacy regardless of political struggles. Quay's first act when he came to Philadelphia was to invite me to dine with him alone, and I promptly accepted. At the dinner the whole general conditions of State and city were discussed in the frankest way, and he said that the most unpleasant duty he had ever been called upon to perform was the mission that he was then on in the city to defeat my election as mayor. I suggested to him that he might as well let municipal affairs alone and look after his State, but Quay's answer was: "If you're elected, where the hell will we be?" I told him that my election might seriously interfere with some of their political movements in Philadelphia, but I insisted that it would be well for the leaders of the party, and certainly for the party, to adopt methods for its direction that could not be endangered by any honest municipal power, but the suggestion was not received by Quay with any degree of enthusiasm, and

after a pleasant dinner and chat we separated, he repeating the expression that he was very sorry that it was necessary for them to accomplish my defeat.

Enormous sums of money were collected from the police and city officials, with large contributions demanded from business men actively in politics, as the campaign became fearfully expensive. Money was lavishly squandered by the party leaders in every section of the city, where it was believed that money could accomplish political results, while the chief expense on our side was the employment of a detective force, and perfecting and maintaining complete organizations in every division of the city. By the united action of the Democrats and the Citizens, there was no lack of money in support of our cause. One prominent citizen, whose official position was such that he could not afford to be suspected of contributing to the Citizens' cause, sent a friend to me to say that he desired to purchase \$10,000 worth of certain bonds which he knew were in my possession, and which were then entirely valueless and without the prospect of value, adding that if I would deliver them to the person a fair price would be paid for them. I sent the bonds, and the man brought back to me a sealed envelope containing ten \$1,000 bills. The cost of organizing the entire city, obtaining detectives and manning every poll with the proper window men was about \$30,000, all of which was contributed by a small circle of citizens.

On Friday night before the election, when bets were made every evening in the Continental Hotel, usually at 100 to 80 in favor of my election, I received a message to go to a particular room in a private house. I immediately obeyed the summons, and at the place stated met a local party leader, who had repeatedly given me important information, was thoroughly up

in all that was being done, and in whose fidelity I had absolute confidence. He said that he had sent for me to advise me to go and stop at once all betting on my election; that to-morrow bets would be freely offered even on my defeat by 10,000 majority, and that all such bets would be won by my opponents. He told me that it mattered not what vote was cast, I would certainly be returned as defeated by over 10,000. I inquired whether it was to be done chiefly by repeaters, to which he answered that he could not explain how it was to be done, adding, however, that the few thousand votes put in by repeaters would not affect the result. On the contrary, he said that little repeating would be done; that the election would be unusually quiet; that there would be no attempt to rough voters at the polls, but that the result was absolutely predetermined, and that the majority would be over 10,000. I could not doubt the correctness of the information given me, and hastened at once to stop all betting on the election as far as could be accomplished, and the result was just as foreshadowed by my friend.

The election was unusually quiet, and my friends believed the victory clearly won because of the absence of desperate and violent methods at the polls, but the official returns gave 10,985 against me. It was not until a year later that I discovered how the count had been accomplished. The ballot boxes of the city were then in the custody of the city authorities, and an extra box was sent out to the divisions which could be safely manipulated containing a given number of tickets for mayor. Some one and perhaps more of the election officers understood what the box meant, how many tickets were in it, and it was only necessary to substitute that box for the one in which the tickets had been received during the first half or more of the day, and either add or take from it before substituting the

number of tickets necessary to make it correspond with the poll list. There were watchers at the polls, but the elections were conducted with such apparent fairness, such an absence of repeaters and attempts to rough voters, that long before the day was over every watcher was entirely satisfied that his division was square, and all that was necessary was to watch an opportunity when he was off guard to change the box. No one ever informed me that the ballot boxes had been thus stuffed and exchanged, but the man who gave me the information before the election that was fully verified by the returns often spoke of the matter when we met in a casual way, but never would explain how it had been done. On one occasion I pressed him with unusual earnestness to explain to me for my own satisfaction how the fraud had been perpetrated, and he answered by saying that he couldn't tell what had been done, or how it had been done, but added that if he had been called upon to meet such an emergency he would have done it in the manner before described. Thus ended the most desperate struggle ever made in the city of Philadelphia for its highest trust. On the ticket with me were Charles Henry Jones for city solicitor, and Mr. Peirce, of Peirce's Business College, for city treasurer, both of whom received the same blow and fell in the race.

LXXXV.

BATTLE FOR THE GREAT EXPOSITION.

Party Leaders Made the Issue of the Republican Centennial Mayor the Prominent One in the Contest—Democrats in the Legislature Provoked to Hostile Action against the Centennial Appropriation—A Direct Appropriation Impossible—How an Apparent Appropriation of a Million Dollars Had Been Passed in 1873—The Desperate Struggle to Obtain the Million Dollars Needed—Finally Saved by the Positive Intervention of Colonel Scott—The Financial Revolution Keenly Felt and Private Subscriptions Retarded.

IT WILL doubtless surprise most of the intelligent citizens at the present time when it is stated that it required a very desperate struggle, with a large measure of legislative diplomacy, to obtain an appropriation from the State for the Centennial Exposition. When the session of 1873 opened the Centennial Exposition was only three years distant, and it was an absolute necessity that Pennsylvania should contribute at least \$1,000,000, with quite half that amount from the city municipality, to assure the success of the great enterprise. John Welsh, probably the most influential private citizen of Philadelphia, and one of the ripest of our business men, was placed at the head of the Centennial enterprise, and he informed me before the opening of the session of 1873 that an appropriation of a million dollars must be obtained from the State to make the Exposition in any way creditable to the city.

Strange as it may seem, there was little enthusiasm over the Exposition throughout the State, and when the Legislature met I was appalled at the positive hostility to a large appropriation in both branches, and

nearly equal in both the great political parties. After thorough conference with fellow senators and the leaders of the house, it was clearly evident that an appropriation exceeding \$250,000 could not be passed in either branch. Mr. Welsh spent several days at Harrisburg with me, and personally understood the situation. He returned to the city in a condition bordering on despair. The necessity was imperative for favorable legislation promising at least a million dollars, and it was absolutely impossible to obtain that by any direct method. Finally, without consulting anyone, I framed a bill, the first section of which made a direct appropriation of \$1,000,000 to the Centennial Exposition, but it was followed by various provisos. One required that a special Centennial fund should be created for the State treasury by taxes levied for the special purpose to cover the full appropriation; another required the city of Philadelphia to make an appropriation of \$500,000 to the Exposition, and another fixed the limit of \$250,000 as the appropriation from the State, in case a special Centennial fund should not be provided by special taxes. It was most important to obtain a direct appropriation of a million dollars from the State in the first section of the bill, as it made a landmark for further legislation in the event of the failure of the conditions attached.

Another section of the bill provided for a special tax of three per cent. upon the gross receipts of the passenger railways of Philadelphia, to be paid into the treasury and to constitute the Centennial fund, out of which the million appropriation should be paid. Such a special tax was certainly of doubtful constitutionality, but it was a very good foil to disarm a considerable element of opposition to the bill. Another section of the bill provided that the \$1,000,000 appropriated by the State, and the \$500,000 to be appropriated by the

city, should be expended on a memorial hall, to be erected in a suitable place in the park and to remain after the Centennial ended as a permanent place for the display of the industrial and artistic products of the Commonwealth. A number of the most distinguished business men of the State, headed by ex-Governor Bigler and Ario Pardee, were named as supervisors to construct this building in accord with the Centennial authorities, and supervise the expenditure of the money appropriated by the city and State.

Knowing that the weak point was its special tax on the gross receipts of the city railways, the bill was first submitted to William H. Kemble, who was then the master street railway man of the city, and who practically dictated the general policy of that important interest. The street railways were greatly interested in the success of the Exposition, as it meant a rich harvest for them, and Kemble promptly agreed not only not to oppose the bill, but to favor its passage as the only way by which an appropriation or an apparent appropriation could be obtained. He laughed at the idea of forcing the street railways to pay special taxes, and said they were prepared to meet that question when it came. Kemble heartily co-operated in the support of the measure, and his action doubtless induced many legislators to favor the bill, believing that the city passenger railways would pay the entire \$1,000,000 appropriation. The bill was also submitted to Colonel Scott, without whose cordial support it could not have been passed. When he learned that Kemble was entirely willing to support it he said that Kemble understood his business, as the city railways were not in any serious danger of special taxation, and the result was that the bill passed both branches in a very brief period and was approved by the Governor. While in point of fact the bill simply assured an actual appropriation

of \$250,000, it was generally believed that at the next session any necessary amendments could be accomplished to assure the full \$1,000,000 from the State in some way, and the city authorities hastened to make a positive appropriation of \$500,000, to be expended on the special State and city building in accordance with the act of Assembly.

When the Legislature met in 1874 there were very confused political conditions, and the Philadelphia mayoralty contest added greatly to partisan disturbance on the Centennial issue. The supporters of Stokley appealed to the people at every mass meeting to elect a Republican mayor for the safety of the Centennial, as the entire State and National authorities were Republican, and the success of the Exposition would be greatly impaired by my election. This was not simply an incidental issue of the contest, but it was made the main issue, and when Stokley was returned as re-elected the Democrats generally were not only very greatly chilled in their support of the Exposition, but absolutely driven into open opposition. No movement had been made in the Legislature until after the mayoralty contest was over to revise the bill making a State appropriation to the Centennial, and when I returned to the senate, after three weeks of campaigning, I found every Democrat in the senate provoked to positive hostility to any further appropriation to the Exposition, while the Republicans were nearly evenly divided for and against it.

My position in the senate was one of peculiar delicacy and responsibility. If I failed to secure the direct appropriation of a million dollars from a body that was then certainly two-thirds hostile to it, it would have been impossible to escape the accusation that political disappointment had made me indifferent to the success of the Centennial and false to senatorial

duties. There were a number of unusually able Democrats in the body at the time, including Wallace, Dill, Yerkes, and others, and the closest friendly relations existed between us, while on the other side were men like Strang, Cooper and Rutan, who were equally friendly, personally, and all of them broad gauge, liberal men. The first move made was a conference with the leading Democratic senators, to whom the situation was frankly presented in confidence and the position in which I would be placed if the appropriation failed, however faithfully and wisely I had supported it. They held the matter under advisement for some time and finally agreed that they would support the measure chiefly as a matter of justice to myself. It was generally accepted at the time that the proposed special tax on the gross receipts of the passenger railways could not be enforced and that there was practically no special Centennial fund to be in the treasury by the bill enacted the previous year. It was necessary, therefore, to make the appropriation of a million dollars direct to the Exposition, but the shock of such a drain upon the treasury was somewhat tempered by providing that it should be paid in three payments, the last to be made on the 4th of July, 1876.

Elliott, of Philadelphia, was speaker of the house, and greatly interested in the Centennial appropriation. He was a man of unusual force and rendered a most important service in bringing the house into the support of the measure, but with all the combined power that could be brought to favor the bill at Harrisburg, it was found that we lacked a majority of votes in both house and senate. We struggled along for several weeks, and found it impossible to marshal a majority in support of the Centennial. S. S. Moon had long been the personal representative of Colonel Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, at Harrisburg, and was, of

course, earnestly co-operating with the friends of the measure. He understood the situation better than anybody else. He not only knew who were for it and who against it, but he also knew who might be obtained for it if imperious necessity demanded unusually persuasive methods. We went together to Colonel Scott, and presented the actual condition at Harrisburg, disclosing the fact that unless special and important support could be brought to favor the appropriation, it must certainly fail. Scott's final orders were in about these words: "Well, Moon, see that the bill is passed; the Centennial must be made a great success." In the then existing conditions at Harrisburg that order from Colonel Scott meant the success of the bill, but the opposition fought tirelessly and desperately, and it was not until the early part of May that the bill making a clean appropriation of one million to the Centennial was finally enacted.

The opposition managed very adroitly to amend the original bill and bring the two houses in conflict, resulting in a committee of conference that finally reported to both branches the bill as it was enacted. It was in the closing days of the session, when prompt action was necessary. Just when the measure was called up for final action in the senate, and some member of the body was delivering an argument against it, a page brought me a message from Moon, stating that our lines were broken, and that a vote must not be permitted until he gave a signal from some position in the chamber where I could see him distinctly, by dropping his handkerchief on the floor in an apparently accidental way. The debate continued for half an hour or more, when no one seemed desirous to continue it, and a vote would have been precipitated had not the debate been renewed. Having had no signal from Moon, I was compelled to take the floor and to speak in support of

the measure until his handkerchief was seen to drop. It was not necessary to watch Moon, as he would certainly be somewhere in plain view when he could give the signal, and I was compelled to speak just forty-three minutes, when his welcome presence appeared at a window in clear view, and he immediately drew a white handkerchief from his pocket, and, after wiping his face, dropped it on the floor. The speech was suddenly rounded out, and a vote taken resulting in the final passage of the bill. Where or how our line had been broken, or how it was repaired, was never inquired into, but Moon saved the Centennial appropriation.

The financial revulsion that culminated three years later in an eruption of anarchy throughout the entire country, had its beginning in 1873 by the failure of the great banking house of Jay Cooke & Co. It was not the failure of that house that caused the revulsion, for if it had been able to maintain itself the revulsion would have been precipitated by some other failure at an early day. Jay Cooke had no apprehension of failure until the day that he was compelled to close the doors of his banking house. I saw him in his office the day before the suspension merry as a cricket. He was one of the most genial and delightful of men, always looking on the bright side, and within twenty-four hours of his failure he spoke most hopefully of business and financial conditions generally. He had undertaken to finance the Northern Pacific Railway, and when the excessive tide of inflation caused by the war, and the immense volume of currency, worth from 60 to 70 cents on the dollar, began its ebb, it was gradual, but steady, in pinching all who were involved in financial operations, and especially the debtor class. Probably at no period in the history of the country were the people so largely in debt as they were in 1873. The high prices of agricultural products made farmers increase

their lands at enormous prices, and when liquidation came many of them found that their assets would not realize over fifty cents on the dollar. When the revulsion began in 1873 the impression was very general that it was only a temporary break in the general tide of prosperity, but thoughtful business men understood the conditions better. They knew that the people were very largely in debt, and many of them unable to pay their obligations, which would stand unchanged in amount against them while their assets would be greatly diminished in value. The restrictive condition was sensibly felt in 1874, and it increased as liquidation continued through 1875-6, and culminated in the most violent financial and industrial eruption in 1877.

The country has never appreciated the colossal service rendered to the government during the Civil War by Jay Cooke. He was a young banker, and had not been brought up in the severe banking environment that obtained in the Eastern cities. When the financial circles had practically ceased to accept the loans of the government Jay Cooke had the courage and possessed the ability to teach the people their opportunities and their prerogatives as the sovereign power of the Republic. He made his appeal to the homes of the land; not to the rich, but to all classes and conditions, and taught them that it was their own government they were called upon to save, and that their loans were substantially loans to themselves. His new financial methods were a revelation to the old-time bankers, and they were astounded at the success achieved by the sale of the loans to the masses of the people by new methods created by the masterly genius of the young Ohio banker. From the time that he made his first successful sale of a government loan to the people, the problem of National credit was solved, and solved by Jay Cooke. Thereafter the

government could command all the loans needed for the prosecution of the war, and the financial success of the administration, in the face of most appalling difficulties, was due to the rare financial genius and tireless energy of Jay Cooke.

Private subscriptions to the Centennial were largely restricted by the new financial conditions of 1874-75-76, and the fact that the revulsion was felt throughout the entire State greatly increased the difficulty in obtaining a million appropriation from the Legislature in aid of the Centennial. John Welsh, who was the financial manager of the Exposition, had a most responsible and laborious task, but he was a man always dominated by his public spirit in support of the advancement of the city, and he labored night and day, but even with the State and city appropriations he barely escaped financial failure. Public meetings were held throughout the city which were addressed by the ablest of our orators to inspire the people to contribute to the support of the Exposition, and committees were appointed to visit and personally solicit subscriptions. The importunities were not confined to people of wealth, but all classes and conditions were visited and urged to contribute according to their means, however small.

It was then believed that the Exposition could take in sufficient money to pay all the expenses and fully reimburse the subscribers, but the appropriation made by Congress unfortunately embraced the clause making the government a preferred creditor, and as the receipts fell far below what was originally expected, the individual subscriptions were nearly or quite a total loss. There was very general business and industrial depression during the Centennial year of 1876, and it was very severely felt in the receipts. Scores of thousands throughout the country who would have visited the Exposition if the War tidal wave of prosperity had not



John Welsh

been checked were compelled to forego the pleasure of personally celebrating the Centennial of the natal day of the Republic, but the general management of the enterprise made exhaustive and well-considered efforts to bring the largest possible attendance. John Welsh, by his patriotic devotion and tireless efforts to promote the Exposition, rendered a service to the city and State, that was known only to the few who aided him in his exacting labors, and has never been justly appreciated.

The politicians, as a rule, did little in aid of the Exposition enterprise. Democratic leaders in both city and State were disgusted by the partisan slough into which the contest for the Centennial mayor had been plunged by the Philadelphia leaders, and the very men who had thus alienated a large element of contributors, when they had won out at the February election, allowed the Exposition to take care of itself, as they had more than enough on hand to keep their political fences in reasonable repair. The subscriptions from business men throughout the State were not ten per cent. of what they should have been under ordinary good conditions, and the contributions were as a rule secured only by personal visit and solicitation. Had the business conditions of 1874-75 been as favorable as they were prior to the beginning of the revulsion of 1873, and had there been no political complications to chill the ardor of the Democrats, fully a million dollars more could have been obtained by the Exposition management, and with less than half the labor required to obtain the amount actually received.

It was most fortunate that the Centennial was not delayed a year later. Had 1877 embraced the Centennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence the Exposition would have been a colossal failure. Labor strikes prevailed throughout the country from the eastern to the western sea; labor was largely unem-

ployed and poorly requited when employment was given, and finally a period of actual starvation was reached, and an eruption of anarchy engulfed all the great industrial centers of the land. Even the great trunk railways were in possession of the mob, and trains ran only as the mob dictated. Governor Hartranft was on a visit to the Pacific coast when the eruption came, and when he started to come home to make an earnest effort to maintain the peace of his great State, he found that he could travel only by permission of anarchy. The leaders of the revolutionists were wise enough, however, to recognize the necessity of giving the Governor of Pennsylvania a clear passage to his capital, and when both commerce and travel were interrupted almost to a standstill the train bearing the Governor to Harrisburg was handled with special care, and every facility afforded for his speedy and safe return to his official duties. In Philadelphia the Pennsylvania Railroad for some days could not send a locomotive out of its depot, and the bravest men were appalled at the possible mastery of anarchy. Had the Centennial Exposition struck such a year the receipts would not have paid operating expenses.

LXXXVI.

WALLACE ELECTED U. S. SENATOR.

Republicans Lose the State at the First Election under the New Constitution—Wallace Carefully Organized the Democrats, and had a Large Majority of Friends in the Legislature—Nominated for United States Senator with But Few Dissenting Votes—Buckalew Hostile to Wallace, and Controlled Enough Votes to Defeat Him—Buckalew's Attempt to Deal with Mackey—Mackey Saves Wallace.

NOTWITHSTANDING the triumph of the Republican leaders in the Philadelphia mayoralty contest of 1874, the political conditions of both city and State were very unpromising for the Republicans. The registry law election officers had been entirely supplanted at the February election, and the usual methods of controlling majorities in Philadelphia could no longer be employed. A new political factor had gradually developed in the city until it finally became a fearful millstone on the neck of the Republican organization. It was known as the Pilgrim Club, organized ostensibly as a social club, but it was soon discovered that the membership had been carefully chosen, and that it embraced a number of prominent Republicans and a lesser number of prominent Democrats who acted unitedly in Philadelphia politics.

Colonel Mann was one of the prominent Republican members, and Lewis C. Cassidy was one of the prominent Democratic members, and with Cassidy were Samuel Josephs, Senator Cochrane, son-in-law to Cassidy, and other Democrats who were ready to co-operate with the Pilgrim organization either for or against their own respective parties, if power or profit

could thereby be attained. It made Cassidy, Josephs, Cochrane and all the other Democratic members of the club ardently support Stokley in the contest for mayor, and it became so aggressive that it finally assumed to dictate the nominations of both parties. General Bingham, a member of the Pilgrim Club, was nominated for clerk of the quarter sessions in 1875, but the hostility aroused against the variegated political masters of the club made the Union League rebel, and by the vote of its own members it rejected Bingham as a candidate after his nomination had been made, and he narrowly escaped defeat. In the contest of 1874 this peculiar organization alienated many of the more intelligent Republicans from the dominant power of the party, and throughout the State the Republican organization lacked vitality.

There was an unusually large State ticket to be elected, including two additional supreme judges added to that court by the new Constitution, but the people were allowed to vote for only one candidate for judge, thus assuring the election of the Republican and Democratic candidates, regardless of the success of either party in the State. The Republican convention, that was practically controlled by State Treasurer Mackey, with Quay, then secretary of the commonwealth, as a close second, nominated Judge Paxson, of Philadelphia, for the supreme bench, with Senator Olmsted of Potter, for lieutenant governor, Senator Allen, of Warren, for auditor general, and General Beath, of Philadelphia, for secretary of internal affairs. The ticket was a very creditable one, as Olmsted was one of the ablest and most respected of the prominent legislators of the State, while Allen had served creditably in both branches, and Beath was one of our most gallant soldiers. Paxson had long been on the common pleas bench of Philadelphia, and was recognized as

one of the foremost of our Philadelphia jurists. The Democrats nominated Senator Latta, of Westmoreland, for lieutenant governor, Justus F. Temple, a Greene County farmer, for auditor general, General McCandless, of Philadelphia, for secretary of internal affairs, and Warren J. Woodward, of Berks, for the supreme court.

In Philadelphia the important city offices of district attorney and coroner were to be filled, and Colonel Mann was nominated to succeed himself as district attorney, and Representative Ashe was nominated for coroner. The local candidates were both members of the Pilgrim Club, and they were presented by their opponents in every section of the city as the Pilgrim candidates. Furman Sheppard, who had been defeated by Mann three years before, was again nominated as Mann's competitor, and Dr. Goddard was made the Democratic candidate for coroner.

Mackey, who had won out the year before by his majority in Philadelphia, as he came to the city with fifty-nine votes against him, did not believe it possible that the Democrats could carry the State, as he believed that the congressional year, with an unusually important State ticket, would call out a much larger Republican vote than he had received in 1873. The new Legislature to be chosen was the first to conform to the new constitutional provision enlarging the senate from thirty to fifty, and the house to about two hundred. A United States Senator was to be chosen by the Legislature, and Mackey gave special attention to the Legislative districts, but Senator Wallace, altogether the ablest of the Democratic organizers of his day, saw the opportunity to carry the Legislature and thus win the United States Senatorship for himself. He devoted himself and his well-organized body of very devoted friends to the single duty of looking after the

Legislative districts, and as the political tide proved to be in his favor, he won out handsomely, carrying nine Democratic majority on joint ballot. Mackey found his majorities for the State ticket very generally lessened, and the Democratic candidates came to the city of Philadelphia with nearly 18,000 majority. Philadelphia gave a little over 13,000 for the State ticket, thus enabling the State Democratic candidates to win out by over 4,000 majority. Judge Paxson had a majority against him with his comrades on the State ticket, but he was saved as the minority member of the supreme judges.

Not only did the Republicans lose their entire State ticket and the majority in the Legislature, but they suffered severely from a loss of Congressmen. The delegation elected two years before contained five Democrats and twenty-two Republicans, while the delegation elected in 1874 contained seventeen Democrats and ten Republicans. Harmer was beaten in the Fifth district, in Philadelphia; Laporte was defeated by Powell, in the Bradford district; Blair was defeated by Riley, in the Blair district; Stenger defeated Wistar, in the Franklin district; Hopkins defeated Negley, in one of the Allegheny districts, and Cochrane defeated Bayne in the other; Jenks defeated Harry White in the Armstrong district, and Egbert defeated Curtis in the Erie district. It was a Republican Waterloo, and was a most marvelous political achievement considering that the victorious party was beaten in the State only two years before by nearly 140,000 majority.

The term of John Scott was about to expire in the Senate. He had made an unusually creditable record as Senator. While always recognizing just obligations to party interests, he was not subject to orders from party leaders. Had the Legislature been Republican, he would not have been re-elected, as they wanted and

greatly needed a much more flexible type of Senator. Mackey and Quay decided that, as a Republican could not be elected, the only thing they could do was to punish Scott for having been a faithful Senator, and they refused him a renomination, which was only an empty honor, beyond an expression of appreciation of his Senatorial record. While he cared little for the office, and was probably more than willing to retire, he and his friends were greatly mortified at the Machine whip that was plied upon him to make him retire from the Senate without even the empty nomination of his party. In order to emphasize the lesson, Quay selected John Allison, an ex-Congressman from his own town, to whom the party nomination for Senator was awarded.

When Scott retired from the Senate he was soon made the general solicitor of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and continued in that responsible position until his death. No man in the public service left a cleaner record than did John Scott.

As Wallace had given his personal attention to the nomination and election of Democratic senators and representatives, an overwhelming majority of the Democratic legislators were in favor of him for United States Senator, and in the Democratic caucus he was nominated by more than a three-fourths vote, but some half dozen of the Democrats were devoted followers of Buckalew, and Buckalew was earnestly disposed to resent the humiliation put upon him by Wallace, when Buckalew's term in the Senate had ended. Instead of according to Buckalew the empty compliment of a nomination, Wallace took it himself, intending it to be an intimation to the Democrats of the State of his purpose to contest for that honor in the future. Buckalew felt very keenly the slight that was put upon him, and some of his friends were ready for revolutionary action against Wallace. I was at Harris-

burg when the contest was on and witnessed the inner movements on both sides. Buckalew was implacable in his opposition to Wallace, and believed that he had the power to defeat him. He had more than enough Democratic votes ready to follow him to prevent the election of Wallace, but he knew that a deadlock would be very odious, and he at once sought to make terms with Mackey and Quay.

Buckalew's proposition to them was that he would allow them to name a clean Democratic candidate for United States Senator, to whom the entire Republican vote should be given, and Buckalew would give him enough Democrat votes to assure his election, but Buckalew with all his great ability had little knowledge of the inner circles of Pennsylvania politics. He might just as well have gone to Wallace himself to propose a deal as to go to Mackey and Quay, as they were friendly to Wallace, and they meant that if any Democrat was elected it must be Wallace. Buckalew had several conferences with Mackey and Quay and they held the matter under advisement, until the morning of the day when the vote was to be taken for Senator, they surprised Buckalew by notifying him that they would not take the responsibility to choose between Democrats for the position of Senator, but proposed that they would cast the entire Republican vote for any Republican that Buckalew might name, if Buckalew would join to secure his election. Buckalew then saw that he was really in the Wallace camp when conferring with Mackey and Quay, as between Democrats the Republicans could readily excuse themselves for choosing the man they preferred, and that man would certainly have been Wallace, who had many personal friends in both branches of the Legislature independent of his close relations with the Republican leaders. Wallace, of course, was fully advised from time to time



William A. Wallace

by messengers from Mackey and Quay of what transpired between them and Buckalew and was entirely confident that the Republican leaders would in some way end the contest in his favor.

When Mackey made the proposition to Buckalew to elect any Republican Senator that Buckalew might name and gave that as his ultimatum, Buckalew suddenly abandoned the fight, and sent word directly to Wallace that the Buckalew Democrats would vote for him. I was in Wallace's room at the Bolton House when the Buckalew message was received by Wallace. The fight was thus ended, as Wallace was elected in the joint convention, practically without a struggle, and Buckalew retired rather more disgusted with the play that Mackey and Quay had made upon him than because of the success of Wallace, and he never thereafter attempted to make himself felt as a factor in State politics. He was later twice elected to Congress, but rounded out a career of rare distinction and usefulness by a humiliating defeat for another term in Congress, in the strongest Democratic district in the State outside of Berks. He struck the fearful revolutionary tide of 1884, when the State voted nearly two to one Republican.

Wallace was the last Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania, and the Legislature that elected him was the last Pennsylvania Legislature with a Democratic majority on joint ballot. Even in the revolutionary sweep of 1877, when the Democrats elected their State ticket by a larger majority than they attained in 1874, they failed to carry a majority of the Legislature. Thus for thirty years the Pennsylvania Legislature has been uniformly Republican. When Wallace resigned his seat in the State senate to assume his Senatorial duties at Washington, Dr. Boyer, of Clearfield, who had been involved in the Senatorial scandal when Buckalew

defeated Cameron in 1863, was elected to serve Wallace's unexpired term.

When Wallace became United States Senator he rapidly developed as a political organizer of the Senate, and in a very short time was formally recognized as the Democratic manager of the body. He was a most adroit politician, and as able in shaping the party policy in the United States Senate as he was in organizing his party forces in the State, and he regarded his nomination and election to the Presidency as altogether within the range of possibility. That was Wallace's chief error, as from the time he became a candidate for President he greatly impaired his own powers as a party leader. Randall had been in the House for a dozen years, and was a candidate for speaker when Wallace became Senator. Instead of heartily supporting Randall, as was his true policy, he assumed that it would endanger his own prospects if Randall became speaker of the House, as he knew that Randall looked to the Presidency as a possible achievement. Wallace threw himself openly and aggressively into the fight against Randall, and was successful in defeating him by the nomination of Ker, of Indiana. Ker was elected, but died within a year, and Randall then became speaker without a serious contest. Wallace saw that Randall could not be defeated, and permitted the nomination to go by default.

That was the beginning of an estrangement between Wallace and Randall that continued as long as they were actively in politics. I cannot recall a single political movement in the State thereafter in which they cordially co-operated, and Wallace's last battle was fought at Scranton for the nomination for Governor only a few months after Randall's death. New forces and new conditions had arisen such as confront every political leader after the long exercise of power,

and he was defeated by a convention in which a majority of the delegates were of Wallace's old-time following, but the granger element had become very aggressive, and the "hayseed" influence dominated the convention, and made Wallace an impossible candidate. Soon thereafter his financial failure was announced, resulting from heavy investments made in timber lands and other Western property, most of which became valuable after some years, but not in time to save Wallace from bankruptcy. The last few years of his life he spent chiefly in New York city, struggling from day to day to hold his property and rescue himself from his serious financial troubles. His political power, once so omnipotent in the State, had entirely passed away, fickle fortune had deserted him, and after a long and wearing struggle to retrieve his condition, the silver cord was loosed by fretting anxiety and the once great leader was borne to the City of the Silent at his mountain home.

The defeat of the Republican State ticket, and the loss of Republican control in the Legislature were appalling results to Mackey and Quay, and when they looked over the other States they found little to encourage them. Governor Hartranft would come up for re-election the following year, and they appreciated the necessity for most extraordinary efforts to restore Republican supremacy in the State. The elections of 1874 were a regular Democratic tidal wave, as they elected Democratic Governors in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut; the Democratic Governor in New York by over 50,000, and Governor Beadle, Democrat, was elected by a large majority in New Jersey. Ohio had elected a Democratic Governor the year before, and elected the Democratic State ticket that year by an increased majority. Indiana had also given a large Democratic majority, and the

Republicans elected a State officer in Illinois only by division among the Democrats. The Democrats elected a large majority of the popular branch of Congress for the first time since the beginning of the Civil War, and Mackey and Quay fully appreciated the serious political conditions which confronted them.

They at once directed their efforts to making a complete organization throughout the State for the re-election of Governor Hartranft, and it was carried to the extent of a positive contract made with the leaders of the Molly Maguires in Schuylkill County, by which the protection of the Governor was promised them if they would support the Republican ticket.

It is due to Governor Hartranft to say that he had no knowledge of this compact at the time, and did not know of it until some time after his re-election, if he ever knew of it, when Jack Kehoe, who had made the contract on the part of the Molly Maguires, had been convicted of murder in the first degree along with a number of his associates, and was in prison awaiting the death warrant of the Governor. Exhaustive efforts were made on the part of Mackey and others to save the life of Kehoe, but Hartranft yielded to these importunities only to the extent of delaying the execution for an unusual period. The political compact with the Molly Maguires had been publicly discussed during the campaign, and the delay in the execution of Kehoe finally brought out the most emphatic demand, not only from the Democratic journals of the State, but from many of the leading Republican organs, for the prompt issue of the death warrant. Whether Hartranft was ever advised of the compact that had been made for the protection of Kehoe and others is now uncertain, but it is safe to assume that, however he may have temporized the delay, he was incapable of such a flagrant disregard of his official duty as to

protect the lives of men who had in cold blood deliberately planned and executed many murders without provocation. It was expected that Kehoe would make a statement when he appeared on the fatal platform for execution, but he understood the situation, and the men who had made the compact with him were delighted to be able to say that he died game.

Mackey and Quay were tireless in their efforts to rehabilitate the party organization to enable it to win the following year by the re-election of Hartranft and to regain the control of the Legislature. They took every legislative district in hand, gave personal attention to the nomination of candidates wherever a contest was probable, contributed freely to aid in the nomination of available men, and in doubtful districts money was liberally supplied to aid the Republican nominees. Live party organizations were made in every election district in the State, and long before the campaign opened, or the State nominations were made, and the result was that by the time the State convention met they had the party in the best possible shape, and recovered the State by a small majority with the control of both branches of the Legislature. It was the work of these two men at the opening of the year 1875 that made the re-election of Hartranft possible. They were working day and night when the Democratic leaders were at rest, and it was organization alone that saved Governor Hartranft in the contest of 1875.

LXXXVII.

THE PHILADELPHIA "TIMES."

The Author First Purchased the Press from Colonel Forney—Contract Revoked—How the Times Was Founded—Personal Friends Take a Fourth Interest for the Author—Collins Gives Instructions to the Editor—Final Success of the Newspaper—How the Original Partners Protected Collins in His Misfortune—Independent Journalism a Surprise to Philadelphia—Liberal Return to the Stockholders of the Newspaper—Personal Relations of the Author with Political Leaders.

THE year 1875 dated a very important and far-reaching revolution in Philadelphia journalism. The long-maintained rule of political Machine leaders in Philadelphia, with the vast patronage they possessed for the newspapers, which they steadily increased by legislation, and the prompt convictions and severe punishment for libel, had gradually stripped Philadelphia journalism of the essential attribute of manly independence. The "Ledger" was beyond the control of political power, but it was severely neutral, and maintained its wonderful prosperity by rarely giving offense. Political leaders did not hesitate to proclaim their general mastery over the newspapers of the city, and it was not uncommon for them to call upon editors, dictate a policy, and openly declare to their associates that the newspaper was "fixed."

Colonel Forney had quickened Philadelphia journalism in some measure by the advent of "The Press" in 1857, and the heroic and masterly battle he fought against the policy of the Buchanan administration, but after his great work was accomplished, and he

became the recipient of official favors, the aggressive independence of the paper gradually lessened until it was finally classed with the dependent organs. The repeated struggles in the city, started by the senatorial contest of 1872, and culminating in the mayoralty contest of 1874, created a profound reform sentiment, not only throughout the city, but generally throughout the State, as was clearly exhibited by the defeat of the entire Republican State and city ticket in 1874. There was no public journal in Philadelphia to give expression to the reform sentiment and organize it to effective action. Colonel Forney was then in Europe, and his great newspaper had steadily gravitated downward until it had little influence and as little profit.

Without consulting any one but Governor Curtin, I decided to make a proposition to Forney for the purchase of "The Press," and wrote out an agreement of sale whereby he would have received \$300,000 for the machinery, fixtures and good will of the paper. By the terms of the agreement he would have received \$160,000 in cash and \$140,000 in six per cent. preferred stock, and the purchaser to take common stock to the amount of cash actually paid. In addition, a permanent rental of the rooms occupied in "The Press" building was made at \$10,000 a year, and Forney was to be permanently employed as contributing editor at \$100 a week. The agreement was transmitted to Forney in London, and after cabling for and receiving explanations of one or two features of the agreement, he signed the contract of sale that already had my signature, mailed it to me from London, and cabled authority to take possession of the newspaper property. No one was advised of these proceedings but Curtin and myself, and the men in charge of the paper under the general direction of Mr. Weigley, Forney's son-in-law, were greatly surprised when I called at the office

and exhibited Forney's cablegram closing the sale. Access was promptly given for the examination of all the departments of the paper, and arrangements were made to take possession of it on the first of the following month.

The sale of "The Press" was publicly announced, and it was notice to the political leaders of the city that aggressive hostility to their mastery was about to confront them. I went to Washington to complete arrangements for the Press Bureau at the National Capital, and when I returned Mr. Weigley informed me that Mrs. Forney was very much disturbed about the sale and desired to see me. The terms were so advantageous to Forney that I could not doubt that Mrs. Forney would be glad to approve the sale, if she fairly understood the conditions, but I was surprised to find her implacably and violently hostile to it. She stated that she had consulted Mr. Childs, Mr. McMichael and other prominent friends of Colonel Forney, who had cabled to Forney urging him not to consummate the sale, as they did not then know that the contract of sale had been signed by both parties and was complete. Mrs. Forney appealed to me in the agony of tears to permit the sale to be revoked. I well knew how erroneously she reasoned on the subject, but I finally agreed that a cablegram should be sent to Forney over my signature authorizing him to revoke the contract if he desired to do so. The result was that within twenty-four hours Forney cabled revoking the sale, and Forney continued to conduct "The Press" for several years with little profit, and finally sold it to its present owners for just one-half the price he would have received by the contract of 1875.

The necessity for an independent newspaper was so generally understood, and the establishment of such a journal so earnestly desired, that the failure of "The



Frank McLaughlin

Press" purchase brought Frank McLaughlin and myself into conferences on the subject of starting an entirely new paper. Our acquaintance was not intimate, although each probably well understood the qualities of the other, as McLaughlin was known to be one of the most accomplished printers and publishers of the city. He had ample capital, which I had not, but I had assurances from friends that my share of the needed capital would be furnished. It was a bold undertaking to start a new daily journal in Philadelphia without the hope of any official patronage, and with the assured hostility of the whole political power of city and State. McLaughlin was an extremely cautious man, but broad gauge and liberal in carrying out any enterprise he decided to accept. The man who really brought Mr. McLaughlin and myself together, and who finally resolved all doubts in McLaughlin's mind about engaging in the new venture, was Philip Collins, an old-time close friend of McLaughlin, who had retired from business as one of the greatest of our State railroad contractors, with an ample fortune, and located in Philadelphia.

"The Age," then owned by Dr. Morwitz, that had less than five hundred circulation, was offered for \$30,000 payable in the stock of the new company, and that gave us the Associated Press franchise. One-fourth of the capital stock was taken by Governor Curtin, Charles A. Dana, Andrew H. Dill and Colonel Scott, represented by Senator Wallace, who kindly proposed to take the risk of the venture, and allow me at any time to become owner of their stock, by paying the par value and six per cent. interest. The ownership of the new paper was divided into four equal parts and held by Frank McLaughlin, his brother, John, Philip Collins and myself, holding the powers-of-attorney for those who had subscribed to my interest.

The only things of value to us in the equipment of the old "Age" office were the cases, tables and an old double cylinder Hoe press, capable of printing about 15,000 copies of "The Times" in an hour on one side. The outside forms were put to press about midnight, and before finishing the first run the pressman, who is now mine host of Dooner's Hotel, would go out on the street star-gazing, and if a fair morning was promised, he would add 500 to the regular edition, and if stormy weather was indicated, he would cut about the same number from it. Of course, the weather was at times fickle and misled Pressman Dooner by furnishing a clear morning when he had printed a reduced edition for a stormy morning, but these were unavoidable accidents.

All of the men connected with the business part of the enterprise, including the four who kindly furnished my capital, have crossed the dark river, but two of the men who began with the issue of the first number of "The Times" are yet well known in journalistic circles. Dr. Lambdin, now editor of the "Ledger," was managing editor of the "Times" when it was first issued, and continued to fill that position creditably until the "Ledger" finally purchased the paper and continued Dr. Lambdin on the staff. Louis N. Megargee, then an ambitious embryo reporter, was on the local staff, and wrote for the first issue an article of a column and a half, beginning the battle against the Philadelphia Pilgrims that not long thereafter ended in the destruction of that organization. Philip Collins, without whom "The Times" probably never would have been started, was a man of few words, but he exhibited an unusual interest in the newspaper enterprise that was entirely outside of his business ideas and tastes.

The first number was issued on the 13th of March, 1875, in the "Old Age" building on Seventh Street,

above Chestnut, and on the day before its issue, when all hands were hard at work, Collins came into my editorial room, and after asking a few questions as to how things were progressing, he came up to me and said: "I have put a large amount of money in this enterprise and perhaps am largely responsible for bringing others into it. I believe that the paper can be made a great success, but if it fails I won't squeal. I have but one request to make of you; that is that you shall run this paper just as you damn please." I answered that while I expected to assume the responsibility for the tone and general policy of the paper, I should certainly rely to some measure upon the considerate judgment of my associates. The paper was started without a single subscriber, and none were distributed gratuitously. A fund of \$50,000 was in bank to aid in meeting the current expenses. At the end of three months we had drawn over \$13,000 upon that fund; the next quarter the receipts and expenditures were about balanced, and at the end of the year we could have paid a dividend of six per cent. out of earnings and cash in hand.

The second year we bought the property at Eighth and Chestnut with a mortgage of \$50,000 upon it, and built the original Times building out of the drawer during the Centennial year, and bought two Hoe Perfecting presses, and the third year we paid the mortgage on the property with a considerable surplus in the treasury. No dividends were thus paid the first three years, and dividends were also passed some ten years later when the paper was reduced to a penny, and a hundred thousand dollars of new machinery had to be purchased, and again when "The Times'" mechanical building on Sansom Street was burned in 1892, when the rebuilding and the increased plant cost \$115,000 more than the insurance. Notwithstanding these five years in which

no dividends were paid, "The Times" in the twenty-six years in which it was under the direction of its founders paid its stockholders in cash dividends their entire capital five times over, and then sold the property at a premium of \$275 per share, including every share of stock issued by the company. The dividends many years were as high as forty per cent. and in a short time they refunded to those who had aided it their money with interest. There were few stockholders outside of the four chief interests in the paper, and they had the assurance that under no circumstances would the stock be sacrificed by a sale of a majority.

That policy was carried out after all the founders were dead but myself, and the sale was made to Mr. Kindred, who purchased every share of the stock at the same price. As an illustration of the fidelity that was cherished by the original founders for each other, the case of Philip Collins may be given. He had suffered some losses in stocks in 1875, and he was tempted to resume his old business of contracting by an offer that came from London for the construction of a railway in Brazil. After consulting with Mr. Gowan, then president of the Reading, who heartily co-operated with him, he and his brother, Thomas Collins, took the contract and sailed for Brazil with an outfit and a large company of operators. Within a year a decision of the English court rendered the fund that was relied upon for the construction of the road unavailable, and the result was that the Collinses returned hopelessly bankrupt. When Philip Collins entered into the Brazilian contract he needed money, and he asked his associates to purchase his stock in "The Times" at par and interest, and it was done. Money was not needed in the office, and the stock was put away in the safe to be held for any emergency that might arise. The purchase was absolute, and Mr. Collins never dreamed of

having any further interest in the concern. When he returned bankrupt, his associates decided that as he had been one of the most active in founding "The Times," and had now suffered great losses at an age when he could hardly hope to retrieve his fortune, he should have the benefit of his stock without giving him any formal ownership. The dividends were then forty per cent. and he was paid the dividends less interest upon the money from year to year, until finally the company again purchased his stock at double its original cost. He made the sale when we were about to reduce the price of the paper to a penny, as he regarded its future success as somewhat problematic. When John McLaughlin died, leaving an estate heavily encumbered, the stock was sold and purchased by the president of the company for the benefit of the children, who had a liberal income from it, even after the payment of interest.

Frank McLaughlin's health was sadly broken for years before his death, so much so that he was really incapacitated for handling a great newspaper enterprise, and at his death I was left alone of the original founders, and with a large majority of the stock held by guardians for minor children who were dependent upon its dividends for a livelihood. Finally the period came, by rapidly increasing competition in journalism, when the entire earnings of the paper would have been necessary for a year in advance to enable it to maintain its prosperous condition. Expending profits to make future profits assured meant the loss of much needed income to a number of children, and a conference was called with the guardians and executors who represented the chief interests, and the facts were presented, leaving simply a choice between the sale of the property or expending its entire earnings for a year to enlarge its business. It was decided to sell, and Mr.

Kindred became a purchaser in 1899, when my editorial control of the paper ceased, although by the contract of sale I was required to continue as editor. The policy of the paper on all matters political and otherwise was dictated by the owner, and I twice asked for a reduction of my own salary for the simple reason that I was of no more value to the paper than any other editorial writer who could furnish editorials according to directions. "The Times" finally ended its career by a sale that united it with the "Ledger."

When "The Times" was founded it was an imperious necessity that it should be severely and consistently independent. The public abuses in nation, State and city were the abuses of Republican authority, and that necessitated an aggressive crusade against the Republican organization. In the first issue of the paper it was announced that it would be "independent in everything, neutral in nothing," and it maintained that policy with scrupulous fidelity regardless of personal or party interests. Its first great battle was with the Pilgrim organization, whose leading members, assuming that "The Times" could be easily overthrown, came out in a defiant challenge, denying the accusations and assuring the public that the club would be continued indefinitely. It was a short, sharp and decisive campaign, and before a dozen moons had filled their houses there was a public sale of the furniture and fixtures, and the Pilgrim Club passed into history.

The policy of supporting competent and faithful judges for re-election was declared at the outset, and the sincerity of purpose pointedly illustrated by earnestly favoring Judge Biddle, the Republican candidate for judge, against a thoroughly competent Democratic competitor, while as actively opposing the remainder of the Republican ticket. The policy of supporting an independent judiciary and urging the re-election of

all faithful and competent judges, regardless of party, was maintained until "The Times" passed from the possession of its original founders.

Another policy from which it never departed was to solicit no patronage from political power. One of the first achievements of the new paper was the defeat of Rowan for sheriff and the election of Mr. Wright, the Democratic candidate, in 1876. When nominated, Mr. Wright called on the editor and desired to know what the attitude of "The Times" would be. He did it because it had long been the custom to visit editors, ascertain the expression they would make, and the attitude of the paper would be freely spoken of and discussed before its issue. He was sorely disappointed when informed that he must wait until "The Times" was issued the next morning, to know what it had to say on the subject. He was doubtless agreeably surprised to find the most positive attitude in support of his election, and when elected he immediately called at the office of the paper to say that his entire advertising patronage would be given to "The Times." He was amazed when informed that he could not publish any official advertisement as sheriff in the columns of the paper. His term covered the severe depression of 1877, and the sheriff's advertising amounted to over \$30,000 a year to each of any two papers he selected for the purpose, but "The Times" refused it, believing that it was necessary to establish in the public mind the absolute independence of the paper, and its refusal to accept the sheriff's advertising led to the re-organization of the "Record" that laid the foundation for one of the great newspaper properties of the city. A decade later the paper received official advertising, as its independent attitude was fully understood, but it never permitted an abatement of a dollar for the benefit of the official advertising.

One of the most interesting features of a long political career was my personal relations with the political leaders, especially of the city, with whom the paper was almost constantly in antagonism. There never was any personal estrangement between any of them and myself, although they were earnestly and defiantly assailed when occasion demanded it, and often defeated. The leaders of that day were Stokley, McManes, Leeds, Rowan, Hill, Kemble and others. There never was a time when any or all of them did not feel entirely free to come to my office and confer about political struggles then in progress, or soon to begin, and the utmost frankness was always exhibited with entire confidence in the sanctity of the expressions given. I many times called upon some of them and secured their aid in accomplishing political results which were not inconsistent with the policy of the paper. On one occasion I secured the co-operation of Mayor Stokley, McManes, Leeds, Hill and Kemble with the aid of Mackey, to defeat Republican candidates for several of the most important city offices.

It was not done because they especially desired the defeat of those candidates, but because they did not care specially for them, and expected some time to gain reciprocal results of more importance to themselves. It was that combination that made Robert E. Pattison controller of Philadelphia, and twice Governor of the State. There was not one of those leaders who did not feel entirely free to come to the editorial office of "The Times" and discuss, with entire frankness, any political proposition he desired to present, and their slated nominations were many times modified after a conference in "The Times" office, to avoid a desperate struggle in which their defeat was more than possible. I recall at least two occasions when candidates were withdrawn from the ticket after they had been formally

nominated, because it was a necessity to do so to avoid a desperate and doubtful struggle.

All of these men suffered humiliating defeat at one time or another. McManes was defeated for re-election to the Gas Trust, Rowan and Leeds were each defeated for sheriff, and Hill, after having been slated for the nomination for sheriff practically without a contest, announced his declination in "The Times" office in favor of Enoch Taylor, who had been unthought of for the place, because his election could not be supported by the paper and he saw unmistakable signs of revolution on every side. He was then bankrupt and pleaded most earnestly for a chance to retrieve his fortunes, but while he could not be made a candidate for sheriff, he was enabled to realize a large income during Taylor's term, who received only his salary, while Hill received fifty per cent. of the advertising from the newspapers, giving him a much larger income than the salary of the sheriff. These relations made a political rôle so difficult to accept that it could be maintained only by never departing in the least degree from the absolutely independent policy of the paper, and that policy made "The Times" one of the most successful newspapers of the country.

LXXXVIII.

VENALITY IN LEGISLATION.

Corruption of Legislators Practically Unknown until Half a Century Ago—The Original Old Time Lobbyist Who Never Debauched Legislators—The Struggle Between Ignorance and Prejudice on the One Side, and Progressive Elements of the State Looking to the Development of Wealth, Gave Importance to Venal Influences—The First Open Debauch in the Senatorial Contest of 1855—Again Visible in 1858 in the Sale of State Canals to the Sunbury and Erie Railroad—War Brought Demoralization and Quickened Venality—Many Sternly Honest Legislators Supported Measures They Knew to be Corrupt—Venality Largely Ruled in Legislation until the Adoption of the New Constitution—Political Power Largely Ruled Legislation, But Diminished Individual Prostitution.

VENALITY was practically unknown in Pennsylvania legislation half a century ago. There had been several occasions when important bills were pressed upon the Legislature which aroused bitter partisan antagonism, when the debauchery of individual legislators was hinted at, but in no instance was it clearly established. The recharter of the United States bank as a State institution was a notable instance of the early legislative contests which called out imputations of unlawful influences, but in that case, instead of debauching members of the Legislature, when the bank secured the support of prominent senators and representatives, it accepted in the charter obligations to make public appropriations in which legislators were interested. The State canals had been a running sore of corruption for many years, and it required extraordinary efforts almost every season to obtain the appropriations demanded by the canal board, as the conviction was very general that a considerable

percentage of the money thus appropriated was corruptly applied; but as a rule the canal board had a party majority in the Legislature, and with the patronage it possessed, its power over legislation was usually equal to all its requirements.

The only method adopted for the passage of charters or private bills which met with opposition was what was then commonly spoken of as "log rolling." That method consisted of combining interests in the support of a number of bills, many of which would have been opposed by a number of those in the combination if each bill had been considered only on its merits, but by such combinations a majority could be obtained to pass a large number of bills in which members were specially interested. Log rolling was then denounced as the bane of honest legislation, just as venality is now denounced as a poison to the very vitals of popular government. Banks were then organized by a special charter passed by the Legislature, and on several occasions, when the Legislature was not specially friendly to bank charters, a combination would be formed, including a dozen or more bank charters and other private bills of interest to individual members, and thus by the log-rolling process all would be passed, but no one in those days entered the Legislature as many did later, and as some do now, with the expectation that they may reap large pecuniary profit by the legislative authority.

I well remember when there was but one man known in Harrisburg during the sessions of the Legislature who devoted his time to what would now be called lobbying. He was Captain Kearns, one of the most popular of the packet captains on the canal in the boating season, and who spent his winters at Harrisburg devoting himself to obtaining private legislation when wanted by his many friends throughout the State,

who usually gave him what would now be regarded as a very insignificant fee for his trouble; but he never entertained the idea of debauching members of the Legislature, or tempting them by venal offers. As the Legislature then had unlimited authority over private legislation, it was not uncommon for individuals to be especially interested in the passage of local bills, and they preferred to pay Captain Kearns a small fee because his knowledge of committees and legislators enabled him to accomplish what they could not accomplish by their own efforts.

In later years, when venality ran riot in legislation, the lobbyist became altogether the most important factor in Pennsylvania legislation, and I could name a dozen men who amassed liberal fortunes by plying their vocations as lobbyists. They were men of unusual intelligence and sagacity, some of whom had held important political positions, and when venality became the ruling power of legislative authority and great interests involving at times millions of dollars were presented, none attempted to obtain legislation which affected pecuniary interests without accepting the slimy embrace of the lobby. These men have all passed away, and their names may be consigned to charitable forgetfulness.

I served three years in the house beginning with the session of 1858, and six years in the senate ending in 1874, and during that period of sixteen years venality in legislation reached its tidal wave. I saw it in every phase, and many times supported measures when I knew that a considerable portion of those who were voting with me had demanded and obtained a price for their votes. When not in the Legislature I was connected with the military department at Harrisburg during the war and for some time after its close, and my connection with the public affairs of the State

covered the period when legislative results were often a supreme necessity, and when men, however honest in purpose, could not take pause to inquire what means were necessary for its attainment.

The Democrats were then, as a party, hostile to banks, and with that partisan sentiment arrayed against the banks, a combination was formed by a number of venal legislators to extort money from the banks at the price of relieving them from the penalty of suspension. A committee of bankers were present at the opening of the session and pressed the passage of the bill with great earnestness, but they were dumfounded when, after a long delay, they were confronted with a demand for a considerable amount of money to be put down to save the bill from defeat. The representatives of the banks were appalled at the proposition, and decided to send for a number of prominent bankers to confer with them on the subject. Among the men sent for was the elder Boker, who had brought the Girard Bank up from the verge of insolvency to a thoroughly substantial and dividend-paying institution. He was eminently practical and rugged in his methods. When the matter was submitted to him his answer was: "What's the use of praying when you're in hell. Pay the money and get your bill." There was no time to bring popular pressure to bear upon the Legislature, and Mr. Boker's method was adopted, whereby the suspension of 1857 was legalized by the Legislature.

It is just half a century since Pennsylvania began, at first in a feeble way, to liberalize her policy by the encouragement of corporate organizations to develop her wealth. Until that time the State was held in the leading strings of ignorance and prejudice. Corporations were looked upon by a very large portion of the people as mere organizations to obtain special privi-

leges from the State to enrich individuals, and many others tolerated them only as necessary evils. Every effort made to liberalize the policy of the State was at first hindered by prejudice and later on by venality, as venality was stimulated by the necessities of great enterprises. The Pennsylvania Railroad would never have been more than a local line between Philadelphia and Pittsburg if the terms of its original charter had been maintained, and it had to struggle more than a decade against ignorance, prejudice and venality to liberalize the policy of the State and enable it to bring millions of trade to our metropolis, and to develop the countless millions of wealth which have been gained to the State by the liberal and progressive corporate policy that was finally won after many desperate struggles.

It was these combinations which gave birth to venal legislation in Pennsylvania. The corruption of Legislatures was not, as a rule, for benefits to individuals, excepting as they might profit by the grand enterprises which they planned for the development of the vast resources of the Commonwealth. They were halted by the legislative corruptionist, and they were compelled to bow to his demands or leave the State to plod along with its commerce crippled and its wealth slumbering. It was just such a condition as confronted the National Government in 1865, when the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery had been defeated in the first session of Congress. It was laid over, on motion to reconsider, and finally passed during the second session, when a number of Democrats changed their votes, some of whom received political advantages, lucrative appointments from the administration very soon thereafter. It was a supreme necessity to pass the amendment; it could be done in only one way, and that was adopted not from choice, but from necessity.

The bill for the sale of the Main Line to the Pennsylvania Railroad as originally passed by the Legislature was not the creation of the lobby, as the railroad company refused to accept the bill. That movement had behind it an overwhelming sentiment in favor of the sale of the public works, because of the corruption and profligacy which prevailed in their direction, and the Whig party was practically solid in support of it, while the best elements of the Democrats also favored the sale. It was made the great feature of Governor Pollock's administration, and he pressed it with earnestness upon the Legislature, and that important reform was accomplished chiefly or wholly by legitimate efforts; but the supreme court declared unconstitutional the section releasing the corporation from taxes on its property, including tonnage taxes, in consideration of certain payments made for the sale of the Main Line, and while the sale was declared to be legal when carried into effect, the tonnage tax question remained until the company, after many desperate struggles, finally accomplished its repeal in 1861.

While the imperious necessity for a liberalized policy in Pennsylvania that would promote the development of our boundless resources was the chief fountain of venality in our Legislature in its desperate struggle for the period of half a generation with ignorance, prejudice and venality, it is only just to say that the first general debauchery of the Legislature was caused by a protracted and most demoralizing political contest in 1855, when fully a score of men at one time or another entered the contest for the United States Senatorship. It was the only Know Nothing Legislature the State ever had, and as a very large portion of its members had been nominated and elected by secret machinery that opened the widest doors for fraud, it is not surprising that such a Legislature should be a most inviting

field for corruptionists. The chief contest for Senator was between Cameron and Curtin, and for the first time in the history of the State systematic efforts were made to control the choice of Senator by the direct purchase of legislators. Curtin was backed by the old Whig, or better element of the Legislature, while Cameron traded with the Know Nothings, but neither could command a majority, and at one time or another ambitious men with money were brought to Harrisburg under the belief that they could, by the expenditure of money, become a compromise Senator. Some half a dozen men made that experiment, and all were alike systematically robbed. The result was that the Legislature finally adjourned without electing a Senator, and the Democrats, winning the Legislature the following year, elected ex-Governor Bigler. This episode of legislative debauchery was the first in the history of the State in which the highest honors in the gift of the Commonwealth were made a matter of commerce, and it paved the way for the long season of legislative venality that grew up in the great effort that began a few years later for a liberalized corporate policy to develop our vast resources.

The Legislature of 1858, when I first appeared as a member of the house, had a less flagrant repetition of the venality begun in 1855. The Main Line of our public works had been sold, leaving the State odds and ends of canals which were made a constant source of loss to the treasury, because of their profligate management by the canal board. It was the last remnant of the vast power that had been exercised by political corruptionists who controlled our public works, and, while public sentiment was strongly in favor of disposing of the remaining canals, the canal board made a desperate struggle to preserve its existence and retain its control of patronage and power. I had for years

been advocating the sale of all the State works because of the ceaseless current of debauchery they brought into the politics of the State, and very ardently supported the bill for the sale of the works to the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad. It proved to be a most beneficent measure in a double sense, as it assured the completion of the Philadelphia and Erie line that had been struggling for many years without reasonable prospect of success, and the State received \$3,000,000 for the canals. The bill was, in fact, a loan of credit by the State to the Philadelphia and Erie, as the canals were sold to that company for \$3,000,000, but the canals were left entirely free for the railway company to sell or mortgage, while the State accepted a mortgage for \$3,000,000 on the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad.

The measure was attacked by all the power of the canal board, aided by those who persisted in the moss-back policy of hindering advancement, and by all who hoped to turn their legislative authority to individual profit, and the leaders in the movement were compelled to choose between bowing to the demands of venality or abandoning one of the most important enterprises for the advancement of the State, with individual profits that they hoped to realize legitimately from their great work. There was no hope of constructing the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad for many years, unless some such loan of credit could be secured, and they paid legislative venality its price, and thus created the great artery of trade through what was then largely a vast wilderness between Williamsport and Erie, with boundless wealth slumbering in the mountains and valleys. From that time until the policy of the State was liberalized, perhaps even beyond legitimate necessities during the war, venality ruled in Pennsylvania legislation, and it became so common that even the

most trivial bills involving any individual interest were made to pay tribute to corruptionists, and lobbyists and legislators studied day and night how they could introduce bills affecting existing corporations or other interests, and compel them to be halted by blackmail. They were known as "pinch" bills, and were one of the common features of legislation for many years, as the Legislature then had unrestricted power in private legislation.

War is a great demoralizer, and civil wars the worst of all, and our legislation during the war was so generally controlled by corruptionists that it became accepted as one of the inseparable features of Pennsylvania legislation. Under even ordinary conditions, grave political necessities often arise, but during the war political necessities were often so imperious in every feature that no hopeful means could be left unemployed to meet them. I well remember when the house was brought to the first vote on the question of sustaining the Government, after Sumter had been fired upon. It was of the utmost importance that we should hold the Democrats from a solid column against the government, and within two hours of the time that the house was to act, I was informed by a member of the body who well understood the situation, and who usually profited by such conditions, that for a very moderate sum of money a number of the Democrats could be held to the support of the government. A conference was hastily held in the Governor's office, and some six or eight men who were present contributed, from their own private means, an equal share of money that was promptly paid and the contract fulfilled.

I served continuously in the house and senate from the session of 1858 to the close of the session of 1862, and was thereafter officially connected with the military department of the government until the close of the

war. One of my important duties was to give special attention to legislation relating to the support of the State administration and to the government in prosecuting the war, and during that period I had full knowledge of the attitude of every member of both branches, and nearly or quite all of them knew that I was fully advised of the venal contracts of legislators. They knew that I was so situated that it would not only make me utterly powerless, but probably result in grave disaster on some most important matters, if an attempt had been made to expose and punish, or even to halt, the flood tide of venality. For years during that period I saw the private memoranda of the leading lobbyists, in which the name of every senator and every representative was recorded who could be corruptly influenced in legislation, and I have seen in that record as many as seventy of the one hundred members of the house, and more than twenty of the thirty-three senators. They were of different classes, the larger class ready to deal with or against anything, while the smaller class could be reached only on particular occasions, when they felt that they could do it with safety.

While serving in the senate, the prominent venal traders in both branches never hesitated to discuss any contract for the support of certain measures, as they knew that I could not, and certainly would not, attempt to betray them. Venality was absolutely masterful, and with the terrible exigencies of war and the at times startling necessities which were suddenly thrown upon the administration, there was but one course open, and that was to utilize the Legislature as it was, inasmuch as it could not be made otherwise.

I remember on one occasion a certain bill of local interest had been set up by a prominent lobbyist to be passed in the senate, but a short time before the bill was called a considerably larger sum was offered to

defeat it, and the senator who dealt for the gang, who at the time had the money in his pocket to pass the bill, received the larger sum to defeat it, and it happened that he was called to the chair and presided with the money for both sides in his pocket, when the bill was considered and defeated. In both branches the venal elements were organized in small gangs of ten or a dozen in the house, and five or more in the senate, and by seeing the leaders arrangements could be made, if the terms were acceptable, for the requisite number of votes without dealing with individuals. During all this tidal wave of legislative venality there were men of the purest purpose and sternest integrity who served in both branches, with full knowledge of the venal environment, but they knew that if they attempted to assail it they would simply be made utterly powerless to serve their constituents or any important public or private interests they had at heart.

This condition continued, varying only in degree, until the adoption of the new Constitution in 1874. I was one of those who earnestly urged the constitutional convention for years before it was accepted, and chiefly on the ground that it was necessary to enlarge the Legislature as the only method of rescuing it from the mastery of venality, and it is only just to say that since the enlargement of the Legislature there has been no instance in which anything approaching a majority of either branch of the Legislature has been open to venal purchase. New conditions have arisen, by which partisan power largely commands legislation, and while measures quite as corrupt and profligate as any of those enacted during the tidal wave of venality are occasionally enacted under the new conditions, it is generally chiefly by the power of political leadership, and only to a very limited degree by the debauchery of individual members. I have good

reason to know that the general sweep of legislative venality was halted by the new Constitution. My last term in the senate ended just when the new Constitution went into effect, and at no time during the war was legislative venality more common than it was in 1873-74, the last of the limited Legislature under the old Constitution. Instead of the lobbyists of the olden time, the political masters of the present dictate important legislation that involves profit to individuals, and the shame of a generally corrupted senate and house has been effaced from the annals of the Commonwealth.

I have noted with interest the careers of the men I knew as corruptionists in the early days of my legislative career, and only a very small percentage of those who realized the largest profits by the sale of their votes enjoyed a competency throughout their lives. Money so easily made, and bringing with it a departure from honest purposes in life, logically inspired profligacy and indulgence, and a large majority of those who once thought themselves men of moderate fortune, as the fruits of legislative corruption, died in poverty. Long continued and close observation of this once glaring evil that shadowed the Commonwealth with shame, clearly teaches that, as a rule, no public official can afford to make his official authority a matter of bargain and sale for individual profit, even as a business proposition, exclusive of the disgrace that the moral turpitude involved. There are apparent exceptions to the rule, as is common with all rules, but official venality is reasonably certain, sooner or later, to bring sorrow or shame, and often both.

LXXXIX.

HARTRANFT RE-ELECTED.

Mackey and Quay Take Early and Vigorous Action to Retrieve the Defeat of 1874—They Perfect the Republican Organization—Obtain Absolute Control of the Greenback and Labor Organizations—Greenback Sentiment Very Formidable in the State—Hartranft Unanimously Renominated—A Protracted Contest for the Democratic Nomination—Judge Pershing Finally Chosen—The Labor and Greenback Parties Held from Fusion by Republican Leaders, and That Elected Hartranft by 12,000 Plurality—The Democrats Carried the Popular Branch of the Legislature—Hartranft's Creditable Career as Governor—Later Collector of the Port and Postmaster—Finally Suffered Financial Disaster, and Made Earnest but Unavailing Efforts to Save His Friends.

THE Republican disaster of 1874, by which the dominant party of the State lost its entire State ticket, the control of the Legislature and a United States Senator, made the leaders enter very early and earnestly upon the work of rescuing the State in 1875, when a Governor and State treasurer were to be elected. Hartranft was about closing his first term as Governor, and, beyond his necessary identification with the Cameron-Mackey power of the State, his record had been generally creditable. He was highly respected personally and his superb record as a volunteer soldier warmly commended him to the loyal people of the State. He was not a leader, although generally level-headed as an adviser. He could do little or nothing to promote his own nomination and election, but with Mackey and Quay to handle the organization he could safely rely upon the best possible results being obtained. They knew that the contest was doubtful, and they took time by the fore-

lock in fortifying themselves wherever their lines were weak, and they made very important incursions into the enemy's forces which were not visible to the public. There were two side elements in politics which were then largely commercial, and what Mackey and Quay did not know about handling such elements was not worth studying, and they practically assured the success of Hartranft by the early manipulation of the Greenback and Labor leaders.

The Greenback sentiment had become quite strong among the Democratic people, and there were many Republicans who would have been glad to see their own party adopt the new theory. The Greenback movement was the first insidious form of repudiation that was formulated after the war. During the war there were open repudiationists, but small in number and influence, who openly proclaimed that it was impossible for the nation to pay the enormous war debt, and frankly advised summary repudiation as the only relief. President Johnson, in a formal message to Congress, advised the repudiation of the public debt by the payment of the amount of the principal in interest and make that absolute payment. The movement was given great vitality in 1868 by George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, who had been the nominee for Vice-President with McClellan in 1864. He became an aggressive candidate for the Democratic nomination for President and openly proclaimed his policy of having but one form of paper money, all issued by the government, that should be receivable by all, including the government, as legal tender, excepting where specific contracts were made for different payment. The Democrats of Ohio were greatly enthused in support of Pendleton, and I well remember the Ohio delegation at the New York convention, that nominated Seymour for President and General Blair for Vice-President, all wearing

badges in imitation of Greenbacks, and thousands of Ohio rooters, decorated in like manner, all hurraing for Pendleton and plenty of money.

It had evidently taken deep root in Ohio, and in 1873 the venerable ex-Senator Allen was nominated as the Democratic candidate for Governor on a distinctly Greenback platform and elected over General Noyes, a gallant and crippled soldier of the war. This was the first form of practical repudiation while actually disclaiming repudiation, and the free silver tidal wave was simply a fresh eruption of repudiation in a new form adapted to the new conditions of the country. They logically led to Populism, that has since gravitated into Socialism, and greatly multiplied not only the tolerance of anarchy, but the actual growth of anarchy among the idle and vicious of the land. The socialism and anarchy of to-day are the logical fruits of the repudiation that began with the Greenback movement, followed by the variegated cheap money and get-something-for-nothing movements which were injected into the politics of the country.

The Republicans opened the campaign of 1875 in the early part of the year, holding their convention at Lancaster on the 25th of May. Governor Hartranft was renominated for Governor by acclamation and on the second ballot, Henry Rawle, of Erie, was nominated for State treasurer. The Democratic State convention met at Erie on the 8th of September, presided over by Hon. Hendrick B. Wright, of Luzerne. There was a protracted and somewhat embittered struggle over the question of adopting the Greenback theory as the party faith, but under the lead of Frank Hughes, of Schuylkill, one of the ablest men of the State, who threw himself into the contest with great earnestness, the doctrine of a universal government paper money to be a legal tender in all dealings with the government

and between individuals, excepting where specific contracts were made of a different character, was formally proclaimed as the doctrine of the Democratic party.

Among the prominent Democrats of that day were many men engaged in large financial and other business enterprises who were not prepared to take the plunge toward repudiation that was obviously involved in the newly declared policy of the party, and it chilled many who had been among its most earnest supporters. It was expected by the leaders who dominated the convention that the Democrats would lose a certain percentage of their followers who were engaged in large business operations, but it was believed that the doctrine of universal Greenback currency, that everybody should be compelled to accept, was popular with the masses of the people, and by accepting the policy they expected to control the State. They were disappointed in that expectation, however, as while they lost the support of many of their more prominent business men, they gained very little from the Republicans on the new monetary issue. Many Republicans were willing to accept the Greenback policy, but there were few sufficiently wedded to the new money theory to make them desert their party household.

The convention was in session several days wrangling over the platform that was followed by a protracted struggle for the Gubernatorial nomination. Ex-Governor Bigler had a number of friends in the convention, and although he had made no open efforts to secure delegates, he was very anxious to obtain the nomination. Judge Ross, of Montgomery, was the favorite candidate of the active leaders in the organization, and his vote steadily increased until the tenth ballot that stood Ross 68, Bigler 54 and Pershing 50, with a number scattering. On the eleventh and last ballot the vote stood Pershing 145 and Ross 94, with 11 scattering.

Judge Pershing was not regarded as a promising candidate when the convention met. He was not a favorite of the party leaders and on the first ballot he received only 12 votes, all of which were regarded as complimentary, but as is common in a contest where there are half a dozen prominent competitors, as they are in turn compelled to retire from the race, the natural tendency is for them to transfer their support to a dark horse rather than to those who have bowled them out. Judge Pershing had not been publicly canvassed as a candidate for Governor, and when the convention met none in or out of the convention expected him to be selected as a candidate, but his strength steadily increased until on the eleventh ballot, that was taken after a prolonged session extending beyond midnight, he received a large majority. Victor Piolett, who was an aggressive representative of the Greenback element and who was voted for for Governor on every ballot, was unanimously nominated State treasurer. It was generally understood that Judge Pershing was not greatly charmed with the Greenback idea, and the ticket was balanced with one of the most aggressive of the Greenback leaders.

The nomination for Governor came to Judge Pershing in 1875 entirely without solicitation or effort. He accepted the nomination in a very temperate and sensible address, and he refused to take any active part in the campaign. He insisted that as long as he remained a judge it was his duty to confine himself to his judicial duties, and he was not inclined to resign his position on the bench to accept a doubtful contest for the Governorship. He was a man of eminent ability, not only as a jurist, but as a politician, and would have been a very formidable advocate on the stump, but his high conceptions of judicial duties prevented him plunging into a political contest while performing them. Har-

tranft was not a public speaker, and the result was that both of the candidates for Governor were unheard in the contest, but the struggle was watched with great earnestness by their respective friends.

Notwithstanding the adoption of the Greenback policy by the Democratic convention, Mackey and Quay had the sideshow political element well in hand, and the distinctive Greenback leaders with the Labor organizations, all of whom at that time were in favor of the cheapest money and the largest volume of it, were organized under satisfactory commercial arrangements to aid the Republican ticket. In their anxiety to save Governor Hartranft they were content to have the Greenback and Labor elements brought to the support of the State ticket without pressing them to the point of supporting Republican Legislative candidates, and the result was that while Hartranft was elected by over 12,000 majority the Democrats carried the popular branch of the Legislature by 111 Democrats to 90 Republicans, but the Republicans held the senate by 29 to 21. Hartranft was beaten in the State outside of Philadelphia by some 8,000 majority, but the Greenback theory adopted by the Democrats greatly strengthened the Republicans in business circles, and Philadelphia gave over 20,000 Republican majority.

Hartranft's second administration was uneventful with the single exception of the severe business revolution and general revolutionary tendencies of 1877, during which he rendered a very great service to the State by his firm and discreet direction of affairs in the most serious troubles which had ever befallen the Commonwealth. There were no serious disturbing questions of State policy during his second term, and he performed his duties unostentatiously, but with great fidelity, and commanded the respect of all parties. He was as

modest in civil and private life as he was heroic when in the field, where he fairly won the distinction of being the foremost of Pennsylvania volunteer chieftains in the war.

After he retired from the Gubernatorial chair he filled the positions of postmaster and collector of the port in Philadelphia. In 1876, a year after his re-election as Governor, he was nominated as Pennsylvania's candidate for the Presidency by a practically unanimous vote at the State convention, and the delegation chosen to the National convention was instructed to vote for him as a unit. While he was voted for on every ballot at the Cincinnati convention, he never became formidable as a candidate for the nomination, but his candidacy served the important purpose cherished by the Camerons, Mackey and Quay, to defeat the nomination of Blaine, to whose nomination they were very earnestly opposed.

In the sudden iron boom of 1882, when it was believed that the iron and steel trade would be permanently prosperous in the country, Hartranft engaged in an important iron enterprise in Virginia, of which he took personal charge, and many of his personal and political friends aided him in its capitalization. Like most of the iron enterprises organized at the time, it met with disastrous failure, and Hartranft devoted the few remaining days of his life to protect some of those who invested with him and were unable to stand the loss. He struggled along year after year, exhausting his vitality, and beyond a frugal living to himself and his family, he gave all his surplus earnings to the payment of interest upon his iron bonds which were nearly or quite entirely worthless. The constant and exhausting worry of his financial condition certainly hastened his death, but while he lived he devoted his efforts to save his associate investors.

XC.

THE MOLLY MAGUIRE MURDERERS.

The Most Appalling Chapter of Crime Ever Recorded in the Annals of Pennsylvania—History of the Molly Maguire Organization—The Outgrowth of the Ancient Order of Hibernians—Its Criminal Methods—Offensive Mining Bosses and Operators Murdered in Open Day—Political Power Contracted for Protection to Criminals—The Wonderful Story of James McParlan as Detective Inside the Order—Gowan's Masterly Ability in Conducting Prosecutions—Sixteen Molly Maguires Executed—Many Others Imprisoned, and a Dozen or More Fugitives from Justice.

THE most tragic and deeply crimsoned chapter in the annals of Pennsylvania since the mastery of civilization over the savage, is the story of a murderous organization started within the Ancient Order of Hibernians some time in the early 60's, and continuing a regular carnival of murder against men who were entirely innocent of provocation by which scores of men were deliberately murdered, culminating in the execution of sixteen of the Molly Maguire criminals with a considerable number of additional criminals who became fugitives from justice.

The Molly Maguires who made such an appalling record of crime in Pennsylvania were simply a revival of what was known as Ribbonism in Ireland some two generations ago. The Ribbon Society was organized within the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and oppressive landlords, importunate agents and resolute bailiffs were at times condemned to death by the Ribbon leaders, and one or more members of the organization charged with the duty of committing murder. As a rule those who were entire strangers to the condemned

parties were chosen to commit the murder, thus lessening the opportunity of identification, and at times marauding parties dressed in female apparel to assure concealment. Finally the murderous organization was discovered by detectives and a number of executions followed whereby Ribbonism perished in Ireland. It is a notable fact that while only a very few members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians were directly connected with Ribbonism in Ireland, there is no record of the order openly condemning Ribbonism or aiding in the arrest and punishment of any of its guilty members.

The Molly Maguires whose murders and general lawlessness brought an ineffaceable stain upon our great Commonwealth, like Ribbonism in Ireland, were all members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the fact that the organization made no systematic effort to expose and punish the Molly Maguires brought such general reproach upon the order that it was formally excommunicated by Archbishop Wood, and although the order has largely recovered from the dishonor and demoralization caused by the Molly Maguires within its household, the record of the Mollies remains as a fearful reproach upon the organization.

It is a secret order with signs and passwords which are changed quarterly and given out by the Board of Erin, with headquarters in Great Britain, where it is the governing power of the entire organization. The American headquarters of the order are in New York city, where the national board meets, and in this State in the city of Pittsburg, where the State delegate rules supreme. Beneath him are county delegates in each county of the State in which the organization has members, and beneath the county delegates are body-masters, who are the heads of the various local branches. The signals and passwords are communicated from the



Cyrus L. Perbury.

Board of Erin to the national headquarters in New York city, thence to the various State delegates, and by them to those who are subject to their orders.

In the earlier days of mining in the anthracite region the majority of the miners were Irishmen, and most of them members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. They became greatly inflamed against the coal operators, their employers, and gradually, and perhaps without originally intending it, drifted into the lines pursued by Ribbonism in Ireland. The chief center of the Mollies in Schuylkill County was in Cass Township, where I first struck them, when in charge of the draft made under the State laws in 1862. At that time there had been more than a dozen murders in Cass Township within a few years without any of the guilty parties being brought to punishment. I have stated in a previous chapter how the Molly Maguires not only obstructed, but absolutely defeated the draft in Cass Township, and how I was compelled, under personal instructions from President Lincoln, to revoke the order for the draft and release the conscripts on the mere pretense of evidence that the quota had been filled. It was an imperious necessity to prevent an open, desperate and bloody conflict in the heart of our great Commonwealth, that would have greatly strengthened rebellion in the South and weakened the loyal cause in the North.

This organization of Molly Maguires that seems to have had either the active or passive support of the Ancient Order of Hibernians generally, had its origin as early as 1860, and grew rapidly as year by year it increased its power, and finally absolutely dominated the politics of Schuylkill County. It aimed to control the judges on the bench, the prosecuting officers of the county, the commissioners and the jurors, and in 1872 it had become so masterful in the political control

of the county that good people of all parties made common cause and elected Cyrus L. Pershing, of Cambria, who had never even visited Schuylkill County, president judge, and the heroic administration of justice inaugurated by Judge Pershing was a most important factor in the final exposure, conviction and execution of the Molly Maguires.

Every public officer in the county and in the adjoining county of Carbon felt that his life was unsafe if he took any step looking to the exposure and punishment of these banded murderers, and they became so bold that they did not hesitate to propose terms in political conferences, offering their support to individuals or parties in consideration of money or protection for their criminals. It is an open secret, but well established, that in 1875, when Governor Hartranft was a candidate for re-election, Jack Kehoe, the brilliant and desperate leader of the Molly Maguires, met a prominent citizen of Pottsville in his own parlor, and was there solemnly assured that Governor Hartranft would protect the Molly Maguire criminals in consideration of the organization and all its power supporting Hartranft's re-election. In the trial of Thomas, one of the Molly Maguire murderers, George Byerly, warden of the Schuylkill County jail, testified that in a conversation with Kehoe, then a prisoner, on the charge of murder, said: "I do not think that we will get justice, but if we don't get justice I don't think the old man at Harrisburg (Hartranft) will go back on us."

Hartranft was entirely ignorant of this pledge, and certainly never would have made it or permitted it to be made had he known of the proposition, but he was nevertheless very seriously embarrassed by the powerful influence that demanded the protection of Jack Kehoe. Hartranft delayed the execution longer than is usual under such circumstances, but he finally issued

the death warrant, and Kehoe gave great relief to many in the State by dying with sealed lips.

The organization had rendered such important political services to many prominent men of the State that they naturally made exhaustive efforts to save the lives of their friends. In one instance Lin Bartholomew, then in the forefront of the Schuylkill bar, and one of the ablest of the Republican State leaders, made an earnest struggle to save the life of Duffy, one of four murderers, who were to be executed on a certain day. He made a final appeal to the Board of Pardons for a reprieve for this particular criminal, but the Board divided on the question, even after Bartholomew had given assurance that one or more of the four men to be executed together would, by public confession on the scaffold, acquit his client.

Hartranft acted within the lines of safety, alike to himself and to the administration of justice, by signing a reprieve and sending Mr. Farr, secretary of the Board of Pardons, to attend the execution, with orders to deliver the reprieve if any confession was made by the others acquitting Bartholomew's client. Farr attended the execution, and made known his mission only to the sheriff and the ministering priest. There were four to be executed, two were executed together, and the one whose reprieve was in the possession of Farr was held back with another until after the two were executed who were expected to give the additional testimony in their confession. They accepted the death noose in silence, and without protest from the priest, who had received the confession of the dying men, the whole four were executed, and Farr brought the reprieve back to the Governor.

The political power of this organization became next to absolute in Schuylkill County, and that domination lasted for a number of years. So carefully were the

criminal acts planned and the executions covered, that it was more than ten years from the time that systematic murder was put into practice by the Molly Maguires before any one of the guilty parties was brought to justice. Franklin B. Gowan, one of the ablest trial lawyers in the State, and a man of sublime courage, was district attorney of Schuylkill County during the early operations of the Molly Maguires. He saw that there was organized crime in the community, that murders and other felonious crimes were perpetrated from time to time, and it was impossible to trace the guilty parties, showing that there was a powerful and well organized element in the community that was vigilantly supporting and protecting the criminals. He saw nearly every official of the county unwilling to make a manly effort for the detection and punishment of the banded criminals, and it was largely through his political ingenuity that Judge Riley was defeated in 1872, and Judge Pershing chosen to succeed him. Gowan then had a court that he knew he could trust, and he decided to devote his efforts untiringly to the discovery of the criminals, and bring them to the bar of justice.

After repeated conferences with Allan Pinkerton, of Chicago, the head of the National Detective Agency, it was decided to select some young man who was equal to the terrible undertaking to join the Molly Maguires, secure their confidence and report from time to time the crimes they planned and executed. After very careful investigation Pinkerton selected James McParlan, a young Irishman, born in Armagh County, in 1844, and a Catholic. He was only twenty-nine years of age when he accepted the fearfully perilous undertaking. He was a live, muscular fellow, about five feet eight inches in height, with fair complexion, dark chestnut hair, a broad, full forehead, and a keen gray eye. He

was possessed of a wonderful memory which served him well later on. He started upon his journey in October, 1873, under the name of James McKenna, and by representing himself as a fugitive from justice, claiming to have murdered a man in Buffalo, and slyly suggesting that he did not have to work hard for a living on account of being a false coiner, he quickly got into the good graces of the Ancient Order of Hibernians in the various towns in Schuylkill and Carbon Counties which he visited.

These representations of his misdeeds brought him into such favor that in April, 1874, he was formally initiated a member of the organization, and continued to be most active in its murderous councils until February, 1876, when his identity became known and his career as a detective came to an end. During that period of time McParlan discovered a condition of affairs in the Schuylkill coal region that is so appalling as to almost defy belief. He found that every Molly Maguire, as the assassins and incendiaries were known among themselves, was a member of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and that the proceedings of that organization were used for little other purpose than to order the destruction of life and property. County conventions were little more than gatherings in which men were selected to kill others whom they had never seen. He discovered that the oath of secrecy was nothing more in its enforcement and its use than an oath to protect the murderer and to revenge with pistol or dagger a wrong supposed to have been done any member of the body. It would take many volumes to tell the full story of the details of this gigantic conspiracy to slay and burn.

While other murders had been committed before that period, the first one directly traced to the Molly Maguires was that of Alexander Rae, a mining superin-

tendent, on the 17th of October, 1864, who was shot on the public highway in Columbia County. The really guilty parties were tried for the murder at Bloomsburg, but their efforts in support of an alibi were so overwhelming that they escaped; but twelve years later the murderers of Rae were executed for later murders.

On the 25th of August David Muhr, a colliery superintendent, was murdered in broad daylight and within two hundred yards of the colliery, but the murderers were so well hidden that they were never brought to justice.

On the 10th of January, 1866, Henry H. Dunne, another mining superintendent, was murdered in cold blood on the public highway, but the guilty parties were never discovered and no arrests were made.

On the 15th of March, 1869, William H. Littlehales, another mining superintendent, was murdered on the public road and the murderers were never discovered.

In Carbon County, that adjoins Schuylkill, frequent murders of the same kind were committed in the same period, including those of George K. Smith, F. W. S. Langdon, and Graham Powell, all of whom were colliery superintendents, or connected with large mining operations.

On the 14th of August, 1875, Gomer James was murdered at a picnic in Shenandoah, and subsequent developments proved that the murder was committed by Thomas Hurley, who had been selected at a county convention of the order to commit the crime.

On the 11th of August Thomas Gwyther, a justice of the peace, who had issued a warrant for the arrest of William Love, a criminal Molly Maguire, was shot and killed on the public street of Girardville by Love, who fled and was never captured.

On the 6th of July, 1875, Benjamin F. Yost, a police

officer of Tamaqua, was shot by two then unknown men. In the trial of the suspected parties, who were convicted and executed, it was proved that Yost had offended another member of the order, and Hugh McGehan and James Boyle were ordered to murder him.

On the first of September, 1875, at Raven Run, Thomas Sanger, a mining boss, and William Uren were shot and killed by five men, who were members of the order, and on the third of September, 1875, John P. Jones, a mining boss, of Lansford, Carbon County, was shot and killed by Edward Kelly and Michael J. Doyle, members of the order. They had been assigned by lot to commit the crime.

John P. Jones was one of the best known men in the anthracite coal regions and highly respected, and his murder occurred at a time when Gowan's efforts, through McParlan, were bringing rich fruits. The first arrests made under Gowan's systematic movement to bring the Molly Maguires to justice were those of Michael J. Doyle and Edward Kelly for the murder of Jones, and it was the culmination of the blood-thirsty reign of the thugs of the anthracite region. Mr. Gowan was then well equipped by inside information from the Mollies as to the leaders in these murders, and the public excitement was greatly intensified by the cold-blooded butchery of Jones.

Doyle, Kelly and Kerrigan were the first Molly Maguires brought to the bar of justice, and their trial for the murder of Jones was called on the 18th of January, 1876. Separate trials were demanded, and Doyle was first tried, convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. This was the first conviction of a known Molly Maguire for murder in the Schuylkill region. Kerrigan turned State's evidence and told the whole story of the murder, by which he saved his

neck, while Doyle and Kelly paid the penalty of their crimes on the gallows.

About that time it was discovered by the leading Molly Maguires that every movement they planned became in some way known to the officers of the law. It was McParlan's work, who, every time that opportunity presented, sent written reports of what the leading Mollies were doing to save the assassins. The prosecuting attorney of Carbon County was daily advised, from a source entirely unknown to him, of every move the opposing lawyers would make. McParlan not only gave accurate information as to the criminals and the details of the crimes committed, but he gave equally accurate information as to every movement made for the protection of the criminals who were brought before the courts.

He was finally suspected by his criminal associates, and he saw that the time was not distant when not only his usefulness would be ended, but when he would sacrifice his life if he remained. When his position as detective was first whispered he met Jack Kehoe face to face, and demanded that a convention of the order be called that he might summon his accusers and acquit himself. Kehoe called the convention, but before the time for its meeting McParlan discovered that nothing would be done there beyond taking his life. He was in constant consultation with Captain Linden, who was at the head of the Coal and Iron Police, and who aided materially in effecting McParlan's final escape to Philadelphia. When he reached Philadelphia in safety it was decided that the time had come for him to appear in open court as a witness, and Gowan startled the court and the crowded audience in attendance on the 4th of May, 1876, when the murderers of Benjamin F. Yost were placed on trial before Judge Pershing, by calling James McParlan to the witness stand, who

was at once known to all the Mollics in attendance as James McKenna, who had been a detective in their midst for two years past.

The whole appalling story of the Molly Maguire infamy was then told to the court, and justice again resumed her sway in her own sanctuary until sixteen men, all members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, were hung. They were Thomas Munley, for the murder of Thomas Sanger; James Carroll, James Roarty, Hugh McGehan, James Boyle and Thomas Duffy, for the murder of Benjamin Yost; Michael J. Doyle, Edward Kelly and Alexander Campbell, for the murder of John P. Jones; John Donahue and Thomas P. Fisher, for the murder of Morgan Powell; Jack Kehoe, for the murder of F. W. S. Langdon; Patrick Hester, Tully and McHugh, for the murder of Alexander Rae, and Peter McManus, for the murder of Frederick Hesser.

In addition to these executions, Thomas Donahue, Edward Monaghan, Barney B. Boyle, Kate Boyle, Bridget Hyland, Thomas Duffy, John Morris, Dennis F. Canning, Christopher Donnelly, John Gibbons, Michael O'Brien, Patrick Dolan, Frank O'Niel, and a number of others, all members of the order, were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, varying from one to seven years, for perjury, assault and battery with intent to kill, etc.

Although more than a generation has passed away since these Molly Maguire murders began, there are yet some of the many fugitives from justice living in different parts of the world, who may be tried for murder at any time during their lives if caught and brought back to the scenes of their crimes. Among those who were known to have committed murder in obedience to the orders of the Molly Maguires, and who became fugitives from justice to escape punishment, are William Love,

Thomas Hurley, Michael Doyle, James, alias "Friday," O'Donnell, James McAllister, John, alias "Humpty," Flynn, Jerry Kane, Frank Keenan, William Gunn, John Reagan, Thomas O'Neil and Patrick D. Gallagher, alias "Pugnose Pat." These men became fugitives, and their residence has never been discovered. Doubtless most of them have joined their criminal fellows on the other side, but some of them are living and in constant dread of being overtaken by justice.



John I. Mitchell

XCI.

NATIONAL BATTLE OF 1876.

Republicans Had Not Recovered from the Overwhelming Defeat of 1874—Democrats Held the House Most of the Time for Twenty Years—Tilden Nominated for President—His Strength and Personal Attributes—Receives a Large Popular Majority for President—John I. Mitchell Brought to the Front—Nominated for Congress to Defeat Strang—Senatorial Deadlock of 1881 Made Him United States Senator—Advised of His Selection by the Author in Washington—Made President Judge and Later Superior Judge—Retired for Physical and Mental Disability.

THE first National revolt against Republican power after the war occurred in 1874, when the Democrats elected a large majority of the popular branch of Congress, embracing 181 Democrats, 107 Republicans and 3 Independents, and that revolt culminated two years later, in 1876, when the Democrats gave Tilden, their candidate for President, a popular majority of 250,000 over Hayes, and elected 156 Democrats to 137 Republicans to the House.

The reconstruction policy of the government as administered under Grant became specially offensive to many of the most thoughtful Republicans, while the severe factional mastery in Grant's administration alienated many others. During the severe pressure of early reconstruction, while a very large proportion of Republicans disapproved, of the radical policy adopted, they felt that they must sustain the Republican party until it had completed the rehabilitation of the States; but the crop of adventurers who became rulers in the reconstructed States under carpet-bag power, and the low grade class of men sent to the Senate and House by

the restored States, strengthened and widened opposition to the reconstruction policy, and the result was that in 1874, in the middle of Grant's second administration, the country spoke with emphasis against the Republican rule of that day by electing an overwhelming majority of Democrats to the House, and followed it two years later by giving a quarter of a million popular majority to the Democratic candidate for President.

It is an interesting study to note the repeated and emphatic expressions of the country against Republican authority for many years after the revolution of 1874. The Democratic majority that first appeared in the Forty-fourth Congress was maintained in the Forty-fifth and Forty-sixth Congresses. In 1880, when Garfield was elected President over Hancock, the Republicans regained the House by a small majority, having 152 Republicans, 130 Democrats and 11 Greenbackers, but the record of that Congress, in which the Republicans dominated both branches, was so offensive to the country that in 1882 the Democrats regained the House by a large majority, electing 200 Democrats to 119 Republicans and 6 Greenbackers. Two years later, in 1884, the Democrats held the House by a smaller majority, having 183 to 139 Republicans and 3 Greenbackers, and in 1886 they elected to the Fiftieth Congress 169 Democrats to 152 Republicans and 4 Independents.

In 1888, when Harrison was elected President, the Republicans regained the House by eight majority, having 169 Republicans to 161 Democrats, but in 1890, after the passage of the McKinley tariff bill, the Democrats elected to the Fifty-second Congress 235 to 88 Republicans and 9 Farmers' Alliance, and in 1892, when Cleveland was recalled to the Presidency, they elected to the Fifty-third Congress 218 to 127 Republicans and 11 Independents. Since then the Repub-

licans have uniformly controlled the popular branch of Congress, but from 1874 to 1894 the Democrats had a majority of the popular branch of every Congress with the exceptions of the Forty-seventh Congress, chosen in 1880, and the Fifty-first, chosen in 1888. The Democrats controlled the Senate, and thus both branches, in the Forty-sixth Congress, when they had 43 Senators to 33 Republicans, and again in the Fifty-third Congress, chosen in 1892, the Democrats had 44 Senators to 37 Republicans and 4 Independents. Thus only in two Congresses, the Forty-sixth and the Fifty-third, have the Democrats controlled both branches of Congress since the war.

The popular vote for President, beginning in 1876, when Tilden had a popular majority of 250,000 over Hayes, shows the serious Republican defection that was willing to accept Democratic authority to conserve and restrain the abuses of Republican power. In 1880, Garfield, the Republican candidate for President, had less than 10,000 popular majority over Hancock. In 1884, Cleveland had a popular majority over Blaine of nearly 30,000. In 1888, when Harrison was elected over Cleveland by the electoral college, Cleveland's popular majority over Harrison was nearly 100,000, and in 1892, Cleveland received a popular majority over Harrison of over 300,000. Thus, from 1876 to 1892, including the contests of both those years, the Republicans had a popular majority for President only in a single instance, and that was the nominal majority of Garfield over Hancock in 1880.

A careful study of these elections will satisfy any dispassionate student of our political history that, while the Democrats have many times given popular majorities in National and congressional contests, the country has never been Democratic since the war. In four National contests the Democrats gave popular

majorities to their candidates for President, but the majorities were not made up of Democratic votes. The Democrats have won, alike in Pennsylvania and in the Nation, only by Republican defection that emphasized the purpose to restrain the abuses of Republican power, and the party was chastened in defeat by the deliberate action of its own people. Pennsylvania has had Democratic Governors and other State officers since the war, and the Nation has had Democratic Presidents and gave majorities for others who were not elected, but they have never won either a State or National victory wholly by Democratic votes.

The contest of 1876 was a memorable struggle, not only because it was one of the most earnestly contested battles of our political history, but, also, because of the reversal of the popular majority by the electoral college, whose contested seats were finally decided by an electoral commission created by Congress. Pennsylvania had re-elected Hartranft the year before by a comparatively small majority that was worked out by the very shrewd manipulation of the Labor and Greenback organization of the State, and the Republicans felt that Pennsylvania would be a debatable State in a National contest. There were no State officers to be chosen, but the contest for Congressmen and the Legislature was fought out with great earnestness on both sides.

Tilden's advent into politics presented an unusually brilliant record. He was a severely trained and technical lawyer, so severely technical that his own will was successfully contested in the courts, but he proved to be a most masterful political organizer. The Republicans had made a shrewd move two years before by nominating General Dix, a War Democrat, for Governor, and thereby saved the State. Dix made a highly creditable administration, but Tilden decided to make

a contest for the Governorship in 1874, and he planned and completed the most perfect organization the party had ever in the State, by which he not only nominated himself for Governor, but defeated Dix by a large majority. As soon as he became Governor, he started out to nominate himself for President, by the same method, and while he had no great popular following, although commanding the respect of all parties, he won his nomination with ease over Governor Hendricks, of Indiana, his chief competitor.

Tilden was a severe cloister student, but he carefully studied the men of the country, and he had as his chief lieutenant in Pennsylvania William L. Scott, of Erie, one of the ablest Democratic leaders of that day, who was twice elected to Congress in the overwhelmingly Republican district of Erie and Crawford. Scott was at that time among the most forceful of the Democratic leaders in the State and a tireless worker, and Tilden had men of like qualities directing the battle for him in all of the States. He was not a man of personal popular qualities, being a bachelor student whose social attributes were neglected, but he was recognized as one of the ablest of our National leaders, as a man of undoubted integrity, and as one who would speedily and surely correct the then serious abuses of Republican power.

He had strongly commended himself to the better class of the people of all parties by the courage he exhibited in taking an open stand for the exposure and punishment of Tweed, who was then the assumed Democratic leader of city and State. It was to Tilden more than to any other one man that Tweed owed his fall, and for that reason, and also because of his generally reputable character, he commanded the respect of Republicans, and received many votes from the reform element of that party. Hayes received 17,904 majority

over Tilden in Pennsylvania, nearly all of which was given in the city of Philadelphia. The Republicans carried both branches of the Legislature by a decided majority, and reversed the Democratic majority in the congressional delegation that was elected in 1874, giving the Republicans seventeen of the twenty-seven Congressmen.

The election of 1876 brought into prominence John I. Mitchell, of Tioga County, who was elected to Congress in the district composed of Tioga, Potter, McKean, Cameron, Lycoming and Sullivan. He had served several sessions as a State representative, and was one of the prominent leaders of that body before he retired from it. He was a man of thoroughly clean reputation, sternly honest in public and private life, but lacked the keenness of perception and the ability to lead in a fight without careful preparation, which are so necessary in a brilliant leader, but his high character and genial qualities made him universally respected, and he was one of the most influential members of the body, although lacking rhetorical attainments.

His nomination for Congress, that led to his election, was what is commonly called in politics an accident. The acknowledged Republican leader of Tioga County at that time was Butler B. Strang, a man of unusual ability, always ready for the forensic battle, no matter how suddenly precipitated, and in both house and senate he was accepted as the ablest lawyer of the body. He had served several terms in the house, from whence he was transferred to the senate, where his term ended in 1876. During a long legislative service I saw all the ablest legislative leaders of that period, and I do not know one who surpassed Strang, either in strategy or debate. He served in the senate with such distinguished legal luminaries as Wallace, Dill, Yerkes, White, Rutan and others, and he stood

fully abreast with the ablest of them, and his admirable personal qualities attached his friends to him with hooks of triple steel.

He was as fearless as he was able, and it was his misfortune to offend the Cameron power that was dominant at that time. He was too great to take orders from any political or personal power, and his prominence in the northern section of the State was a constant menace to the Cameron mastery. Had Strang been the trained and tireless political manager that Cameron was, he could have dominated his district and section of the State, but the one distinguishing characteristic of both Strang and Mitchell was their general indifference to political movements even in their own immediate locality, and both loved the ease of indolence.

Strang confidently expected to be the next Congressman from Tioga County, and his ambition would have been realized had he understood and interposed against the far-reaching management of Cameron. It was generally conceded that Tioga County was not entitled to the Republican candidate for Congress in 1876, according to the rule of rotation that generally obtained in the rural sections, and Strang paid no attention, whatever, to the congressional matter, believing that the county could not, and should not, receive the nomination at that time; but when the county convention met Cameron's friends were fully advised of his purposes, and in the absence of Strang as a candidate, the name of Mitchell was proposed to the convention for what was generally regarded as the empty compliment of a congressional recommendation. While the convention did not understand it, the Cameron managers well understood what it meant, and when Mitchell was given the conferees of Tioga County, the other counties were carefully manipulated by Cameron's

friends to nominate Mitchell as the district candidate, and thus, for a decade at least, preclude the possibility of Strang's congressional aspirations being gratified.

In addition to this shrewd overthrow of Strang in his own district, Cameron threw himself into the breach in the Republican State convention, where Strang was a candidate for State treasurer, and his nomination generally conceded, and the same influence and methods which were employed to defeat him at home were employed with equal success in the State convention, and Strang was mortified by a defeat that utterly astounded himself and his friends.

Cameron thus succeeded in practically ending the political power of Butler B. Strang, who, thereafter, was comparatively unknown and unfelt in the politics of his section, as he was usually not an aggressive man, although a desperate fighter when engaged in earnest conflict, and a few years thereafter, in a moment of that fearful despondency that hurls reason from her throne, he sent the death bullet into his own brain and ended his career as a suicide. Had he sought the nomination for Congress in his county in 1876, it would have been accorded to him without a serious contest, but he doubtless would have been defeated for the nomination in the district. He could have bided his time, however, for his county of Tioga, possessing as it did more than the entire Republican majority of the district, could not have been long denied a representative, and had Strang entered the National councils his record would have been distinguished among the able representatives of Pennsylvania.

Mitchell entered Congress, served without making his impress in the proceedings of that body, was re-elected in 1878, and was about closing a four years' term of service in February, 1881, when the same fortuitous circumstances which had sent him to Congress

in 1876, made him a United States Senator, although unthought of as a candidate until after the Legislature had become involved in a bitter factional contest. His career in Congress was not distinguished for either industry or participation in debate, but he was a straightforward, honest representative, and was respected as widely as he was known.

I happened to be in Washington on the night that he was agreed upon by the disputing factions at Harrisburg as a compromise candidate for Senator, and was in Mitchell's room engaged at a game of whist with him and two others, with several visiting spectators. Colonel Lambert was then on "The Times" staff with me, and was at Harrisburg carefully watching the Senatorial struggle. His high character and attainments as a journalist, and his admirable personal qualities, gave him access to the inner circles of all political movements then as they do to-day, and about half past ten o'clock in the evening, when engaged at whist with Mitchell and our partners, a telegram was brought to me from Lambert, stating that Mitchell had been agreed upon by both the disputing factions for United States Senator, and would be elected on the following day.

I handed the despatch to Mitchell, and with equal surprise and delight he announced it to the others in the room, whereupon a rush was made to congratulate him, and all did so but myself, as I remained seated at the table. He finally turned to me and said: "You are the only one who has not congratulated me." I at once arose and took him by the hand, and told him that if he felt equal to the discharge of the high duties of Senator so as to make his name remembered by the Nation when he retired from it, he was to be congratulated. His head involuntarily dropped toward his breast, and he said: "McClure is right, but I will try."

I had great respect and much affection for him, and knew that his election to the Senate, while it would make a stainless record, would not rank him among the leaders of the Nation. He was just in the prime of life, and in the possession of perfect physical and mental vigor, but who of all the men who have carefully studied the records of the first legislative tribunal of the country can recall a single monument of statesmanship that owes its creation to Senator Mitchell? He was not at all alone in his class, for Pennsylvania and many other States have repeatedly sent men to the United States Senate whose names are unknown in the important annals of National legislation.

Mitchell entered the Senate on the 4th of March, 1881, and his first and only great utterance or movement that he made in either politics or legislation was in leading a revolt one year later against the Cameron power that had not only sent him to Congress, but that had made him the compromise candidate for United States Senator, as in the factional fight in the Legislature Cameron's power was largely dominant. What particular influence led him to make a revolution against the organization of the party has never been given to the public. That he was honest in his convictions none who knew him could doubt, but what special provocation made a man who had studiously avoided factional warfare throw the plume of his Senatorship into a revolutionary movement not only against his party, but against the men who had given him the most important positions he had held, seemed incomprehensible; and when it is remembered that he led a revolution against General James A. Beaver, the Republican candidate for Governor, a man of the cleanest record and the sternest integrity, and a gallant and maimed soldier, who had been nominated without a serious contest in the State convention, his

revolutionary action seemed even more difficult of explanation.

I witnessed the nomination of General Beaver, and when the convention adjourned there was not the sign of revolt in any quarter. There was not a cloud visible even so large as a man's hand on the political horizon, and the members of that convention adjourned without a doubt as to General Beaver's election; but suddenly the revolt sprang to the surface, and when it was led by a Republican United States Senator against the Cameron rule of the State, the movement was quickened in every section, and for once the power of Senator Mitchell was felt from center to circumference of the State.

I saw him at the Independent Republican convention, and it was the only time that I ever saw him thoroughly aroused, aggressive and defiant. His position and environment made him altogether the most important factor in the revolutionary movement, and brought to the Independent convention a very large number of representative Republicans from every part of the State. A full State ticket was nominated with Senator (now Judge) Stewart, of Franklin, for Governor. Stewart had been the leader in the senate in the revolt against the election of Oliver and others, who, in turn, were adopted as the candidates of the Cameron end of the party for United States Senator, and when he accepted the nomination it was notice that the battle of the revolutionists would be made a fight to the finish.

Stewart canvassed the State, as did Beaver and Pattison, and the struggle became one of desperation. There was no hope, whatever, of Stewart's election, and the fact that his candidacy had but a single practical aim, and that the defeat of the regular Republican State ticket, made many of the Independent Republicans

vote directly for Pattison for Governor in order to assure the defeat of Beaver. The result was the election of Pattison, by a plurality nearly equal to Stewart's vote, and the entire State ticket, including candidates for lieutenant governor, secretary of internal affairs, supreme judge and congressmen-at-large, fell with Beaver.

After this grand exhibition of aggressive action on the part of Senator Mitchell, he practically retired from participation in factional conflict, and thereafter acted generally in harmony with the regular organization, and was unfelt in the party leadership of the State. He was universally respected and very generally beloved at home, and when he retired from the Senate and was practically without power in the general direction of the politics of the State, he announced himself as a candidate for president judge in his home county, and although his opponent was the Republican incumbent who had served ten years with general acceptability, Mitchell was nominated by a decided majority and became president judge of his district.

He continued in that position until a few years ago, when a vacancy was made on the Republican State ticket by the enforced withdrawal of the candidate for judge of the superior court, when Mitchell was accepted by the leaders and was elected to the second appellate tribunal of the State, but his service was very brief in his new judicial capacity, as paralysis suddenly laid him low, from which he has never recovered. For a considerable period after he became entirely unfitted for the performance of any judicial duties he retained his position, hoping to be able to resume his judicial work, but finally the physical wreck sadly impaired his mental powers, and he was retired from the bench by a law passed chiefly for his benefit.

XCII.

ANARCHY RULED IN 1877.

The Darkest Year in the History of Pennsylvania—Culmination of the Revulsion of 1873—Business Depressed and Working Men Without Bread—Anarchy First Asserted Its Mastery in Pittsburg by Destroying Several Millions of Pennsylvania Railroad Property—took Possession of all the Railroads of the State, and Generally Throughout the Country—Governor Hartranft Absent in the West—Adjutant General Latta Rendered Timely and Heroic Service—Appalling Condition in Philadelphia—Mayor Stokley Calls for a Committee of Safety—The Author a Member—Interesting Incidents in Preserving Peace in the City—Stokley's Magnificent Administration to Preserve Peace—Exceptional Military Service Rendered by Col. Bonnaffon's Regiment.

EIGHTEEN hundred and seventy-seven was the darkest year of the last half century in the history of Pennsylvania. The excessive inflation, bewildering extravagance, and tidal wave of speculation which had prevailed for years under the immense volume of depreciated currency during the war were brought to a halt in 1873, when liquidation began. At no time in the history of the country were the people so largely and so generally in debt, as all channels of industry, commerce and trade had been steadily expanded for a full decade from the beginning of the war, and all intelligent observers of the situation knew that a terrible reckoning must come, but each hoped that it would be postponed until he had reached a solid financial basis.

When the revulsion began in 1873 it was generally believed that it would be only temporary, but the liquidation that was then begun continued steadily and relentlessly until it culminated in 1877, when most

of the great States of the Union were plunged into anarchy. As liquidation continued, the wages of labor were reduced when the industrial classes had been enjoying for ten years the most prosperous season they had ever known, and had naturally drifted into excessive extravagance in imitation of the people of fortune about them. The severe necessities, which were felt in almost every home restrained expenditures, thus largely limiting consumption, resulting in the enforced limitation of products, and employment of labor.

Many were forced into bankruptcy after 1873, and when 1877 was reached the general business depression and paralysis of industry was more general than at any other period during the last half of the nineteenth century. Labor strikes for increase of wages that it was not in the power of the employers to pay, were common in all the great centers of industry, and there were hundreds of thousands of people in Pennsylvania without bread in their homes to satisfy the demands of hunger. A mob exasperated by pinching want is not only always unreasoning, but is always desperate and revolutionary, and on the 19th of July, 1877, in the city of Pittsburg, the rule of anarchy began when the mob took possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad and refused to allow the freight trains to be moved.

Governor Hartranft was in the far West on a visit to the Pacific coast, and Adjutant General James W. Latta was compelled to act in the absence of the Governor, and on application of the sheriff of Allegheny County for military to aid in maintaining the peace, he ordered troops to Pittsburg. The appearance of troops upon the railway called out the revolutionary elements along the entire line between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, and within twenty-four hours the railroad was practically blocked at every important point

between the two great cities. The Baltimore and Ohio was also seized by the revolutionists, and in a few days the great trunk lines to the far West were absolutely in the hands of the people, who were inflamed to the point of anarchy.

Philadelphia passed through an exceedingly severe ordeal, and although I had little political sympathy with Mayor Stokley, I regard it as only just to say that the preservation of the public peace in this great city was due almost wholly to his unfaltering courage and wisely directed efforts to prevent an eruption of lawlessness. He knew the people of the city, had grown up with them, and he specially understood the class of our citizens who were likely to be inflamed to violence. The only power exhibited by the mob in the city was in taking possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad depot in West Philadelphia, from which point all trains were then started. The mob held possession of the depot and the line for most of two days, but it was finally suppressed by the appearance of a small body of regular troops, whose presence intimidated the rioters, as they had a wholesome fear of the willingness of regular troops to obey orders and fire upon mobs when necessary, while the volunteer troops sent to Pittsburg and other points of the State greatly inflamed the rioters and provoked them to desperate lawlessness. In no instance did they attempt any violent movements in the presence of regular troops.

The police force of Mayor Stokley was entirely inadequate to the emergency, and he addressed letters to some two hundred citizens asking them to meet promptly at the mayor's headquarters to consider the best methods of preserving the peace of the city. Although the relations between the mayor and myself were then somewhat strained, I was among those he invited to attend that meeting. John Welsh, then

perhaps the foremost of Philadelphia's citizens, was called to the chair, and Mayor Stokley frankly stated to the meeting, held with closed doors, that he desired that a Committee of Safety be appointed by the meeting to consist of five persons, who should act with the mayor, and whose judgment he could freely accept in any emergency that required extraordinary measures to be taken for the protection of person and property. He desired that the judgment of this committee should be full warrant for him to take any measures deemed necessary, even without authority of law, to suppress violence in the city. The meeting promptly decided to comply with his request, and charged Mr. Welsh with the duty of selecting the committee of which he should be chairman. The mayor gave no details to the meeting of the conditions in the several sections of the city, beyond stating that violence was threatened in different localities.

Before the meeting was held he had issued an order forbidding persons to congregate anywhere on the streets, and his police were privately instructed to prevent any meetings in the disturbed portions of the city. His policy was to keep the revolutionary elements scattered and ignorant of their strength, and in that he was eminently wise, for had the revolutionary elements of the city known their strength they could have precipitated Philadelphia into anarchy in an hour. He had also given private instruction to the officers of several regiments of the city to be ready to march at the shortest notice, and to guard against extreme conditions he had a boat on the Schuylkill, and another on the Delaware, laden with ammunition, so that the military could be supplied even if the depositories of ammunition were destroyed.

When the meeting adjourned I thought it due to Mr. Welsh to advise him not to think of me as a member of



Sylvester Bonaffon

that committee, and I told him privately that my relations with the mayor were not such as would make it agreeable for him to have me serve in that capacity. I went to my office, but was not there more than thirty minutes when I received a notice from the mayor that I was appointed one of the Committee of Safety, and my presence was required at his office at once. I was greatly surprised, but it was a call that could not be disobeyed, and I hurriedly returned to the mayor's office, where Mr. Welsh informed me that he had appointed me in obedience to the special request of the mayor himself, thus relieving me of all embarrassment in entering upon the responsible duties. The Committee of Safety consisted of John Welsh, ex-Mayor McMichael, ex-Mayor Fox, Senator Cochran and myself, and when we had gathered in the mayor's office we were all startled at the condition of affairs in our city. While under Mayor Stokley's admirable use of his police to prevent any gatherings whatever in any part of the city, there was every indication on the surface of a peaceful and quiet community, the mayor informed us how difficult it had been for him up to that time to keep the revolutionary elements apart, and to prevent the city from being plunged into anarchy. He stated all the precautions he had taken, in which he had acted with great intelligence and firmness, and said that the first need of the city was to double its police force, for which he had no lawful authority. He stated, however, that any means necessary to preserve the public peace would be employed by him regardless of their lawfulness if approved by the Committee of Safety.

The committee at once unanimously authorized him to double the police force, then consisting of but little more than a thousand men in the entire city. My first awakening to the actual situation in Philadelphia was caused by a reply that Mayor Stokley made to my sug-

gestion that there were thousands of intelligent and law-abiding skilled laborers of the city who were without employment, and who doubtless would be very willing to be taken on the police force. The mayor's answer was that we had plenty of the very class I had described, many of whom owned their own homes, and who were without employment, but while they would not join in revolutionary proceedings themselves, they could not be induced to employ force to restrain the starving laborers who had been inflamed into riotous action by the few vicious spirits who are ever ready in a community to incite to lawlessness.

At first blush the task of obtaining a thousand capable and faithful policemen seemed next to impossible, but the mayor suggested that they should be found in the ranks of the Grand Army of the Republic. He paid what I have ever regarded as the highest tribute ever paid by any one to the veterans of our civil war, when he said that there was not a Union soldier who had served with credit in the army, however poor, or however dissolute, who could not be trusted to enforce law and order in the community against all classes and conditions. The result was that the police force in the city was promptly doubled, and chiefly, if not wholly, from the ranks of the Grand Army, and not one of the men thus called to duty failed to give honest and faithful service to the city.

In one of the uptown sections of the city there was very serious disturbance, and systematic efforts were made by a few ringleaders to precipitate a riot, in imitation of the mastery of anarchy in Pittsburg. The police officer in charge of that section was present at the first meeting of the Committee of Safety, and gave a detailed account of the danger of a breach of the peace being precipitated that night. The mayor very coolly asked him whether he knew the man or men who

were studiously seeking to inaugurate lawlessness, to which the policeman answered that he did; that one man was the leader of the whole movement, and he was tireless in his efforts to precipitate revolution. The mayor quietly remarked to his police officer that he should have a good force on hand, and that, if any riotous action was forced upon him, he should see that the right person or persons were killed. The policeman seemed to understand the mayor perfectly, and bowed himself out.

On the following morning the same officer made his report in the presence of the mayor and the committee, and he stated that a riot had been started in his section, but that the ringleader was killed before it had attained any great importance, and that the lawless elements were then easily controlled. The mayor thanked the police officer, and he again bowed himself out. Who had killed the man was never inquired into, and the newspapers simply stated that a riot had been started in one of the uptown sections of Philadelphia, and that one man was killed, but the policeman certainly could have told by whom and how the rioter had fallen.

Within twenty-four hours after the Committee of Safety met with Stokley, when he was invested by the committee with dictatorial powers, he had the city so completely under control that an outbreak was simply an impossibility. He was greatly fretted that the railway depot was held so long by a mob, and he was restrained from going to the depot on a locomotive with the engineer to move a train out of the city, only by the earnest protest of the committee against thus imperilling his own life. The committee met with him three times each day for more than a week, when the regular municipal authorities were entirely equal to maintaining the public peace. It made no record of its proceedings, and neither the newspapers nor the public

sought to know what measures had been adopted. There were many important facts brought before the committee which were certainly not proper for public information, but all these have no place in history, and the writer is the only one of the six men who assumed dictatorial power for the preservation of the peace of the city who is yet among the living.

Mayor Stokley had held important public positions, and was one of the foremost leaders of his party in the city, but he was one of the few men in important municipal trust who had never enriched himself directly or indirectly by official power, and he was not a man of fortune. On the day that the Committee of Safety adjourned finally, I returned to "The Times" office and drew a subscription paper to raise a fund to be given to Mayor Stokley as a tribute to the exceptionally great service he had rendered the community when threatened with anarchy. Within a few days \$10,000 was subscribed and paid, and that fund was delivered to Mayor Stokley by Mr. McLaughlin, the publisher of "The Times," and he gratefully accepted it. I have heard that another fund was raised by some of the financial institutions of the city, but I cannot speak advisedly on the subject. Had ten times ten thousand been contributed and paid to Mayor Stokley, it would not have been in excess of his just deserts.

At the expiration of his term as mayor I earnestly urged the nomination of Mayor Stokley for re-election by the Committee of One Hundred, and that was accomplished. There were no conditions imposed upon him that he could not have consistently accepted, and he was more than willing to have the endorsement of the Committee of One Hundred with the regular Republican nomination, but the Republican leaders were smarting under wounds which had been inflicted by the Committee of One Hundred in former political contests,

and they were imperative in demanding that the mayor should reject the nomination of the Committee of One Hundred. I called on the mayor and appealed to him not to reject the support of the Committee of One Hundred, not only because it would endanger his election, but because it would deny him the opportunity to conduct his next administration on a higher and better plane, and command the confidence of the entire community. He earnestly desired to do so, but the leaders, each of whom had been humiliated by defeats given them by the Committee of One Hundred, were imperious in demanding that their candidate for mayor could not accept the nomination of the Committee, and threatened him with disastrous defeat if he disregarded their appeal. He informed me that he was compelled most reluctantly to decline the nomination of the committee to maintain the unity of his party.

The result was that the Democrats and the committee nominated Samuel G. King for mayor, and John Hunter, an Independent Republican, for receiver of taxes, and the newspaper I then conducted had no choice but to separate from Stokley and support the King and Hunter ticket. Stokley suffered a humiliating defeat, as King was chosen by over 5,000, and Hunter by a largely increased majority. Stokley afterwards served very creditably as director of public safety, under Mayor Fitler, and while many criticised his violent political methods, he lived respected by all for his personal integrity, and died widely lamented.

The story of the mastery of mob rule in Pittsburg, in 1877, when property of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to the value of some \$4,000,000, was fired and destroyed by the mob, need not be repeated in detail. The chief reason for the more violent eruption of anarchy in Pittsburg than elsewhere was the lingering prejudice in that community against the railroad, that

had been created by the long struggle of a large majority of the community, and many of the officials of the county, to accomplish the repudiation of a debt the county had assumed to aid in the construction of the railway. So violent and dominating was the repudiation movement that the commissioners of the county preferred to go to prison for contempt of court rather than obey the order of the court to levy taxes for the payment of the interest on the debt, and the struggle was maintained in the courts for many years. The children of that day were taught that the people were being robbed by the railroad corporation, and when they grew up to manhood they did not forget it.

The sheriff, being unable to maintain the peace, called upon the Governor for the military to aid him in preserving order, and the trouble became so serious in different sections along the line of the road, and in the anthracite coal region, where the miners were on a strike, that practically the entire military force of the State was called out. There were ten major generals, whose divisions were presumably in service to maintain the peace in Pennsylvania, as the adjutant general's report of that year contains the reports of the ten major generals, detailing the service rendered by their respective divisions. It should be said, however, that a very large portion of the militia did not respond to the call. Most of the privates were working men, who were in sympathy with the mob spirit that was rife at the time, and some of the soldiers who appeared for service threw down their arms and fraternized with the mob when they came in contact with the rioters. Enough faithful soldiers, however, were brought into service to restore the State to comparative tranquillity within two weeks, but not until after a number of the rioters and some of the soldiers were killed or wounded.

It was a costly experience for Allegheny County, as

under the law of that time the county was responsible for any property destroyed by the mob, and after the attempt at legislation to reimburse the loss from the State treasury that resulted in disaster and scandal, the matter was finally adjusted by Allegheny County paying nearly \$3,000,000 for the property destroyed.

While many of the military called out to suppress disorder behaved with great gallantry, the one military organization that stands out distinct from all others, alike in its promptness in responding to the call of the Governor and in its faithful performance of every duty assigned to it, was what was known as the Twentieth Regiment, organized in Philadelphia by Colonel Sylvester Bonnaffon, Jr. The adjutant general in his report stated that the emergency was great for an additional military force of thoroughly reliable men, and in response to Colonel Bonnaffon's proposition to raise a regiment of veterans it was promptly accepted, and in the adjutant general's report he said of this regiment: "It was recruited in thirty-six hours, fully clothed by the contributions of patriotic citizens, armed by the State, and in fifty-six hours from the time recruiting was commenced it was on duty at Pittsburg."

It was made up of veteran soldiers of the Civil War, and so valuable were its services, and the courage, skill and discretion of Colonel Bonnaffon as commander, that after its service in Pittsburg it was transferred to the anthracite coal region, where it held the disorderly elements in check, and it was the last of the military organizations called into service released from duty.

Colonel Bonnaffon was as modest as he was brave and skillful, and while many others reaped rich rewards for their services, he gathered no fruits for the heroic record he had made, beyond the highest encomiums from his superior officers, and the sincerest expression of thanks from the leading citizens of Wilkes-Barre to

the soldier who had given peace and protection to the community. He has long held the responsible position of cashier of customs in the port of Philadelphia, and has handled hundreds of millions of government money with scrupulous fidelity. He suffered severe wounds during the Civil War, which have caused and ever will cause him much suffering, and he is one of the very few pensioners who, when called to official position by the government with ample salary for his livelihood, has uniformly covered his pension check back to the treasury of the United States, thereby presenting an example that should be imitated by every pensioner who is given official position by the government with adequate salary for the support of himself and family.



Edwin Laurentine Drake

XCIII.

THE GREAT OIL DEVELOPMENT.

The Humble Beginning of a Trade that has Risen to Hundreds of Millions—Professor Silliman's Chemical Investigation of Petroleum—Colonel E. L. Drake Sank the First Oil Well—His Difficulty in Raising One Thousand Dollars to Start the Oil Development—He was More than a Year in Getting His Well Completed—Representative Rouse Regarded as a Hopeless Crank by his Fellow Legislators in 1859—The Tidal Wave of Speculation in Oil Companies, Resulting in Sweeping Disaster—Desperate Battles of the Oil Men to Reach Markets—The Annual Oil Product Now Over One Hundred Million Barrels—At First Worth Twenty Dollars a Barrel; now Worth One Dollar or Less.

ONE of the most marvelous developments of the mineral resources of Pennsylvania during the half century just closing, was that of the petroleum industry. As an article of commerce and universal use, petroleum was unknown fifty years ago. The existence of petroleum springs in Western New York, Western Pennsylvania and West Virginia had been known to the Indians for many generations, and to the white settlers for at least a century. But that it was stored in great rock reservoirs ready to gush forth by the thousands of barrels daily at the magic touch of the artesian drill, had never been dreamed of.

An oil called "kerosene" had been manufactured for several years prior to 1855 from bituminous shales, and the increasing use and demand for this illuminant prompted chemical investigation of some specimens of petroleum secured from springs along Oil Creek. Professor B. Silliman, Jr., professor of chemistry in Yale College, completed a thorough analysis of some petroleum taken from a spring on Oil Creek nearly

two miles south of Titusville, at nearly the identical location where, four years later, the first successful petroleum well was drilled by the late Colonel E. L. Drake. In his report upon this analysis, which was published in the spring of 1855, Professor Silliman said, "The crude oil was tried as a means of illumination. For this purpose a weighed quantity was decomposed by passing it through a wrought iron retort filled with carbon and ignited to redness. It produced nearly pure carburetted hydrogen gas, the most highly illuminating of all carbon gases. In fact, the oil may be regarded as chemically identical with illuminating gas in a liquid form. It burned with an intense flame. Compared with gas the rock oil gave more light than any burner except the costly argand, consuming two feet of gas per hour. These photometric experiments have given the oil a much higher value as an illuminator than I had dared to hope." Until this time the oil had been collected from the surface of the springs and sold in small bottles as a medicine, under the name of Seneca Oil, the name being derived from the Seneca Indians, who had been the first to collect it and utilize it for medicinal purposes. Professor Silliman's analysis four years in advance of its discovery in sufficient quantities to be of real commercial value had determined its principal use in the future, although he probably was not aware of this at the time.

Silliman's report attracted wide attention, and a company was soon organized with a capital of a quarter of a million dollars, to purchase lands and erect such machinery as might be required to collect all the oil in the vicinity of the spring from whence the test sample had been taken. Even at this time, however, the most sanguine promoters of the plan to develop the petroleum industry had not dreamed of boring artesian wells to tap subterranean deposits of the fluid. Their only idea

was to develop and utilize to the fullest possible extent the product of the various surface springs which were known to exist. One result, however, of the agitation was the employment of Colonel Edwin L. Drake to visit the property near Titusville and make a report of the best means of securing paying quantities of oil. Stopping on his way from New Haven, to view the salt wells of Syracuse, Colonel Drake visited Titusville near the close of 1857. Remaining a few days to transact legal business and examine the lands, he proceeded to Pittsburg, visiting the salt wells at Tarentum, on the way. The salt wells at Syracuse and Tarentum gave him the idea of boring for oil, and he hastened back to Connecticut to conclude a scheme of operating the property. Provided with a fund of one thousand dollars as a starter, Drake was engaged at a thousand dollars a year to begin operations, and arrived in Titusville early in May, 1858. So inexperienced was he, however, in the art of drilling wells, and so many difficulties and discouragements did he encounter, that it was not until August 28, 1859, a year and a third after he had arrived at his post to begin the work, that the drill had reached the depth of seventy feet and pierced the rock deposit in which the stored petroleum had been waiting for ages. A twenty-barrel well had been tapped, and the foundation of the great oil industry, which has since grown to an annual value of more than one hundred millions, had been laid.

When oil was first developed in Venango County by boring wells, most of those engaged in the enterprise became enthusiastic over the measure of wealth they expected to realize, but the public generally regarded the whole scheme as unpromising. I well remember serving as a representative at Harrisburg in 1859 with Mr. Rouse, a member from Venango, who was one of the earliest pioneers in oil development. He had half

a dozen small vials of different qualities of oil in his pocket, and soon was regarded by his associates generally in the house as an unbalanced crank on the oil question. He was constantly telling us, like Mulberry Sellers, that "there's millions in it," but he could not induce one of his associates to invest a dollar in oil development. He was an intelligent and enterprising man, and had studied the question as thoroughly as it was possible then to master it, and in a very few years he acquired a large fortune from his oil wells, but his life work was cut short when one of his flowing wells suddenly took fire when he was close to it, and his life was given in a struggle with the flames. He was a bachelor without kith or kin about him, and his entire fortune was equally divided between the improvement of the roads of the county and the support of the poor.

In this connection some comparative figures will be interesting. The total production of oil for the year 1859 was 1,873 barrels, which brought an average price of twenty dollars a barrel. The following year, 1860, the production increased to 547,439 barrels, at an average price of \$9.60 per barrel, the lowest monthly price being \$2.75. In 1861, the year of the beginning of the Civil War, the Empire and other large wells producing thousands of barrels a day each were struck. The production for the year went up to 2,119,045 barrels, and the price went down to ten cents a barrel. The process of refining the oil for general use had not as yet been perfected, and the market was flooded with oil for which there were no purchasers. Getting it to market was also a costly as well as tedious process. Railroads had not yet penetrated the oil country, and pipe lines were unknown. The favorite method of getting the oil from the wells to where it could find purchasers and consumers was by loading it into flat boats, which were

floated out of Oil Creek by a series of artificial floods, called "pond freshets," and so down the Allegheny River to Pittsburg. In the dry midsummer season, when there was too little water for flat boat navigation, the oil was hauled in barrels over a series of miserable country roads to Meadville and other points along the Atlantic and Great Western Railway, a distance of thirty miles. This was merely a temporary stage of the development of the great oil industry, however.

The breaking out of the War of the Rebellion in 1861, and the low price of petroleum at that time, incident to a rapidly increasing production, and the crude and costly processes of refining and marketing the oil, tended for a short time to check the development of the petroleum industry. This check was only temporary, for the output of the flowing wells already tapped inspired railway building, and in a short time one branch of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway was constructed from Meadville to Franklin, and later to Oil City. Another branch was laid from Corry to Titusville, and extended first to Miller Farm, six miles below, on Oil Creek, and then to Shaffer Farm, a mile further toward Oil City, which was the terminus of this branch for several years. This left a ten-mile stretch of the Oil Creek Valley from Shaffer Farm to Oil City still without a railroad, but with railroad privileges at either extremity; the product of this rich producing region was easily handled from either direction, for oil could be towed up the stream in flat boats by horse power as well as floated down the stream with the current. With these improved transportation facilities and a gradually perfected system of refining, the market for petroleum steadily expanded. Long before the close of the Rebellion, it became an important source of revenue to the Federal government, Congress levying a tax for war purposes of twenty cents a gallon

upon refined oil, and one dollar per barrel upon crude. Practically all the oil refined in the country paid this double tax, only that which was exported in the crude form escaping the tax upon refined.

With the advance in the price of oil due to improved methods of transportation and refining, an era of wild speculation set in. Fabulous fortunes were made in a year by such fortunate operators as Orange Noble, George B. Delamater, Dr. M. C. Egbert, the Phillips Brothers, and the owners of the Benninghoff, Tarr, McClintock, Rynd, and other farms, the names of which became household words the country over. Promoters and speculators swarmed through Venango, Crawford, Warren and Forest counties, buying and leasing lands without regard to their location, and in most instances with no evidence that oil was to be found beneath them. With these land purchases and leases as a basis, hundreds of stock companies were formed and the stocks sold in New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg and everywhere where men and women with small or large savings could be induced to invest upon a promise of becoming millionaires within a year. The depreciated and superabundant currency of the war period greatly stimulated this speculative fever. Everybody had money, and very few believed that it would prove stable in value. They were quite willing to exchange it for something that promised substantial wealth, and thus it came to pass that during the period from 1862 until 1865, when this petroleum stock company bubble finally burst, there were very few people east of the Allegheny River and north of Mason and Dixon's line, with surplus means at command, who were not owners of some of this oil stock. Except in a few instances in which capable business men were placed at the head of these oil producing corporations, these stock schemes proved failures, enriching only the promoters who

floated and sold the stocks. The most successful company of this period was known as the Columbia Oil Company, a Pittsburg corporation, of which Andrew Carnegie, then just beginning to come into prominence, was a stockholder. The great majority of these companies were neither honestly organized nor intelligently administered, the purpose of their founders being merely to enrich themselves by stock sales, leaving their deluded shareholders to make the best of their foolish bargains. A farm costing four or five thousand dollars, upon which there were no oil wells and no promise that oil would be found by the most liberal use of the drill, in many instances furnished the basis for a concern capitalized at a half million dollars.

During this period of wild inflation there was a sufficient number of people who, by lucky strikes, acquired fabulous wealth, almost in a day, keeping the public interest in the oil field in a state of the most hopeful expectancy. Johnny Steele, since known to the world as "Coal Oil Johnny," a raw country lad, just arrived at his majority, fell heir to the Widow McClintock farm, with a bulging bank account and a dozen wells producing high priced oil. Visiting Philadelphia, he squandered his money on hackmen, minstrel troupes and everything else which attracted his fancy, creating the impression among those who witnessed his fantastic extravagance that any fool could make a fortune by going into the oil business. The collapse of these speculative corporations, which came about the closing period of the war, would at any other time have inflicted a deadly blow on what has proved to be one of the most profitable industries of Pennsylvania and the nation. But with the disbanding of the Union armies, a great multitude of self-reliant men, trained to the hardships of an army life for four years, were turned loose to begin the world for themselves,

and of these a plentiful sprinkling of the most energetic, adventurous and capable drifted to the oil region. These men, with others equally capable, began at the bottom, learned the business, drilled wells, dressed tools, lived in shanties and boarded themselves, and studied and improved upon the methods of drilling and handling oil. Learning how to drill for oil, a half a dozen of these men would lease a piece of territory, erect a derrick and machinery and drill a well themselves, often eating and sleeping in the shanty engine house while the work was in progress. By this process was trained the great group of successful oil operators who have expanded the production of American oil from 2,500,000 barrels in 1865 to 100,000,000 barrels in 1903. With the close of the war the speculative period of oil development came to an end, and from that time the production of petroleum became first a legitimate and permanent, and later a scientific, industry. The living oil princes, like Ex-Senator Lewis Emery, Jr., of Bradford, John Fertig and the McKineys of Titusville, Thomas W. Phillips, the only surviving member of the firm of Phillips Brothers, and others scarcely less well known, have accumulated great fortunes by producing oil as a legitimate business, every detail of which they have learned by careful attention and practical experience,

The petroleum industry has extended far beyond Pennsylvania. Oil is produced largely in New York, Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, Texas, Louisiana, Indian Territory, Kansas, California and a half dozen other States and Territories, the total production at this time exceeding 100,000,000 barrels per year, but the business had its origin in Pennsylvania, and in every State and territory where it is now produced the successful operators are Pennsylvanians or men from other States who first learned the business in Pennsylvania. That

a new and unheard of business should have sprung up and expanded from nothing to an annual output of more than \$100,000,000 in the space of forty-five years, would at first blush seem incredible, but there is no disputing the figures. And the \$100,000,000 estimate covers only the value of the crude material. The manufactured product, and it is nearly all manufactured to prepare it for consumption, brings two or three times the value of the crude, so that it has come to be one of the most valuable of our great American productions, and one of our most important articles of export to foreign countries,

That Pennsylvania has not reaped the full benefit to which the State was entitled from this great natural product, is now conceded. Every gallon of Pennsylvania oil should have been manufactured in Pennsylvania, and that which was sent abroad should have been exported from Pennsylvania's chief seaport, if the natural advantages of location and distance to market had been permitted full force and effect. That more than half of Pennsylvania's great product is refined and exported from New York and New Jersey and other States, is due to legislative stupidity. One of the important features of the oil industry has been the development of a system of transportation long distances through pipe lines. The legislation which permitted the laying of pipe lines for the transportation of oil at first was confined to eight counties of northwestern Pennsylvania, with a proviso that no pipe line should be laid within a mile of the State line. This bottled up the oil producers as to the cheapest and most natural method of bringing their great product to the seaboard. It was not until a pipe line had been laid the whole length of the State of New York, through a free pipe line law passed by the Legislature of that State, that the Legislature of Pennsylvania consented

to uncork its own petroleum bottle by passing a similar bill in the session of 1883, ten years after it ought to have been passed, and after the representatives from the oil region had vainly urged its passage. In the meantime the mischief was irreparable, for the stream of crude oil had been diverted to the shores of New York Bay, where great refineries and export warehouses had been established. Since the passage of the free pipe law, a portion of this lost traffic has been recalled to the shores of the Delaware, but not a barrel of it should ever have been lost. No more forcible example of the lack of real statesmanship which has characterized the law making power of Pennsylvania for half a century could be furnished than a mere recital of the fact that the manufacture and export of one of the State's great natural products has been concentrated at the seaports of two other States through the folly and stupidity of its own legislators, who for ten years prohibited petroleum from flowing down hill through their own State to their own seaport.

XCIV.

JAMES DONALD CAMERON.

Became Prominent National Political Leader in 1876—Member of the Grant Cabinet—He Forced the Struggle that Made Hayes President After an Overwhelming Popular Defeat—Hayes Rejected Cameron for a Cabinet Office—His Father Resigned His Place in the Senate and the Younger Cameron Elected—Cameron Power Supreme in Pennsylvania Authority—Both the Camerons Four Times Elected to the United States Senate—How Governor Pattison and Secretary Harrity Saved Cameron's Fourth Election in 1891—Marvelous Record of Political Achievement by the Two Camerons in Pennsylvania—The Younger Cameron's Dominating Influence in Tranquillizing South Carolina and Other Southern States—His Personal Attributes.

JAMES DONALD CAMERON, son of Simon Cameron, who established a political dynasty in Pennsylvania more than a generation ago, that at times has been halted but never overthrown until the present day, became a prominent leader in National politics in May, 1876, when President Grant appointed him to fill a vacancy in the cabinet, placing him at the head of the War Department. Until then, while he had been a very important State leader for some years, and had become largely the manager of his father's political interests in the State, he had not been known or felt in the arena of National politics, and his appointment to the cabinet was attributed to the influence of his father, then in the Senate.

He was always an unusually reticent and unemotional man, and was little seen or felt, even in the political contests of the State, outside of the private conclaves where battles were planned and their execu-

tion definitely arranged. He was not ambitious to be conspicuous at the front, but distinctly preferred to rule without being ostentatious in the exercise of his power. The few who knew him intimately fully appreciated his ability, but in the public estimation his qualities were unappreciated because not understood.

At the time of his appointment to the cabinet, Senator Cameron and President Grant were in very close accord, and both vindictively hostile to Blaine, who was then apparently the leading candidate for the Republican nomination for President; and the purpose of the President and the Camerons was clearly signaled soon after the younger Cameron's appointment to the cabinet, by the Pennsylvania Republican convention, while certainly two-thirds of the Republican people preferred the nomination of Blaine, being manipulated to instruct the delegation to the Cincinnati convention to vote as a unit for the nomination of Governor Hartranft for President, and the new Secretary of War headed the delegation and was its chairman. But for the Cameron combination in Pennsylvania Blaine would certainly have been nominated for President, and certainly would have carried as many States as gave their electoral votes to Hayes; but with the hostility of the National administration, it is doubtful whether the States of Louisiana, Florida and South Carolina would have been manipulated for Blaine as they were for Hayes.

The younger Cameron's record as Secretary of War was chiefly notable for the bold and defiant stand he took in the most public way to declare that Hayes was elected President over Tilden, and that the power of the army would sustain the Republicans in the disputed States in the South in their struggle to secure the electoral votes for the Republican candidate.

He was nothing if not heroic, and once exhibited his genuine Cameron grit by peremptorily refusing a very earnest demand from his father for the appointment of a young man to a lieutenantcy in the army. The father was greatly disappointed, supposing that he had only to suggest the name to his son to secure a commission in the army, and he exhibited some temper at the refusal, but afterwards he often spoke of the incident with pride in the positive characteristics of his son.

Hayes' election was accomplished by the manipulation of the three Southern States which had given popular majorities for the Democratic candidate, and all the power of the administration was exhaustively exercised to attain the declared election of Hayes, in which both the Camerons had played a conspicuous part. Indeed, but for the initiative taken by Secretary of War Cameron, and the defiant attitude he sustained in the struggle, it is very doubtful whether the declared election of Hayes could have been accomplished.

It was naturally assumed by the Camerons that Hayes would recognize his obligations to the Camerons, and that the least he could do would be to continue the younger Cameron in the cabinet. Great pressure was brought upon Hayes in favor of Cameron, delegation after delegation visiting him in Ohio before he went to Washington, and occupying much of his time after he had arrived at the Capital. The last delegation that called was headed by Benjamin Harris Brewster, and embraced a number of prominent Pennsylvanians. Hayes then announced that he would choose a new Secretary of War, and he was bitterly denounced as an ingrate by most of the Pennsylvanians who had made desperate battle for Cameron's retention in the cabinet.

The failure to have the younger Cameron continued in the cabinet suddenly brought the elder Cameron to the immediate fulfilment of a purpose that he had long had in view after he found himself securely in the Senate with the power of his State behind him. He did not conceal his desire to establish a Cameron dynasty and have his son succeed him in the Senate. I have heard him express the purpose on several occasions. I was not in accord with the political aims and methods of the Camerons, but always maintained pleasant relations with them, and I well remember on one occasion, when in conversation with the elder Cameron, he jocularly remarked that I ought to be United States Senator some time, but that I was young enough to wait for him to finish his career and have his son follow him for one or more terms, when, if I cherished Senatorial ambition, I might be gratified if I learned to behave myself politically.

The elder Cameron had been elected to the Senate four different times; first, by a Democratic bolt and fusion with the Whigs in 1845 when he defeated Judge Woodward; in 1857, when, by the bolt of Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller, Democratic Representatives, and the support of the Republicans, he was elected over Forney; in 1867, when he was nominated by the Republicans over Curtin and elected by the full party vote, and again in 1873, when he was nominated and re-elected practically without a contest.

His first election was to fill an unexpired term of four years, and his second election ended in four years by his resignation to accept a position in the Lincoln cabinet. The third election gave him a full term, and at the end of four years, after his fourth election, he resigned in 1877 to give place to his son. The elder Cameron thus resigned from the Senate when in the very zenith of his power, and there is little doubt

that he could have continued to serve as Senator until his death twelve years later. It was his settled purpose to retire at some time in favor of his son, and the refusal of President Hayes to continue the younger Cameron in the cabinet precipitated the resignation of the elder Cameron, who desired to teach the new administration that the man he had rejected for Secretary of War had the power of a great State behind him, and could enter the Senate practically without a struggle.

The Cameron power in all the departments of authority in Pennsylvania was then supreme. Hartranft was Governor, and Mackey and Quay were lieutenants of rare efficiency. No intimation of Cameron's resignation was given until every plan was perfected for the election of the younger Cameron. The Legislature was in session when Hayes refused to continue Cameron as Secretary of War, and not only the Republican leaders, but most of the Republican followers in the Legislature were quickened in their devotion to the younger Cameron by the defeat he had suffered at the hands of the President who had been elected chiefly by Cameron's strategy.

The elder Cameron visited Harrisburg, conferred with Hartranft, Mackey, Quay and others, and inside of twenty-four hours had the leaders in both branches of the Legislature thoroughly posted and ready to accept the younger Cameron when the resignation of the father was announced; and when those who were ambitious for Senatorial honors hurried to Harrisburg to make a battle for the vacant Senatorship, they found that the Senatorial incident was closed, and that opposition to the Cameron power would be utterly hopeless. The result was that James Donald Cameron was elected to fill the unexpired term of two years of his father in the Senate, and it goes without saying

that one of the Senators from Pennsylvania was not enthusiastic in support of the Hayes administration.

In the contest of 1878 the Republicans carried both branches of the Legislature by a large majority, and Senator Cameron was re-elected for a full term of six years, practically without a contest. Again, in 1884, when Blaine was defeated for President, the Republicans carried the State and Legislature, and Cameron received his third election to the Senate without serious opposition in 1885, but when the time came for his fourth election to the Senate in 1891, he was threatened with very serious opposition, and at one time it looked as if his defeat was not only possible, but probable.

In the contest of 1890, when Quay, with Cameron's assent, had forced the nomination of Delamater for Governor, and lost the head of the ticket by Pattison's election to a second term, the revolt against the Cameron power was large and aggressive, and Cameron's open hostility to what was known as the "force bill," then pending in the Senate, became a serious menace in his Senatorial struggle. Cameron had uniformly opposed the force bill after the first experiment had been made in that line, believing that it was unwise as a political measure and dangerous in many respects.

Soon after the Legislature had met in 1891, Cameron telegraphed me to meet him at the Continental Hotel, where I found Quay in company with him. Quay, for reasons of policy, was supporting the force bill, although at heart earnestly against it, but, above all, he desired the re-election of his colleague. Cameron informed me of the situation at Harrisburg; that he might be compelled to vote on the force bill before the election of Senator, and, if so, his opponents would probably organize open defection against him. He said that his nomination by the caucus was assured under any circumstance, and that he could be defeated



J. Donald Cameron

only by a combination between force bill Republican bolters and the Democrats.

Pattison was soon to be inaugurated as Governor and Harrity was announced as secretary of the commonwealth. They were both within two squares of the Continental Hotel, and Cameron desired that they should be conferred with and informed of the ground upon which Cameron was likely to be opposed. The Democrats were intensely hostile to the force bill, and he authorized them to be informed that he was opposed to it and would vote against it, but he believed himself entitled to the assurance that if his defeat for Senator was threatened because of his voting against the force bill, the Democrats should not permit a combination against him for the election of a force bill Republican.

I left Cameron and Quay and at once visited Pattison and Harrity, and received their positive assurance that if a revolt was attempted against Cameron by the force bill Republicans, the Democrats would not permit him to be defeated for what they regarded as the most patriotic act of his life. There was no hesitation on the part of either Pattison or Harrity, and when Cameron was informed of their purpose he expressed his contempt for his factional opponents.

It soon became known at Harrisburg that if a bolt was attempted against Cameron the Democrats would support him against any force bill Republican, and as his defeat was impossible, the Republicans gave him a practically united support. He served the full fourth term for which he was elected, and then voluntarily retired from public life. During his last term he was not entirely in accord with his party on the silver question, but he had gathered all the laurels of a Senatorial career, was weary of its exactions, and his retirement was in full accord with his own purposes and desires.

The Camerons thus made the most marvelous record ever made by any family in Pennsylvania politics. The father was four times elected to the United States Senate, serving three terms of four years and one of six, making an aggregate of eighteen years, beginning in 1845 and continuing at intervals until 1877, while the son, who immediately succeeded the father, was four times consecutively elected to the United States Senate, and served an aggregate period of twenty years. There was only one other instance that I can recall in which a son succeeded the father in the United States Senate. James A. Bayard, of Delaware, resigned his seat in the Senate at the early part of the war because he refused to take the oath of allegiance that was then required of Senators, and at the next meeting of the Delaware Legislature Bayard was elected to serve his unexpired term, and on the same day his son, Thomas F. Bayard, was elected the successor of the father.

Henry Dodge was one of the first United States Senators elected from the State of Wisconsin and served from June, 1843, to March, 1857, and Augustus C. Dodge, his son, was the same year elected one of the first Senators from the new State of Iowa, and served from December, 1848, to February, 1855. It was the only instance in which father and son served together in the Senate. Benton served a brief period in the Senate with his son-in-law, John C. Fremont.

Only one man has represented more than one State in the United States Senate. James Shields, after having filled several State offices in Illinois, was elected to the United States Senate, but was refused admission because he lacked a few days of being eligible as a naturalized citizen. The Legislature re-elected him as soon as he became eligible, and he served the full term, when he removed to Minnesota, where he was

elected to fill an unexpired term of one or two years in the United States Senate. After serving with great credit in the army during the Civil War, he removed to Missouri, where he was appointed adjutant general, and later was appointed by the Governor to fill an unexpired term of one year in the United States Senate. In addition to serving as United States Senator, representing three different States, he once located in California, where he held an important State office.

The younger Cameron was not aggressive in statesmanship, but he exercised a very potent influence in all important legislation. He was not ambitious to pose as a leader, but he was a man of clear judgment, unusually sagacious, and when occasion required it, heroic in action. He saw the disastrous results of carpet-bag rule in the South, and the great peril of placing the power of the force bill in the hands of such irresponsible agents. His friend, John J. Patterson, who was nominated for Congress in Cameron's district in 1862, and defeated in the revulsion of that year, had gone to South Carolina and secured his election to the Senate.

According to the Hayes policy agreed upon between the Hayes leaders and a number of Southern leaders, it was substantially decided that the South should submit quietly to the election of Hayes by giving him the electoral votes of Louisiana, Florida and South Carolina, and that those States should have their Democratic Governors and State officers without dispute from the National authority. Of course, it meant a patent fraud on one side or the other, as the vote that would give Hayes the electors of those States would elect the Republican State ticket, but the occasion was too grave to be halted by irregularities of that sort, and Democratic Governors were installed in the three disputed States and recognized by the National administration.

The Kuklux of South Carolina had been provoked to savage activity, and a score or more of them were under indictment in the United States court, where Judge Bond presided, and where they were likely to receive severe punishment. On the other hand, nearly all of the Republican leaders of South Carolina, black and white, were indicted in the State courts for embezzlement and other crimes, and most of them were illy prepared to confront an honest court. In this emergency Cameron came to the front, and a general if not a definite understanding was reached that all prosecutions in both State and Federal courts should be halted, and Cameron exhibited his fidelity to the compact by securing the admission of Butler, a Democratic claimant for United States Senator from South Carolina.

The result was that not a single criminal case against the Kuklux or the Republican leaders of the State has ever been called for trial, and there are several prominent colored men who were then leaders in South Carolina politics, who are yet holding positions at Washington, although under indictment at home for embezzlement. Whether the cases were *not pressed* or not I am not advised, but for many years they stood open upon the records of the court with the understanding all around that they were not to be pressed to trial, and a host of Kuklux marauders and embezzling politicians escaped justice to give peace to a long-disturbed and fearfully-plundered State. Since 1877, when peace was reached by agreement with South Carolina, Cameron never favored the enactment of a force bill for the South, and certainly saved his party from that supreme folly as late as 1890.

Senator Cameron has many times been felt in the important political struggles of the nation. I have already told of his masterful leadership by which

Blaine was defeated at Cincinnati in 1876, but he loomed up even greater in the National convention in Chicago in 1880, when a battle royal was fought out between the Grant and Blaine forces, resulting in the nomination of Garfield after a desperate struggle of more than a week. Cameron was then chairman of the National committee, and called the convention to order. He had a following in the convention that was just short of a majority, but thoroughly united and earnest, and ready to follow the Grant leader without question. Blaine had a following of nearly equal numbers and equal earnestness, but lacking in such lustrous leadership as was exhibited by Conkling, Cameron and others.

In the preliminary proceedings, when the chairman of the National committee presided, Cameron ruled rigidly in favor of unit voting where such instructions were given, but the convention reversed him, and that was a fatal blow to Grant, as nearly one-third of the New York delegation, with a number of other fractions of delegations, were thereby released from the unit instructions they had received at home, and all took advantage of the new situation and voted against Grant. It was a most earnest and desperate struggle, exhibiting the highest qualities of leadership, but Grant never had a majority within reach, and Cameron fought until the last moment, when he stood at the head of the 306 who cast their votes for Grant, and afterwards received, and wore with pride, the medal that was given to the defeated supporters of the Hero of Appomattox.

Senator Cameron never employed the arts commonly used by public men to popularize themselves with the people. He despised all such methods in politics, and fortunately for himself was quite big enough to succeed without them. It is said that he once entertained the idea of being a candidate for Governor,

but it did not develop to his satisfaction and it was abandoned, but to-day he would probably be accepted as the Republican candidate for Governor if he indicated his willingness to accept it.

It is an open secret that when Quay died, the Republican leaders of the State urged Cameron to accept the appointment of United States Senator with the assurance that he would be elected, but he peremptorily declined it, declaring that under no circumstance would he return to the Senate, and his declination was followed by the suggestion of the name of Attorney General Knox. While he was not visible in the movements which settled the party leaders in Pittsburg and Philadelphia in favor of Knox, it is none the less true that the combination was planned by Cameron and carried to successful execution.

Whether he would accept the Governorship is not known even to his closest friends, but there is no man in Pennsylvania who is to-day better equipped for that position than J. Donald Cameron. No man is more familiar with all the great interests of our State, and he is entirely familiar with the political conditions, and the new issues which have come to the front in the flight of time, and he would be thoroughly honest and wisely progressive in his administration of the government of our great Commonwealth.

XCV.

HOYT ELECTED GOVERNOR.

The Democratic Victory of 1877—How Trunkey was Made Supreme Judge—Trunkey Defeats the Late Chief Justice Sterrett—Pattison's First Victory by Election to the Controllorship—Quay and Mackey Reform Their Lines for the Election of Hoyt—Notable Contest for Supreme Judge Between Chief Justice Agnew and Judge Sterrett—Quay Side-tracks the Greenback Party Against Fusion, Then Declares for Sound Money—Hoyt Elected by 22,000 Plurality with Over 80,000 Greenback Votes Side-tracked — Death of Mackey, Leaving Quay Supreme Party Leader.

AS Pennsylvania was in the violent throes of labor strikes and angry revolutionists before mid-summer of 1877, the political prospect was most unpromising for the Republicans. The party in power has always been held responsible for financial and industrial depression, and as the troubles of that year were developed to the extent of plunging Pittsburg into anarchy, whereby railway travel was halted, and millions of railway property destroyed by a mob, with the loss of a score or more of lives and the wounding of many others in conflict between the military and the mob, few of the Republican leaders had hope of party success at the fall election. The industrial disturbance was universal throughout the State, with riotous eruptions in most of the centers of population, and such a condition always means disaster to the party in power. The Republicans were in power in city, State and Nation, and that party was compelled to reckon with the starving people who were inflamed to lawlessness.

The Democrats took the lead in forming their line

of battle in the contest of 1877. It was an unusual proceeding, but they felt confident of success, and inspired confidence among the people by boldly coming to the front and challenging the dominant party to battle. Their convention was held at Harrisburg on the 22d of August, with Congressman William S. Stenger as permanent president. Three State officers were to be elected—supreme judge, auditor general and State treasurer. Henry Warren Williams, of Allegheny, who had been appointed to the supreme bench to fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Justice Strong in 1867, and was elected the same year, died in 1877, and President Judge Sterrett, of Allegheny, was appointed to fill the vacancy. It is worthy of note that two men bearing precisely the same name, Henry Warren Williams, one residing in Allegheny, and the other in Tioga, without relationship, were candidates for the supreme judgeship. The Allegheny judge first succeeded and died in office, and a few years thereafter Williams of Tioga was appointed to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Chief Justice Mercur, and was elected for a full term the same year, and like his namesake died after a decade or more of service.

The contest for the Democratic nomination for supreme judge became intensely embittered, chiefly because the late William M. Singerly, then a strong Democratic power in Philadelphia, threw himself into the breach to prevent the nomination of Furman Sheppard, who was the favorite of the convention, and would certainly have been nominated but for Singerly's aggressive and skillful tactics. The first ballot gave Trunkey 71 and Sheppard 64, with a large scattering vote diffused among a half a score of candidates. On the second ballot Sheppard received 103 votes to 100 for Trunkey, with 48 votes scattering;



Henry M. Hoyt

on the third ballot, that was taken in almost breathless silence, every delegate answered to his name but "Uncle Jake" Zeigler of Butler, the leading Democratic politician of his section, who had been clerk of the house for many years. He had retired between ballots with some friends to sample the old rye of the Brady House, and as the ballot progressed, and his absence was noted, several exploring parties were sent out to bring him in before the ballot ended.

When the last name on the list was called the vote stood Trunkey 124 and Sheppard 124, but just then "Uncle Jake" entered the hall, and stood up in the main aisle smiling like a bridesmaid, and asked that his name be called. The clerk at once responded and Zeigler's vote was given for Trunkey, thereby making him the candidate, and giving the State a supreme judge. William P. Schell, of Bedford, who had served in both house and senate, was nominated for auditor general on the second ballot, and Amos C. Noyes, of Clinton, who had served several sessions in the house, and was one of the most popular of the leading lumber men of his region, was nominated for State treasurer on the fifth ballot. He was popularly known throughout the campaign as "Square-timber Noyes." The platform was very shrewdly drawn to commend the party to the disturbed elements of the State.

The Republican convention met at Harrisburg on the 4th of September with ex-Congressman William H. Armstrong as permanent president. Justice Sterrett was unanimously nominated for the supreme court to succeed himself, and William B. Hart, of Montgomery, was also nominated by acclamation for State treasurer. A single ballot was had for auditor general, when John A. M. Passmore, of Schuylkill, was nominated over Howard J. Reeder by a vote of 165 to 82. The platform was reported by Representative John

Cessna, and was skilfully drawn to meet the new conditions which confronted the party, but revolutionists never take pause to study political deliverances.

In revolutionary times new parties are born in a day, and old side-show organizations are brought into renewed activity. The workingmen held a State convention at Harrisburg on the 10th of September; and nominated Judge William Elwell, of Columbia, for supreme judge, John M. Davis, of Allegheny, for auditor general, and James L. Wright, of Philadelphia, for State treasurer. The Greenback party also held a State convention at Williamsport on the 19th of September, of which Frank W. Hughes was chairman, and Benjamin S. Bentley, of Lycoming, was nominated for supreme judge, with James E. Emerson for auditor general, and James L. Wright, the Workingmen's candidate, for State treasurer. The Prohibitionists also held a State convention on the 14th of September, at which ex-Congressman A. A. Barker presided, and nominated A. D. Winton, of Luzerne, for supreme judge, A. A. Barker for auditor general, and Samuel Corney, of Chester, for State treasurer.

The Republicans made exhaustive efforts to get their broken lines reformed, but it was an utter impossibility to bring the revolutionary tidal wave to an ebb, and the entire State ticket was defeated by nearly 10,000 majority. While the Democrats carried all the State officers, the Republicans held both branches of the Legislature, having 31 senators to 19 Democrats, and 120 Republicans in the house to 81 Democrats.

The election of 1877 brought to the front Robert E. Pattison, then a young lawyer in the office of Lewis C. Cassidy, and spoken of rather contemptuously by his political opponents as "Cassidy's boy." He had just begun a moderately successful career at the bar, and was little known to the public when his name was first

presented. The proposition to place a young man without official experience in the important office of city controller was not at first regarded with general favor, but the more the people studied the character and qualities of Pattison the more valuable he was regarded. Two common pleas judges were to be elected, and Judges Fell, Republican, and Ludlow, Democrat, were accepted by both parties and received the unanimous vote of the people.

There was a very earnest struggle for the nomination for district attorney, involving a number of ambitious expectants, but after a considerable wrangle they were all set aside, and Judge Thayer was made the compromise candidate against Hagert, who had been assistant district attorney under Sheppard. Pattison's competitor was Mr. Sayre, an active and popular Republican, and Dr. Gilbert, the Democratic candidate for coroner against Mr. Knorr, who was an earnest Republican and generally acceptable as a candidate, but while the candidates on the Republican State ticket all received majorities in Philadelphia of from 6,000 to 7,000, the entire Democratic city ticket was elected by majorities ranging from 1,000 to 2,000.

This defeat of the city ticket was the result of internal dissensions within the party, and not because of special objections to any of the candidates. The selection of Thayer was regarded as specially strong, but he was seriously weakened by Benjamin Harris Brewster accepting the nomination of the Labor party for the same office, and receiving some 5,000 votes. The public estimate of Judge Thayer was shown one year later when he was unanimously re-elected as judge.

With such a disaster as that suffered by the Republicans in both city and State in 1877, it was only natural that the Republican leaders who were masters in their line would exhaust their resources to regain the State

in 1878, when a Governor was to be elected, and Republican mastery was secured in that contest only by the shrewdest political strategy on the part of the Republican leaders. The Greenback issue had become a very dangerous one, and clearly held the balance of power between the two parties. Its most active leaders were trained in commercial politics, and Mackey and Quay began their campaign by getting absolute control of the Greenback organization. Its State convention was held in Philadelphia on the 6th of May, and Samuel E. Mason, of Mercer, was nominated for Governor. The only condition that Mackey and Quay required from the Greenback leaders was that they should nominate Mason, who was pledged to remain in the field, and under no circumstances to consent to a fusion between the Greenback and Democratic parties.

Such fusion would have been natural, as a large majority of the Democrats to a greater or less degree believed in the Greenback policy, and a fusion with that party by the Democrats, with a Democrat for Governor and a Greenback man for Lieutenant Governor, would have swept the State. A counter movement was made in the Greenback convention to nominate William H. Armstrong as the candidate for Governor, believing that he would be accepted by the Republicans and thus give the Greenbackers the semblance of victory, but Mackey and Quay had the Greenbackers ticketed through and baggage checked with all the Greenback leaders involved in the deal, including the Greenback nominee for Governor, sworn to resist fusion under any and all circumstances.

The Republicans held their State convention at Harrisburg on the 15th of May with Mayor Stokley as permanent president. Henry M. Hoyt, the slated candidate for Governor, was nominated on the first ballot by a vote of 161 to 47 for Grow, 29 for Wicker-

sham, 12 for Beaver and 1 for Morrell. For Lieutenant Governor Charles W. Stone, of Warren, was nominated on the first ballot by a vote of 182 to 59 for J. Howard Jacobs, and Aaron K. Dunkel, of Philadelphia, was nominated for secretary of internal affairs on the first ballot by a vote of 122 to 106 for McClellan.

The only earnest contest of the convention was on the nomination for supreme judge. Chief Justice Agnew's term in the supreme court was about to expire, and he was then well on toward the patriarchal age. He was highly respected alike personally and judicially, and under ordinary circumstances it is quite probable that even his age would not have precluded his renomination, but Judge Sterrett had resigned the president judgeship of Allegheny to accept the appointment of supreme judge in the disastrous year of 1877, when he suffered defeat with his associates on the State ticket, and Quay and Mackey were pledged to the nomination of Sterrett, although Quay was a fellow townsman of Agnew, and had nominated him fifteen years before.

The two most notable speeches I have ever heard in a State convention were made on that occasion by the late Lin Bartholomew, of Pottsville, in favor of the nomination of Judge Sterrett, and by ex-Congressman William H. Koontz, of Somerset, pressing the renomination of Agnew. Those addresses rank amongst the ablest of the political deliverances I have heard in a Pennsylvania State convention. Each of the speakers knew the responsibility he had assumed, and both acquitted themselves in a masterly manner, but the organization was omnipotent, and Sterrett was nominated on the first ballot by 154 to 92 for Agnew.

The Republican ticket was one of unusual strength. Hoyt was one of the ablest men who ever filled the gubernatorial chair of Pennsylvania, and with his clean record as citizen, as judge and as soldier he was

a formidable candidate to assail, while Judge Sterrett commanded the confidence of the entire profession of the State, and was universally respected personally as widely as he was known. Stone, the nominee for Lieutenant Governor, had been a prominent name in Pennsylvania politics, having served very creditably in Congress, and was a prominent candidate for Governor against his namesake to succeed Hasitngs.

The Democratic State convention met at Pittsburg on the 22d of May with ex-Senator Buckalew permanent president. The contest for Governor was unusually animated, as Wallace, who favored the nomination of Andrew H. Dill, locked horns with William L. Scott, of Erie, in urging the nomination of ex-Congressman James H. Hopkins, of Allegheny. Wallace won out and nominated Dill on the third ballot by a vote of 136 to 89 for Hopkins and 27 scattering. Judge Ross, of Montgomery, was nominated for supreme judge on the first ballot, receiving 162 votes with 71 for Sheppard and 10 for Golden. John Fertig, of Crawford, was nominated for Lieutenant Governor on the third ballot, the vote being 162 to 64 for Sowden, and J. Simpson Africa, of Huntingdon, was unanimously nominated for secretary of internal affairs.

The Prohibitionists met at Altoona on the 20th of May, and nominated Franklin H. Lane, of Huntingdon, for Governor, and the party would have made no figure in the contest if it had not nominated Chief Justice Agnew for supreme judge, and soon after the nomination had been made, Judge Bentley, the Greenback candidate for supreme judge, retired from the ticket, and the Greenbackers accepted Agnew as their candidate. Thus a fusion was effected between the Greenbackers and Prohibitionists on the single office of supreme judge, but the Republican leaders did not fear any fusion embracing the Democratic party.

The Republicans knew that they had a desperate contest before them, and Quay took the chairmanship of the State committee and became the immediate commander in the battle. He had the Greenbackers safely side-tracked against fusion with the Democrats, and well knew that more Democrats than Republicans would follow the distinct Greenback party flag. He knew also that the Democratic business interests in the State were not in sympathy with the Greenback policy, and he astounded the Democrats and many of his own followers by opening the campaign with Galusha A. Grow as the oracle declaring distinctly in favor of maintaining the credit of the government by adhering to the gold standard, and reaching specie payments as rapidly as could be done without embarrassment to the business and industrial interests of the country. Under ordinary conditions such a policy would have been fatal, as it would have rushed the Democrats and Greenbackers into fusion, but Quay well knew that he had created an impassable gulf between those two parties, and he decided to take the chance of losing a few Greenback Republicans and winning a larger number of sound money Democrats.

No campaign ever organized and fought in the State was more skilfully planned and executed. Many of the Greenback people were aroused to aggressive action in demanding that in the face of the gold standard being flung into their faces by the Republican organization, the Democrats and Greenbackers should make common cause, as thus united they undoubtedly had the power to carry the State. The Greenback candidate for Governor was faithful to his agreement, and the Greenback leaders in charge of the campaign threw every obstacle in the way of fusion.

The fact that Judge Agnew polled 99,316 votes for supreme judge by a fusion between the Prohibitionists

and Greenbackers alone, clearly shows that even a measurable fusion between the Greenbackers and the Democrats would have defeated the Republican State ticket. Fortunately for Quay, the Greenbackers had no party leaders to make battle for the integrity of their organization. Many of them were purely commercial, and others idealists who were always ready to follow a hopeless flag in support of their faith, rather than mingle it with the faith of others to gain victory.

Hoyt took the stump, and his speeches were among the ablest ever delivered in the State. He did not enthuse audiences as Curtin did, but he seriously impressed all intelligent hearers, and came out of the struggle a very much more highly appreciated man than he was when he entered it. Dill made few speeches, but what he did make were of a masterly type. He was one of the ablest men then connected with State authority, as he had served a long period in the senate, but he was one of the most unassuming of all our public men. He was personally popular, for none more nearly completed the circle of all the admirable personal qualities of a public man. No one in the Senate was more highly respected by the Republicans than was Andrew H. Dill, and thus the two great parties had eminently able representatives at the head of their tickets, and men completely equipped alike in character and attainments to fill the office of Governor with the highest measure of credit.

Africa, the Democratic candidate for secretary of internal affairs, had creditably served in the Legislature, although representing a strong Republican district, and was very highly respected, while Dunkel, his Republican competitor, suffered to some extent from defection within his own party. The result was the election of Hoyt by a plurality of 22,253, with Mason, Greenback candidate, receiving 81,758 votes.



Andrew H. Dill

Stone's plurality was 23,255, Sterrett's plurality was 23,821, with Agnew, Greenback-Prohibition, polling 93,316 votes, and Dunkel was elected by 12,159 plurality.

In Allegheny County Agnew received 10,181 votes, the Democratic candidate for supreme judge received 11,999, and Sterrett 19,518, showing a majority in Allegheny against the Republicans, although their State ticket received a plurality of nearly 10,000. In a number of the counties in the State the combined Greenback and Prohibition vote cast for Agnew was larger than the Democratic vote, but the compact between the Republicans and the Greenbackers had held good from start to finish, and Quay won the most important victory in the State that was gained solely by the most superb political strategy.

When it is remembered that at the September election of that year the strong Republican State of Maine faltered, and the Greenbackers and Democrats elected the entire State officers and both branches of the Legislature, defeating Hale for Congress, the perfection of Republican strategy in Pennsylvania may be understood. Quay and Mackey began early to perfect the policy to divide and conquer the opposition, and they were successful at every stage of the struggle. The Republicans, of course, carried both branches of the Legislature, having 32 senators to 15 Democrats, 2 Greenback Democrats, and 1 National, and the house had 107 Republicans, 78 Democrats, 7 Greenback Democrats, 3 Greenback Republicans and 6 National. It was in this campaign that Quay made himself the acknowledged Republican master in the State, as Mackey died a few weeks after the election, and Quay, green with the laurels of his great victory, became the supreme leader of the party.

XCVI.

POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1878-9.

Quay Makes Himself Recorder of Philadelphia with Large Compensation—Locates in Philadelphia at Eleventh and Spruce—Chairman of Republican State Committee—Succeeded by David H. Lane as Recorder—The Office Finally Abolished—Quay Becomes Secretary of the Commonwealth Under Hoyt—The Pittsburg Four Million Riot Bill—Defeated After a Bitter Contest—Convictions Followed for Legislative Venality—Quay Nominates Butler for State Treasurer—Serious Hitch When Butler Assumed the Office—How the Treasury Deficit was Covered—Cameron and Quay Make Earnest Battle for Grant's Nomination for a Third Term.

THE disastrous Republican defeat of 1877 made the leaders of the party begin at once to perfect the organization, and to devise the policy for the campaign of 1878, when a Governor was to be chosen. Mackey lived in Pittsburg, and had complete control of the organization in the Western counties. Quay's home was in Beaver, within the radius where Mackey could direct party movements without the aid of Quay. The Camerons were centrally located at Harrisburg, but in Philadelphia they had no great party leaders.

Quay's political methods were always expensive, and being then without fortune himself, it was decided by Quay, Mackey and the Camerons that the office of recorder for the city of Philadelphia should be revived with greatly enlarged powers, which would yield to the official not less than \$30,000 a year. The bill provided that the recorder should be appointed by the Governor with the approval of the senate, and did not require him to be a resident of Philadelphia at

the time he was commissioned. The measure was very desperately fought by most of the Democrats and some reform Republicans, but it was carried through the Legislature and approved by Governor Hartranft, who soon thereafter nominated Quay for the position.

It required a two-thirds vote in the senate to confirm him, but after much agitation and some scandal the confirmation was effected by the aid of the Democratic senator from York. It is notable that for many years York furnished more Democratic legislators who served the Republican organization than any other dozen counties of the State. At no time during the political rule of Quay was he without power over the Democratic organization in York County, and in 1901 it was the direct vote of a Democratic member from York for Quay's candidate for speaker that enabled him to get control of the house by the defeat of General Koontz, the fusion candidate. Democratic demoralization logically followed such continued commercial Democratic politics in one of the strong Democratic counties of the State, and the culmination was reached in 1904 when the Republicans carried the county by a decided majority.

Quay at once located in Philadelphia, and made his home in a large double house on the northeast corner of Eleventh and Spruce Streets. He believed that with his official power, and his close relations with the leaders of the party in the city, he could dominate the eastern part of the State, while Mackey ruled the west, but the recorder bill was very odious throughout the State, and specially odious to the citizens of Philadelphia, who were needlessly taxed to furnish a large income solely for the benefit of a political leader. Quay soon discovered that the office he had wrung from the Legislature weakened rather than strength-

ened his power, as there was very general disapproval not only of the creation of the office of recorder, but of filling it with a political leader from Western Pennsylvania.

Quay discharged his duties as recorder with great moderation by neglecting to enforce the collection of the large fees he could have commanded. He was also made chairman of the State committee, and devoted himself exclusively to the severe duties that position imposed in the gubernatorial contest of 1878. He won out by the most carefully-planned and well-executed political methods which have been described in a former chapter, and when Hoyt was elected Governor he was ready to abandon the recordership, and was succeeded by David H. Lane, one of the most level-headed and widely-respected of the local Republican leaders. Lane made a great struggle to halt the tidal wave that demanded the repeal of the recorder act, and proposed to revise the duties and prerogatives of the recorder, to cut off extravagant fees and make it an eminently useful position to the public, but public sentiment was overwhelmingly against the whole scheme, and the recorder bill was finally repealed.

It was only natural that Governor Hoyt should tender the position of secretary of the commonwealth to Quay, and it was done soon after his election and promptly accepted. Hoyt called to the attorney generalship Henry W. Palmer, from his own town, a lawyer of eminent ability and one of the most conscientious of all our Pennsylvania officials. The Hoyt administration would have been rather uneventful but for the agitation and scandal developed in the Legislature of 1879 growing out of what was commonly known as the "Riot bill," and his defiant political deliverance made just before the election of 1882, when

he declared against the Republican organization and State ticket headed by General Beaver.

Several millions of property were destroyed by the Pittsburg mob in the desperate riots of 1877, in which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was almost the only sufferer. The laws of the State made Allegheny County liable for the destruction of property by a mob within its jurisdiction, but prominent lawyers of Pittsburg invented the defence that the mob had been provoked to violence and the destruction of property by the State ordering its militia to Pittsburg, thus greatly inflaming the riotous spirit of the people without having sufficient military force to protect person and property. They insisted that as the State had, by its mistaken military movements, caused the destruction of property by the mob, the losses should be paid from the State treasury and not by the people of Allegheny County.

This theory was accepted by the leaders, and it was decided to pass a bill making an appropriation of some \$4,000,000 to be applied to the payment of property destroyed by the mob, or so much thereof as might be needed. This bill aroused fierce opposition, not only throughout the State, but within the Legislature, and the measure was fought with desperation. A large lobby was brought to Harrisburg to aid the passage of the bill, and that intensified the opposition, and led to charges of the employment of corrupt influences to command the approval of the Legislature.

Just when the battle for and against the measure was at its height, a resolution was adopted by the house providing for the appointment of a committee of five "for the purpose of investigating the charges made by the member from Union (Mr. Wolfe) and any other improper influences brought to bear upon members

in connection with house bill 103." The committee consisted of A. M. Rhodes, C. B. Elliott, Charles S. Wolfe, M. P. Doyle and G. E. Mapes. It began its inquiry on the 24th of April and ended on the 23d of May, when it reported to the house declaring that eight persons, including three members of the house, had been guilty of corrupt solicitation and should be prosecuted.

The prosecutions were tried before Judge Pierson in the Harrisburg quarter sessions, and after much legal sparring and considerable delay, the accused parties decided to plead guilty, believing that they would be punished only by fine, but to the overwhelming surprise of the defendants and the very general surprise of the public, Judge Pierson sentenced them to the penitentiary, and that error of the trial judge opened the way for their pardon, as it was held by Attorney General Palmer, whose integrity and ability were unquestioned, to be a sentence entirely unwarranted. The scandal arising from the efforts to pass the bill aroused such aggressive opposition that the measure was abandoned, and the riot losses were finally amicably adjusted by Allegheny County.

The year 1879 was an off year in politics, as the only office to be filled was that of State treasurer, and Quay decided upon Samuel Butler, of Chester, as the party candidate for that position. That nomination was designed as a tub to the reform whale, as the Butler element, in which Judge Butler, brother of the candidate for State treasurer, was an important factor and a candidate for a seat in the supreme court, was not in sympathy with the machine. When the leaders decided in favor of Butler, the reform sentiment of the State readily acquiesced, and at the convention held at Harrisburg on the 23d of July, of which Galusha A. Grow was president, Butler was nominated by acclamation, and that convention for the first time in many

years declared in favor of a sound financial policy, as Quay had won out with it in the election of Hoyt. For several years prior to that time the Republicans regarded it as unsafe to make a distinct declaration in favor of the gold standard.

The Democratic State convention met at Harrisburg on the 16th of July, over which A. H. Coffroth presided, and Daniel O. Barr, of Allegheny, was nominated for State treasurer. The Greenbackers also held a convention at Altoona on the 15th of July, and nominated Peter Sutton, of Indiana, for State treasurer, and the Prohibitionists met at Altoona on the 23d of September and nominated W. I. Richardson, of Montour, for the same office. The contest was not a spirited one, as the Democrats had little hope of success. The result was the election of Butler by a majority of 58,438. The Greenbackers had fallen down to 27,208 votes, and the Prohibitionists to 3,219, giving Butler a decided majority over all. The Legislature was also Republican by a large majority. The senate had 32 Republicans, 15 Democrats, 2 Greenback Democrats and 1 National, and the house contained 107 Republicans, 78 Democrats, 7 Greenback Democrats, 3 Greenback Republicans and 6 Nationals.


One of the many serious troubles injected into Quay's public experience occurred when State Treasurer Butler came to Harrisburg in the spring of 1880, to take charge of the State treasury. Butler's predecessor was Mr. Noyes, of Clinton, a man of unusual intelligence, but eminent for his amiable and confiding qualities. He was not a financier, nor had he any knowledge of banking, and he entrusted the management of the treasury almost entirely to Mr. Walters, his cashier, who was a very shrewd and capable man with a fondness for speculation.

A combination was made by Quay with several

men at Harrisburg to speculate largely in some particular stocks about which they believed they had a reliable tip, and without Treasurer Noyes participating in the operation, and most likely without even knowing it, a large amount of the State money was used to aid the speculators. It was not drawn directly from the treasury, but loans were obtained from banks which had State deposits, with the assurance that they would not be called until the obligations were paid. It was common in those days, as it had been for many years before, and as it has been, as a rule, from that time to the present, for State treasurers to favor political or personal friends, or serve private speculative interests of their own, by the use of the public money in the treasury just as Mr. Noyes did, although in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the law.

It happened that the stock speculation was a misventure, and a large amount of money was lost, involving Quay in the most serious financial troubles he ever experienced. State Treasurer Butler sternly refused to accept the assets of the treasury as they were presented to him, and required that every account should be put upon a strictly lawful basis, to obviate all personal risk on the part of the new treasurer. Many wild stories have been published by the vindictive enemies of Quay relating to this episode in his political career. Detailed accounts have been given of how he was with difficulty hindered by his friends from plunging into the Susquehanna and ending his troubles with his life, all of which were wholly inventions of the malice that ever pursues successful men.

Quay was not built in that way. I have seen him in many very severe trials, and in every instance the graver the difficulties the more heroic he was in meeting them. The younger Cameron and Kemble promptly came to his relief by advancing a large amount of money



Henry W. Palmer

that was probably aided by liberal deposits from the treasury, and in a few years Quay was able to repay his friends, with a moderate fortune left to himself. He was bold in everything, and as bold in speculation as he was in politics. Three times during his public career he would have been utterly bankrupt if called to a settlement of his affairs, and he was as many times the possessor of a liberal fortune. He was evidently fortunate in his financial operations during the tidal wave of increased values that occurred several years ago, as at no time during his life was his accumulated wealth so great as at the time of his death.

The death of Mackey, that occurred only a few weeks after the election of Hoyt, in the fall of 1878, was a great loss to Quay. Mackey was one of the safest of advisers in finance as well as in politics, and he equaled Quay in boldness of conception and execution; but while Quay lost a most important colleague in the management of the Republican organization, of which Mackey was always the acknowledged leader, the death of Mackey made Quay practically the absolute arbiter of Republican movements and policy in Pennsylvania. He had the benefit of the counsels of both the Camerons, but the elder Cameron had practically retired from active participation in political affairs, and the younger Cameron, while most valuable in advising and directing political operations, greatly preferred that some other than himself should be at the front and take the honor with its exacting labors. Quay was thus practically in charge of the Republican organization of the State, and never was forgetful of the necessity of wielding his authority.

As the National contest of 1880 approached it presented a very serious problem to be solved by Quay and Cameron. They had defeated Blaine for the Presidency in the Cincinnati convention of 1876, after

a desperate struggle and by a very narrow margin, and Blaine was looming up as an apparently invincible candidate for the Presidential nomination of 1880. Both Quay and Cameron were weary of Hayes and distrustful of Blaine. They wanted a President who would be in thorough accord with them, and not quibble over the advancement of men useful in politics, even though somewhat shady on the score of merit.

They very much wanted a Republican President, but they felt that they could not afford to accept Blaine, although they were confronted by the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Republican people of the State were earnestly devoted to Blaine, and desired his nomination. Blaine was a native of Pennsylvania, having been born in Washington County, was educated in the State, and was for some time a teacher in the deaf and dumb asylum of Philadelphia at Broad and Pine. He became a resident of Maine by the accident of marrying an accomplished Maine teacher in Kentucky, when Blaine held a position in one of the prominent educational institutions of that State. His wife's strong love of her home on the far northeast coast, decided the destiny of the man who rose to be the most idolized man of his party since the days of Henry Clay, but who, like Clay, was destined never to be President.

Blaine's close political associations in Washington were not in sympathy with the Quay-Cameron association, and as Quay and Cameron had defeated Blaine for President in 1876, by sheer manipulation that made Pennsylvania practically voiceless in the contest, they felt that they had little to expect from Blaine if he became President. The differences which existed between Blaine and the Quay-Cameron forces were not logical. They were politicians of much the same type. Blaine believed in old-time political

methods, and while he gave a passive approval to the civil service ideas, he was never in sympathy with them. His political theory was that the land belonged to the saints, and that his party were the saints, but for some reason, never fully understood outside the circle immediately interested, Blaine became offensive to Cameron, Quay, Mackey and Kemble, and the breach was steadily widened until death interposed to end the contest. They could have made terms with Blaine, as Blaine would doubtless have agreed to their absolute supremacy in Pennsylvania if he became President, but they were entirely distrustful of Blaine, and rejected all of the many overtures which were made to bring the warring interests into harmony.

Grant was the ideal President of the men who were in harmony with him. He never quibbled about the demands they made upon him if it was within his power to grant them. Grant, after having made a journey around the world, had returned home and received the grandest ovations ever accorded to an American citizen. It was believed by his friends that the public sentiment was so strongly in sympathy with him that he could be nominated and elected to a third term, and it was only natural that Quay and Cameron should turn to Grant as the most available man to serve them in overthrowing Blaine in the convention of 1880.

They did not proclaim their preference for Grant, but carefully canvassed the State, beginning even before the advent of the year 1880, and quietly arranged for the election of delegates to the State convention at a period long before the time the masses of the party gave any thought to the subject. When the work of arranging for the election of delegates was completed, an obedient State committee was summoned and a snap State convention was called

to meet on the 4th of February to nominate State officers, and select delegates to the National convention.

The friends of Blaine had practically no knowledge of the systematic movement that had been made to give the State to Grant until they were astounded by the call for the State convention at the earliest period that had ever been named for the meeting of such a body, and when they attempted to organize for the election of delegates, they discovered that the field had been carefully gleaned by Quay and Cameron, and that it was impossible, in the brief period they would have for organization, to make successful battle against the machine. The result was that Pennsylvania was first in the field in 1880 with her State convention, with nearly unanimous instructions for Grant's nomination for the third Presidential term, and with a practically solid Grant delegation instructed to vote as a unit for the hero of Appomattox.

Blaine thus lost, at the very opening of his great battle of 1880, the moral power of the second State of the Union, and one in which he well knew that a large majority of the Republicans were sincerely and earnestly anxious for his nomination as the candidate of the party for President, and when the vote of the National convention is carefully scanned, any intelligent student will understand that it was this shrewdly conceived and boldly executed movement of Quay and Cameron, at the opening of the year 1880, that defeated Blaine's nomination at Chicago. True, Grant fell with him, but Blaine lost the Presidency, and it was Quay and Cameron who dealt the fatal blow.

XCVII.

POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1880.

Quay and Cameron Call Early State Convention, and Declare in Favor of Grant for a Third Term—Cameron Chairman of National Committee—Ruled Strongly in Favor of Grant in Preliminary Proceedings—Reluctant Support Given to Garfield—Blaine's Appointment as Premier Offensive to Quay and Cameron—State Offices Filled at the Election—Memorable Speeches in National Conventions by Ingersoll, Conkling and Dougherty.

CAMERON and Quay were compelled to face a huge proposition as 1880 approached, as Blaine's nomination for the Presidency could be defeated only by the diversion of Pennsylvania from its undisputed favorite candidate, and even with that accomplished, most exhaustive efforts were required by the powerful combination that had accomplished the defeat of Blaine at Cincinnati in 1876. Cameron was then in the Senate, and Quay was secretary of the commonwealth with their leadership in the State on all ordinary propositions practically undisputed, but to wrest the State from Blaine in 1880 was a task of great magnitude, and it could not have been accomplished in any other way than by a snap movement that precipitated the convention earlier than any had ever been held before, after the State had been quietly organized by Cameron and Quay when the Blaine men were entirely off guard.

Long before the advent of 1880 Cameron and Quay had quietly organized every section of the State for the election of delegates to the State convention, and not until an official call was issued for the convention to meet on the 4th of February, 1880, had the Blaine

people any intimation of the movements to give the State to Grant. Even with all the advantage the leaders had of quiet manipulation when the Blaine people were patiently waiting for the time to act, the instructions for Grant, and requiring the delegation to vote as a unit for his nomination, were passed by a vote of 133 to 113. Had there been an open, square battle between Blaine and Grant in the State, even with all the power of the organization against Blaine, it is not only possible, but quite probable that he would have carried a majority of the convention.

Conkling, then as supreme in New York as Cameron and Quay were in Pennsylvania, followed with an early convention in that State, and declared in favor of Grant with like instructions to the delegation to vote as a unit. Thus the two greatest of the States led off for Grant, and for the time his nomination appeared to be inevitable, but Blaine had a vastly larger popular following than had Grant, and it was aroused to desperate resistance. Never was a preliminary battle for the Presidency so earnestly contested as in the struggle between Grant and Blaine in 1880. Every State was battled for with desperate energy, and when all the delegations had been chosen to the National convention, Blaine, with the field, had a clear majority against Grant, but Grant had a like clear majority against Blaine.

The vote in the convention on the first ballot was 304 for Grant, 284 for Blaine; 93 for Sherman, 31 for Washburn, 34 for Edmunds and 10 for Windom. It was a struggle of giants, and the convention lasted for more than a week. Thirty-six ballots were taken, and Grant varied from 304 to 309 until the thirty-fourth, when he reached 312, and on the thirty-fifth his highest vote was obtained, 313. On the thirty-sixth and last ballot his vote fell back to 306. Blaine never

exceeded his first vote of 284 on any of the many ballots, but polled that vote several times. His last vote before the final break to Garfield was 257, and on the final ballot he received only 42, his friends having almost bodily gone to Garfield.

The nomination of Garfield was not in any measure acceptable to Cameron or Conkling. True, they had defeated Blaine, and thus accomplished one of the great purposes of the combination, but they long hesitated to give a cordial support to Garfield. The friends of Garfield immediately after his nomination called upon Conkling, and requested him to indicate a candidate for Vice-President, but he refused, in the contemptuous manner that he so often exhibited, to give any intimation on the subject. As Arthur was a delegate and cast the vote of New York on several occasions when Conkling was otherwise engaged, and as he was known to be the special favorite of Conkling, the Garfield people nominated him for Vice-President, but for the time being the nomination of Arthur did not seem to temper the keen disappointment of Conkling. Garfield had been nominated by the supporters of Blaine, and Conkling feared that Garfield would be much more friendly to Blaine than he could afford to have the President. I saw Garfield and Arthur at the general reception given to them on the evening after the nominations had been made, and the occasion was chiefly notable for the absence of Conkling and Cameron.

The nomination of Garfield was not cordially responded to by the followers of the Republican leaders in either New York or Pennsylvania. I saw Cameron frequently, and during the early stages of the contest he did not regard Garfield's election as probable, and was not disposed to lose sleep at the prospect of a Republican National defeat. The organization in the State was in his own hands with John Cessna as chair-

man of the State committee, and under any circumstances the vote of Pennsylvania would be given to Garfield, but New York was then regarded as certain to vote Democratic. The Republican leaders in the Eastern States were very slow to organize for the National battle, and in the early part of the summer Garfield was so much alarmed at the situation that he voluntarily visited New York and stopped at the same hotel where Conkling made his home, and although Garfield was there for several days, Conkling never called upon him.

Later in the struggle, when the leaders were required to decide between victory or defeat, Conkling was pressingly invited by Garfield to visit him in Ohio, and after a conference in which Grant, Cameron and others participated, it was decided that Conkling should accept the invitation and confer with their candidate. The result of that conference was that the entire Grant combination decided to give an earnest support to Garfield, and Grant himself went so far as to attend a meeting and deliver a public address in favor of the Republican candidate. General Hancock, who was the Democratic candidate for President, had a strong hold upon the people, and was a very popular and dangerous antagonist for Garfield. Thus after having been apparently quite willing for Garfield's defeat for several months after his nomination, the Grant-Cameron combination found, when they decided to elect him, that they had an immense contract on their hands, and Garfield's election was finally accomplished only by a combination with Tammany that made them betray Hancock.

The first blow that struck the Grant leaders after the election of Garfield was his public announcement that Blaine would be called to the premiership of his cabinet. When the cabinet was sent to the Senate



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for confirmation, Cameron, more level-headed than Conkling, supported it in its entirety, but when Blaine's name was read in the Senate Conkling said to a fellow Senator that he must either retire from the body or hold his nose to escape the stench of Blaine's name, and he quietly adjourned to his committee room. Another cabinet nomination, that of Wayne MacVeagh for Attorney General, had peculiar dual significance. He was not of the Grant school of politics, but he was the brother-in-law of Senator Cameron, for whom the entire Cameron family cherished just pride. The appointment of MacVeagh would have been fully justified entirely on his own merits, as he possessed high legal attainments, and a reputation without blemish, but mere individual merit and fitness seldom control cabinet appointments, and with all of McVeagh's admitted qualifications for the Attorney Generalship, Garfield certainly intended the appointment as a compliment to the Cameron power of the State.

Conkling had no faith in Garfield after the appointment of Blaine, and he was not a man who concealed his distrust of those who had provoked his disfavor. Finally, the nomination of Robinson for collector of the port of New York, who had led the anti-Conkling forces in the National convention, came like a lightning stroke from an unclouded sky, and he and Platt, then a new Senator, in a sudden fit of resentment, sent their resignations to the Governor of New York, and started home confidently expecting to command a re-election. Conkling naturally held Blaine responsible for the nomination of Robinson, but Attorney General MacVeagh assured me that Blaine had never suggested the appointment, and did not know that it was to be made until the President had acted in the matter. The desperate and disastrous struggle made by Conkling and Platt for re-election to the Senate

need not be detailed. Before the battle ended, but when all hope had perished with the supporters of Conkling, Garfield died from the wound inflicted by the assassin Guiteau, and Arthur, who was at Albany, as Vice-President struggling for the re-election of his old friend, became President of the United States.

Two State offices were to be filled at the election of 1880—supreme judge and auditor general. Henry Green, of Northampton, was then serving by appointment as justice of the supreme court to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Justice Warren J. Woodward, and he was unanimously nominated for election. Senator John A. Lemon, of Blair, was nominated for auditor general on the first ballot, receiving 158 votes to 93 for Mr. Passmore. It was at this convention that Quay startled many of his followers by a very emphatic declaration in the platform in favor of honest elections, declaring that “until a man is considered infamous who casts an illegal vote, our government will not be safe, and whoever deprives a citizen of his right to vote, or of the legal effect of his vote, is a traitor to our government.” With this he demanded: “An honest count of all votes regularly cast, and an honest return of whoever is elected, free from all attempts to defraud the people of their choice through technicalities or by the arbitrary rejection of their votes.” The State ticket presented unusual strength, as Justice Green had brought to the court of last resort eminent qualifications alike in character and legal attainments, and Senator Lemon was one of the most popular men in the interior of the State.

The Democratic convention met at Harrisburg on the 28th of April, and after selecting delegates to the National convention, George A. Jenks, of Jefferson, was nominated on the first ballot for supreme judge, and Colonel Robert P. Dechert, of Philadelphia, was also on

the first ballot nominated for auditor general. The resumption of specie payments had then been accomplished, although steadily opposed by the Democracy, but the State convention of 1880 made a bold deliverance on the money question as follows: "That the Democratic party, as of old, favors a constitutional currency of gold and silver and of paper convertible into coin." Senator Andrew H. Dill was made chairman of the State committee.

The Greenback State convention was held at Harrisburg on the 23d of March, and nominated Frank P. Dewees, of Schuylkill, for supreme judge, and E. A. L. Roberts, of Crawford, for auditor general, without the formality of a ballot, and a resolution was adopted recommending the nomination of Hendrick B. Wright for President. The Prohibition convention met at Altoona on the 20th of May, and nominated George F. Turner for auditor general, but declined to make a nomination for supreme judge.

The Greenback element had been practically put out of business by the complete accomplishment of the resumption of specie payments, and its vote was greatly reduced in the State. Hancock, a native of Pennsylvania, and one of the most accomplished and heroic soldiers of the war, inspired the Democrats to unusual enthusiasm, but they knew that the State was hopeless, and the most they could accomplish was to reduce the Republican majority. The Legislature was certain to be Republican in both branches, and the campaign moved on in this State without any violent efforts on either side. Philadelphia gave about 20,000 Republican majority, and the State added 18,000 more, giving 38,030 majority for Judge Green, and 37,276 majority for Garfield. Weaver, the Greenback candidate for President, received 20,068 votes, and the Prohibition vote fell off to 1,940.

Two memorable speeches were made in the National conventions of 1880. The speech of Robert G. Ingersoll, presenting the name of Blaine in the Cincinnati convention of 1876, suddenly crowned him with National fame in a single day. It was received with unusual enthusiasm because Ingersoll was little known beyond his own State before he delivered that address, and I remember well when Ingersoll was announced at Cincinnati as the man who was to present the name of Blaine to the convention, there was very general apprehension that he would not be equal to the occasion; but I have heard many able speeches in National conventions, and never heard one that was as forceful and impressive as that of Ingersoll presenting the name of Blaine for the Presidency.

Conkling's speech nominating Grant in the Chicago convention of 1880 is well remembered as one of the grandest efforts of his life. I sat on the platform within ten feet of him when he rose to deliver it. He was a man of unusually handsome face and form, with a manner that had the air of majesty, and when his clear silver voice rang out the first sentence to the convention and spectators, making an assembly of fully 10,000 people, the effect was electrical. His first utterance was: "When asked whence comes our candidate? we say, 'from Appomattox.'" It was a bold, defiant deliverance, rather assertive than persuasive, but it was grand in eloquence and sublime in earnestness.

The late Daniel Dougherty delivered the most impressive address of his life before the Democratic convention at Cincinnati in 1880 when he presented the name of Hancock for the Presidency. Dougherty was not a delegate, and had taken little interest in the proceedings of the convention until, after a long delay, Tilden's letter of declination was received, when he plunged into the fight and urged the selection of Han-

cock, whose nomination was practically settled just before the convention met. It was regarded as most important to have some one present Hancock's name whose address would be fully worthy of the great occasion, and the Pennsylvanians at once suggested that Dougherty was the man. A member of the delegation gave Dougherty a substitution, and informed him that he was assigned the task of presenting the name of Hancock to the convention.

Dougherty never spoke on important occasions without careful preparation and thoroughly committing his address to memory. He had only a few hours to prepare his address, and that doubtless gave it the merit of brevity. Within an hour of the meeting of the convention, Dougherty came up to me in front of the St. Nicholas Hotel, and in a rather excited manner asked me to step around the corner. I did so, and he requested me to permit him to recite his Hancock speech, and suggest any revision that I might think necessary. The recitation did not require over six or eight minutes, and I was the sole audience while Dougherty repeated, in smothered tones, but with all his impassioned manner, the magnificent address that gave him National fame as a political orator. It was as faultless as it was beautiful, and no changes were suggested. The speech was received with the wildest enthusiasm as he styled Hancock "the superb," and one whose record was as stainless as his sword.

The only rift in the lute of Dougherty's eloquent presentation of Hancock was in the fact that Randall, of Pennsylvania, was a candidate for the Presidency, and on the second ballot received 128½ votes to 320 for Hancock. Immediately after the ballot was announced the Pennsylvanians changed solidly to Hancock, and the final summing up of the ballot gave Hancock 705 votes to 33 scattering.

In Pennsylvania the Republicans held their own in the Congressional delegation, electing 19 of the 27 Congressmen, and the Legislature consisted of 32 Republican senators to 18 Democrats and 1 National, and 122 Republican representatives to 78 Democrats and 1 Greenbacker.

While occasional murmurs were heard in different sections of the State against the Cameron-Quay rule, everything on the political surface indicated entire harmony and unity of action among the Republican leaders. Hoyt was apparently as solidly in accord with Cameron as was Quay himself, and none then dreamed that they were just on the threshold of the formidable revolt and deadlock of the Legislature, elected the same year, on the United States Senatorship. The most potent of political revolutions are often started in a single day, and apparently almost by a single breath, while oftentimes the most flagrant political affronts to the people are sullenly submitted to.

Galusha A. Grow had made an earnest canvass of the State as an avowed candidate for United State Senator. The leaders welcomed him as an efficient champion of the Republican cause, fully conscious of their power to defeat him in the caucus for Senator, and thus, as they supposed, end the contest. Grow is not of a revolutionary type of political leaders. He is as amiable as he is able, and while he was often grieved at the action of his party, he was counted on as one of the most willing to bow to party orders, and fall in to support the party flag; but the unrest of the independent element throughout the State had been quietly and surely widening and deepening, and an unusual number of able men, independent in their tendencies, were in the Legislature of 1881.

From under this apparently serene political surface there was a sudden eruption when the Legislature met

that dumfounded the leaders, defied their mastery, held the Legislature in deadlock on the Senatorship from the 19th of January to the 23d of February, and defeated every candidate the organization presented; and the aftermath of that contest came in 1882, when, after a unanimous nomination for Governor by an apparently harmonious party, General Beaver was suddenly confronted by an independent eruption that defeated him at the polls.

XCVIII.

SENATORIAL BATTLE OF 1881.

Galusha A. Grow Made an Active Canvass for Senator—Henry W. Oliver the Organization Candidate—Serious Revolt Against Quay-Cameron Rule—Forty-seven Republican Legislators Announce Their Refusal to Enter the Caucus—Oliver Nominated on Second Ballot—Received a Majority of the Entire Republican Vote of the Legislature—Senator John Stewart Leader of the Revolt—Oliver Withdrew and General Beaver was Made Organization Candidate—February 23d Both Factions United on Congressman John I. Mitchell—He Received the Full Republicans Vote and Was Elected—Wolfe, Independent Candidate for Treasurer.

THE battle between Garfield and Hancock for the Presidency did not call out extraordinary exertions from either political party, as the State was not regarded as in any sense debatable, but both sides well maintained their organizations, and very general interest was exhibited in the contest, as is common in all National elections. The one question that was agitated during the campaign was the United States Senatorship, as the Legislature would be called upon to elect a Senator to succeed Senator Wallace. Several avowed candidates were in the field, but the only one who commanded general attention and received instructions in a number of the counties was Galusha A. Grow, who had served a dozen years in Congress and was Speaker of the House during the first two years of the war. He was not in favor with the Cameron-Quay organization, and had to make his battle against it. The organization did not present a candidate during the campaign, and Grow apparently had the field largely to himself, but he well understood that before the meeting of the Legislature the domi-



Henry W. Oliver

nant political power of the State would determine upon a man who would be Grow's competitor.

The man who was preferred by the regular party organization for the Senatorship was Henry W. Oliver, of Pittsburg, but his name was not canvassed before the people, nor was he an importunate candidate. He was one of the most respected and successful young business men of Pittsburg, and while not seeking party favors, he had been a very efficient supporter of the party organization, and his intimate familiarity with the political questions of the time may be understood when it is known that he drew the tariff planks of the Republican National platforms for the Cincinnati convention in 1876, and the Chicago convention of 1880. He was as unassuming as he was courteous in all his intercourse with his fellows, and I doubt whether any business man in the State, of his years, more thoroughly understood the great and varied interests of the Commonwealth, and how to give them the most practical and certain development.

His quiet manners and close devotion to business at home made him a comparative stranger to the public outside of his immediate business circles, and when his name was presented as the candidate of the organization for the Senatorship it was at once resented by the Independents as an attempt to force a man into the position of Senator from Pennsylvania who lacked the intelligence and culture befitting the high station. The Independents in their address to the public, after they had taken their revolutionary attitude, criticised Mr. Oliver's qualifications as follows: "Wholly inexperienced in public life, Mr. Oliver was not known to the people of the State beyond the limits of his own county until named in connection with this distinguished position. Why one so obscure should have been selected out of the great body of the people as the

one of all others best qualified to represent the State, is not for us to explain."

This reflection upon Mr. Oliver was far from being just, and the Independents who thus criticised him finally gave a united vote for Mr. Mitchell, who did not approach Mr. Oliver in any of the great qualities necessary to make an efficient and respected United States Senator. Oliver was not an orator, not so much because he was wanting in ability to engage in public disputation, but chiefly because his life pursuits exhausted his energies in other directions, and his distaste for ostentatious display made him avoid the platform, but no man would have more intelligently mastered every problem of National legislation, or defended it more intelligently than Mr. Oliver if he had been called to the Senate.

He never was justly appreciated by his party or the public until after the Senatorial contest, but he commanded the respect of friends and foes by his chivalrous retirement when he found that his name was an obstacle to party unity. In the business revulsion that followed a year or two later, Mr. Oliver was overwhelmed and bankruptcy appeared to confront him, but his creditors had absolute confidence in his ability and integrity, and they generously aided him in his efforts to rehabilitate his broken fortune. In a few years he had paid all his obligations, principal and interest in full, and for a number of years before his death he was one of the multi-millionaires of Pittsburg, and certainly in the forefront of the most respected public-spirited and philanthropic citizens.

How keenly the injustice to Mr. Oliver, by his defeat for Senator in 1881, has been appreciated by the party in Pennsylvania, is evidenced by the fact that had he been living he would have succeeded Senator Quay without a contest; and Governor Pennypacker, in

tendering the appointment to his brother, George T. Oliver, to fill the unexpired term of Quay, stated that while George T. Oliver fully possessed the character and ability to justify his appointment to the Senate, the commission was tendered to him largely because it would in some measure atone for the wrong to his brother. Mr. Oliver declined the appointment, and it was then tendered to Senator Knox.

When the Legislature met in January, 1881, it was known that Mr. Oliver was the candidate of the regular organization for the Senatorship, and that it had the power to force his nomination. The independent sentiment had been greatly increased and intensified by the action of Cameron and Quay in calling the early convention of 1880 and wresting the State from Blaine by sending a Grant delegation to the National convention. As Grant failed to obtain the nomination, the party harmoniously united in the support of Garfield, but when the Independents reached the contest for Senator, they were ready for revolutionary work, and Grow was their favorite candidate.

The Legislature on joint ballot contained 154 Republicans, 92 Democrats, with 4 Greenbackers and Fusionists. The Republican caucus, to nominate a Senator, was fixed for January 13th, and on that day 47 Republican senators and representatives signed and published a pledge to stay out of the regular caucus, declaring that in their belief it was "not for the best interests of the Republican party or the welfare of the State that we should go into a caucus for the election of a candidate for the United States Senate."

The caucus was held at the time appointed, at which 98 Republican senators and representatives appeared. The first ballot gave Oliver 51, Snowden 12, Grow 10, Gilfillan 5, Bingham 5, Ward 4, White 2, Stone 2, Koontz 2 and Morrill 2. On the second ballot Oliver's

vote rose to 63, and on the third ballot to 79, being four majority of the entire Republican vote of both branches of the Legislature, and he was declared the nominee. The Democrats in caucus renominated Senator Wallace by a practically unanimous vote, and the Independents lined up in support of Grow. On the first ballot twenty Republican senators voted for Oliver, 12 for Grow and 16 for Wallace, with 1 for Agnew. In the House Oliver received 75 votes, Grow 44, Wallace 77 with 3 scattering. The vote of the joint convention footed up 95 for Oliver, 93 for Wallace, 56 for Grow, with 1 each for Agnew, Brewster, Baird and MacVeagh.

The time fixed by law for the two branches of the Legislature to meet in joint convention, having failed to elect by a separate vote in the respective branches, was the 19th of January, when two ballots were taken with precisely the same result. On the 17th of January, the day before the two branches voted separately on the senatorship, two addresses were issued to the public, one signed by Senator McNeil, of Allegheny, and chairman of the Republican caucus, presenting to the people of the State the attitude and defense of the regulars, and on the same day the Independents issued a public address that was signed individually by fifty-five members of the senate and house defending their action, and opposing the election of Oliver.

The Democrats had sufficient power to make a combination with either the regulars or the Independents, and assuring the election of the candidate they united in supporting. They could readily have made advantageous terms with either and secured fair congressional and other apportionments, but Wallace commanded the Democratic forces, and he resisted all efforts to make a combination with either of the Republican factions. He was an intense square-toed Democrat,

and was naturally averse to lowering the Democrats' standard, as he regarded it, by a fusion with any type of political opponent. Wallace not only acted in accordance with his own tastes in standing resolutely against fusion, but he was willingly repaying an obligation to Cameron and Quay, in which Mackey was an important figure, who six years earlier had stood resolutely against the fusion of the Republicans with the Buckalew Democrats to defeat Wallace. In all Republican factional contests Wallace was in hearty sympathy with the regular machine.

With the Democrats thus practically eliminated from the contest, it became a struggle of endurance between the Republican factions, and as they were required by the law of Congress, under which Senators were then and are now elected, the joint convention was compelled to meet every legislative day and vote for Senator until one was chosen. During nearly two weeks the opposing lines came up unbroken day after day, but by the time that the second Saturday was reached and many members desired to go home and spend Sunday with their families, as was their habit, a general understanding was reached that any members who desired to go home on Saturday should be at liberty to do so, and that neither side would attempt to rally its forces and elect a Senator by a minority vote because of absentees.

Under the law, if a bare majority of the entire Legislature appeared in joint convention it would be a legal convention with a full quorum, and a majority of that bare majority would constitute a quorum and could elect a Senator. It was necessary, therefore, to have an understanding on the subject. The result was that on the second Saturday, Oliver's vote fell from 95 to 42, Grow's from 56 to 32 and Wallace's from 93 to 47. The joint convention continued to

meet in the hall of the house at noon each secular day of the week from the 19th of January to the 9th of February, without any change in the monotonous grind of the three opposing elements casting fruitless ballots for a Senator.

On the 9th of February Mr. Oliver addressed a communication to the Republican members of the assembly that was most dignified and temperate in tone. In it he said, "For myself, realizing that the party nominee cannot be elected, owing to the refusal of a large and respectable number of Republicans to join with their brethren in the choice of the majority, it is due to my supporters to say that I am no longer a candidate, and they are free to select any other worthy Republican." On the same day Mr. Grow addressed a letter to Senator Davies, one of the Independent Republicans, in which he said: "Please withdraw my name as a candidate for United States Senator in the joint convention of the Legislature," to which he added his thanks to the senators and representatives who had supported him.

The regulars, after full consultation, decided to present the name of General Beaver, and they believed at the time they did it that the Independents could be induced to accept it. It is an open secret that very trivial circumstances prevented the union of the Independents with the regulars for the election of Beaver. Factional feeling was intensely inflamed, and it was quite possible for an accidental expression or action to prevent a union of the belligerent Republican forces. The Independents finally decided to support Congressman Thomas M. Bayne, of Allegheny, and the first ballot, on the 10th of February, gave Wallace 86, Beaver 63 and Bayne 62. Daily joint conventions were held from the 10th of February until the 22d without any change in the struggle, except the varying of ballots because of absentees. Beaver's highest

vote was 80 and Bayne's highest vote was 62. On Saturday, the 19th of February, the total vote polled by the three parties was 69, being 28 for Beaver, 21 for Wallace and 20 for Bayne.

On the 17th of February the utter hopelessness of the struggle between the Republican factions was well understood by all, and after some outside consultations they, on that day, agreed that each should appoint a conference committee of twelve that should be empowered to select a candidate for Senator who must receive a two-thirds vote of both committees. The Independent committee consisted of Senators Davies, Lee, Stewart and Lawrence, and Representatives Wolfe, Silverthorne, Mapes, McKee, Slack, Stubbs, Miles and Derickson. The committee of the regulars consisted of Senators Greer, Herr, Smith, Keefer and Cooper, and Representatives Pollock, Moore, Marshall, Hill, Eshleman, Thompson and Billingsley.

The joint conference committee held daily sessions, and balloted for a candidate without result until the evening of the 22d of February, when they unanimously agreed upon John I. Mitchell, of Tioga, then Congressman from the Sixteenth District, as a compromise candidate. On the morning of February 23d a joint Senatorial caucus attended by all the regulars and Independents was held in which Mitchell was unanimously nominated, and in the joint convention of that day the vote for Senator was: Mitchell 150, Wallace 92, MacVeagh 1 and Brewster 1. Thus ended one of the most earnest and memorable Senatorial contests in Pennsylvania, that was surpassed in desperation and endurance only by the jangled Senatorial contest of 1855, when the Know Nothings controlled the Legislature, and when, after a most embittered contest, the Legislature adjourned without electing a Senator, giving the Democrats the opportunity to elect Gover-

nor Bigler the following year when they had gained control of the Legislature.

Senator Mitchell was accepted by the Independents with some reluctance, and he was generally regarded as rather more acceptable to Cameron than to the bolters, but he was universally respected by senators and representatives of his section of the State that he was then representing in Congress, where the Independent sentiment largely predominated, and the pledge was given by his supporters from that region that under no circumstances would he become subordinate to the regular machine domination of the State. He was not asked to give any pledge for himself, and he was elected to the Senate entirely free from any embarrassing obligations, but he fully vindicated the theory presented in the address of the regulars to the people of the State defending the nomination of Oliver, in which the following deliverance was made: "A compromise means temporary relief from a seeming difficulty, and weakness and decimation for years thereafter. Compromise under existing circumstances means previous consultation with a few leaders, who care more for their own prejudices and hatreds than for the unity of the party. The selection of a vacillating man—the usual result of compromise—will be a source of constant chagrin and demoralization."

Mitchell was not a man of great intellectual force, and until his bold break against the party organization one year after his election to the Senate, he was always regarded as a submissive partisan. Cameron and Quay felt entire confidence that he would act with the organization, as Cameron had accomplished Mitchell's nomination for Congress when his county was not entitled to it, not so much for the purpose of giving success to Mitchell, as to preclude Senator Strang from a future election to Congress. Mitchell served

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in the Senate highly respected personally, but without any conspicuous legislative achievement, and his Senatorial career is now chiefly memorable because of the bold and defiant manner in which he assailed the Cameron-Quay organization in 1882, defeating General Beaver for Governor, and transferring the State to Democratic authority.

While Senator John Stewart, of Franklin, was the acknowledged leader of the Independents, the most aggressive and declamatory of the bolters was Representative Charles S. Wolfe, of Union. It was an open secret that he was ambitious to be elected United States Senator by a fusion between the Independents and the Democrats, and he was inflamed to desperate hostility by the fact that Cameron and Quay, of the regular Republicans, and Wallace, leading the Democrats, were acting in accord against fusion.

Only the office of State treasurer was to be filled in 1881, and the Republicans did not call their convention until the 8th of September, when they met at Harrisburg, and the Independents locked horns with the regulars in that body in the struggle for the State treasurership. Silas M. Bailey, of Fayette, was nominated on the first ballot over Senator Davies, of Bradford, one of the Independent Republican senators, by a vote of 157 to 84. Wolfe attended the convention and was greatly humiliated by the overwhelming defeat of the Independents. On the following day he announced himself as an independent candidate for State treasurer, by a telegram addressed to the Philadelphia "Times." The text of his announcement was as follows: "The black flag has been raised against the Independent Republicans of Pennsylvania. Please announce that, on my own responsibility, I am an Independent Republican candidate for State treasurer in full sympathy with the administration, and against

the rule of the bosses. I will stump the State, and give my reasons for this action."

The Republican leaders were startled at the sudden and defiantly hostile attitude assumed by Wolfe, and they made exhaustive efforts to get the party into line. The Democrats held their convention at Williamsport on the 28th of September, and nominated Orange Noble, of Erie, for State treasurer, and for a time it looked as if the Independents would overwhelm the regulars by the election of a Democratic State treasurer.

Wolfe fulfilled his promise and spoke in different sections of the State, but failed to make any serious impression upon the party organization. He was regarded as a disappointed political aspirant, and that greatly weakened his cause, but he fought the fight out with desperation until election day. Senator Cooper was chairman of the State committee, and managed the Republican battle with great skill. It was an off year, and the Democrats, having known little else than defeat for twenty years, could not be organized to poll a full vote, while the more vital and completely equipped Republican organization brought out a sufficient proportion of its voters to elect Bailey by 6,824 plurality, while Wolfe polled 49,984 votes. It was a great opportunity for the Democrats, but they were lacking alike in organization and vitality, and the regular Republican organization won out even with 50,000 defection in favor of an Independent Republican candidate.

XCIX.

PATTISON ELECTED GOVERNOR.

The Independent Republican Revolt—Davies Defeated for State Treasurer—This Led to Full Independent State Ticket in 1882—Futile Offers of Compromise—Pattison Nominated for Governor by the Democrats—Senator John Stewart as the Independent Leader—Center of the Campaign—The Democratic Ticket Elected by Independent Republican Votes.

WHILE the Republican factions seemed to have been very cordially united in the election of Mitchell to the Senate in 1881, the Independent revolt against the dominant power of the party pervaded every section of the State, and the Independents felt that they had little to expect from the leaders of the party then in power. At the Republican State convention of 1881, when there was only a State treasurer to elect, the Independents urged the nomination of Senator Davies, of Bradford, who had been prominent among the Independent senators in the Legislative battle that resulted in the election of Mitchell.

Had the Republican leaders been wise, they would have accepted Davies and thus ended the dispute, but the State treasurer was too important to the organization, and Davies was defeated by a decided majority, and Mr. Bailey, the slated candidate of the leaders, was nominated on the first ballot. On the following day Charles S. Wolfe's card was published all over the State announcing himself as an Independent candidate for State treasurer, giving as the reason that the black flag had been hoisted over the Independents by the leaders, doubtless referring to the defeat of Davies in

the State convention. The Independent organization was thus continued, and as is usual in all factional fights, the estrangement was widened and deepened every day.

The Independents took the initiative for the important contest of 1882 that involved the election of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, secretary of internal affairs, judge of the supreme court, and Congressman-at-Large. They began their movement to fight out the battle against the bosses on the 16th of December, 1881, when the State committee of Independents issued a call signed by I. D. McKee, chairman, and Frank Willing Leach, secretary, asking the Independents to send representatives from each county to a State conference to be held in Philadelphia on the 12th of January, 1882, to consider the question of nominating an Independent Republican State ticket.

This conference was held four months before the meeting of the regular Republican State convention, and was intended to take such action as would force the regular organization to yield to the demands of the revolutionists. At that conference it was decided to hold a State convention for the nomination of a State ticket on the 24th of May, which would be two weeks after the regular Republican convention was to be held at Harrisburg, on the 10th of the same month. Thus, the two calls for the regular and the Independent Republican conventions were both issued several months before the time of meeting, and the leaders of the Regulars at once began negotiations to unite the conventions on the same ticket and platform.

After some outside conference it was agreed that a committee should be appointed by the organization of each of the two factions to consult on the subject of the party differences. The Independents selected Charles S. Wolfe, I. D. McKee, Francis B. Reeves,

J. W. Lee and Wharton Barker, and the regulars, appointed by Chairman Cooper, were M. S. Quay, John F. Hartranft, C. L. Magee, Howard J. Reeder and Thomas Cochran. These committees had a preliminary conference in Philadelphia on the 20th of April, when they adjourned to meet on the evening of May 1st, at which they agreed upon peace propositions, in which every point in dispute was substantially conceded to the Independents.

The peace resolutions unequivocally condemned the use of patronage to promote personal or political ends, demanded protection of competent and faithful officers against removal, obedience to the popular will of the State in the National convention, prohibited compulsory assessments for political purposes, and the provisions asked for by the Independents for the election of delegates to the State conventions, and prohibiting snap conventions, with an open declaration that all Republicans, Independents and Regulars, should participate in party primary elections. This declaration of principles and party policy was signed by every member of the two committees nine days before the Regular Republican convention met.

Judging the dispute by the records made, and the agreement reached by the opposing factions, it would seem that there was no further ground for continued revolt against the regular organization, but the Independents knew that the Regular leaders were not sincere in their devotion to civil service reform, and had little faith in their purpose to accept in its full and fair letter and spirit the agreement that had been made. It was this distrust that made the Independent committee issue an address on the 3d of May urging the Independents to a full representation at the State

convention to meet in Philadelphia on the 24th of May for the nomination of State candidates.

In that address it was declared that if the Regular Republican convention, to meet on the 10th of May, "failed to nominate as its candidates men who in their character, antecedents and affiliations are embodiments of the principles of true Republicanism free from the iniquities of bossism," such nominations "should be emphatically repudiated by the Independent convention."

The Regular Republican convention convened at Harrisburg on the 10th of May. I witnessed its proceedings, and noted the fact that but one sentiment seemed to prevail in the body, and that was to place the party in a position to command the support of all fair-minded Independents. General Beaver was nominated for Governor by acclamation, and Senator Davies, of Bradford, one of the leaders in the senate in the Independent movement in the Legislature of 1881, was also nominated by acclamation as the candidate for the second place on the ticket. John M. Greer, of Butler, was nominated for secretary of internal affairs; William Henry Rawle, of Philadelphia, for supreme judge, and Thomas M. Marshall for Congressman-at-Large. The platform declared in favor of every feature of reform demanded by the Independents, even to the minutest details.

The Independents had been conceded the nomination for lieutenant governor, an office that is important only to the man who holds it. It is absolutely without power in legislation, and usually without a voice in the dispensation of patronage. William Henry Rawle, who was nominated for supreme judge, was one of the ablest and most aggressive of the reform Republicans of Philadelphia, but as his office was without patronage, the Independents saw that all the can-

didates for offices wherein political influence could be wielded had been accorded to the Regulars.

The result was that the Independents held their convention in Philadelphia on the 24th of May, and it had the appearance of a sudden volcanic eruption. Senator Mitchell, usually one of the most submissive of party leaders, was there and fierce as the tigress defending her cubs, while from every section of the State came men of high character and intelligence, who commanded for the convention the highest measure of respect.

There was no personal objection to General Beaver, who was one of the purest and cleanest men of the State, with a most gallant record as a soldier, losing his right leg in battle, but they distrusted the power that had nominated him, and that they feared would dominate him, and the many qualities, which under ordinary circumstances would have argued so strongly in his favor, were powerless against the aggressive earnestness of the Independents.

The Independent platform was practically a repetition of the reforms which had been agreed upon by the two factional committees, to which was added the following: "We demand, instead of the insolence, the proscription and the tyranny of the bosses and machine rulers, the free and conscientious exercise of private judgment in political affairs, and the faithful discharge by those who assume representative trust of the express will of the people."

Senator John Stewart, of Franklin, was nominated for Governor by a vote of 139 to 62 for Judge Agnew, Levi Budd Duff, of Allegheny, was nominated for lieutenant governor, George W. Merrick, of Tioga, for secretary of internal affairs, William McMichael, of Philadelphia, for Congressman-at-Large, and George Junkin, of Philadelphia, for supreme judge. The

Independents selected altogether their best equipped man for such a battle when they nominated Senator Stewart; a man of sterling honesty, of unfaltering fearlessness, eminently able and always aggressive when called into conflict. His record, alike as citizen and soldier, was unblemished, and his mingled logic and eloquence as a campaigner made many thousands resolve their doubts in favor of the Independent cause.

Exhaustive efforts were made by the Regulars after the nomination of the Independent ticket to reach an adjustment of the differences, and unite the party to avert defeat. The Regulars were quite willing to concede any place on the ticket except that of Governor. They could not afford to have a resolute and fearless Independent in the position of Governor for four years.

Thomas M. Marshall had been nominated by the Regulars for Congressman-at-Large, and after some hesitation formally declined to be a candidate, and the regular convention was reconvened at Harrisburg early in June, and nominated Marriott Brosius to take his place. This convention took the initiative to bring about a union of the two factions upon one ticket, and a formal communication was addressed to Chairman McKee, of the Independent committee, and it was at once communicated to the Independent candidates.

On the 13th of July a letter signed by Stewart, Duff, Merrill and Junkin, of the Independent ticket, was addressed to General Beaver and the other Republican candidates, who, after stating their position, proposed that all the candidates on both tickets should withdraw, and that none of them should accept a nomination from any convention that year. New primaries were to be held in which all Republicans were to be at liberty to participate, believing that such a convention would nominate an acceptable ticket. Mr. McMichael,

the Independent candidate for Congressman-at-Large, refused to join in the proposal to decline.

On the 15th of July General Beaver and all his fellow Republican candidates united in a letter to Chairman Cooper in answer to the letter they had received from the Independent candidates, declining to accept the proposition, in which they said: "To say that in the effort to determine whether or not our nomination was the free and unbiased choice of the Republican party we must not be candidates, is simply to try the question at issue." Thus ended the efforts of the leaders of the two Republican factions to attain unity in 1882. Everything that gave promise of unity had been exhausted, and the question of harmonizing was never afterwards raised during the contest. Both the factions stripped for the battle, and it was universally accepted as a fight to a finish.

The Democrats fully appreciated the advantage that the divided Republican party gave them, and they were very fortunate in presenting a candidate for Governor who had twice been elected by the aid the reform element had given to the Democratic party to the office of controller of Philadelphia, in which position he had discharged his duties with unfaltering fidelity.

The Democratic State convention met at Harrisburg on the 28th of June, with George M. Dallas as permanent president. William U. Hensel presented a very carefully prepared and conservative platform, which was unanimously adopted. The contest for Governor seemed to be narrowed to Robert E. Pattison and ex-Congressman James H. Hopkins, of Allegheny, with a number of candidates receiving a scattering vote. On the first ballot Hopkins received 87 to 61½ for Pattison, but Pattison's vote steadily increased until the sixth ballot, when he received 126½ to 119½

for Hopkins, with two scattering. Chauncey F. Black was nominated for lieutenant governor, and Silas M. Clark for supreme judge, J. Simpson Africa for secretary of internal affairs, and M. F. Elliott for Congressman-at-Large.

Pennsylvania had thus presented to her people three candidates for Governor, all men of distinction, and all of unblemished reputations. General Beaver addressed the convention after the nomination, in which he said: "I have made no pledges to living man as to what my future course shall be. I can make none now or hereafter except this—in the approaching political campaign the harmony and success of the Republican party shall be the one great object of desire and effort on my part."

Senator Stewart was a member of the convention that nominated him for Governor, and accepted the position in a brief speech, in which he said: "The Harrisburg convention would send the Republican party on a mission not of principles, but of spoils. We would have the grand old organization disenthralled and redeemed. I say disenthralled because Pennsylvania is to-day in a state of vassalage, of bondage, and the voice of the honest people of Pennsylvania has not been represented in a Republican convention in a decade. It is from that control that we would deliver her."

The Commonwealth Club, of Philadelphia, gave an enthusiastic reception to Pattison soon after the convention adjourned, at which he presented his acceptance, in which he said: "There is a widespread discontent at what is forcibly called boss government. This is not without much reason. Popular discontent has generally good cause, for the people have no advantage in unnecessary agitation and disorder. The great evil

of boss government is that the interest of the official is made inimical to faithful public service."

The Prohibitionists held a convention at Altoona on the 23d of April, and nominated A. C. Pettitt for Governor, with a full ticket. The Greenback State convention was held on the 18th of May, and nominated Thomas A. Armstrong for governor, and the Labor convention met in Philadelphia on the 28th of August, and indorsed the nomination of Armstrong.

The Republicans did not regard the battle as entirely hopeless, as they had elected their candidate for State treasurer the year before, with the Independents in the field supporting Wolfe, who polled nearly 50,000 votes, but they did not at first appreciate the increased earnestness, as well as the enlarged numbers, of the Independents, which had been created by a year of constant friction between the factions. They counted largely on the high character and war record of General Beaver to command the soldier vote of the State, but failed to reckon the advantage the Independents had in presenting an equally gallant but more fortunate soldier at the head of their ticket, with McMichael, another honored soldier, as the candidate for Congressman-at-Large.

The Independent Republicans had no hope of electing their ticket. They could doubtless have made a fusion with the Democrats and swept the State by a large majority, but they stood squarely on the platform of what they declared to be honest Republicans and fought out their battle with the single purpose, as Senator Stewart declared it, to disenthral the State from the oppression of boss rule. In other words, the battle of the Independents was directed solely to the defeat of the regular Republican ticket, and that purpose was well understood by those who managed the organizations involved in the struggle.

The three candidates for Governor were all able and popular campaigners, and they enthused their friends by addressing large assemblies in every section of the State. The Republican organization was in the hands of Senator Cooper, who was a most accomplished chieftain in a desperate contest. He brought the regulars into the most perfect organization, and as the election approached they seemed to have increased confidence in the success of their ticket, and the organization boldly predicted a decisive victory over both the Democrats and the Independents.

While under ordinary conditions such political methods would have been highly advantageous, it proved to be unfortunate for the Regulars, as it changed the action of many thousands of Independents who sincerely desired Stewart's election, but who voted directly for Pattison to assure the defeat of the Regular ticket. This is evident from an examination of the results of the election. Wolfe polled nearly 48,000 Independent Republican votes the year before, when the Independent organization was feeble in comparison with its strength in 1882, but Stewart received 5,000 less votes in the State than were given to Wolfe.

In Philadelphia, where the Republicans could readily command a majority of 30,000 or more in a square contest, and where the Independent sentiment was stronger than in any other section of the State, Stewart received only 7,999 votes, while Pattison's vote was within nearly 3,000 of Beaver's. The vote of Allegheny exhibited a like landslide of the Independents to Pattison, where Stewart received only 4,726 votes, while Beaver had less than 2,000 plurality over Pattison. In Tioga County, the home of Mitchell, the vote was very nearly evenly divided between the three parties; Pattison receiving 2,257, Beaver 2,270, and Stewart 2,211.

The result in the State gave Pattison 355,791, Beaver 315,589 and Stewart 43,743, electing Pattison by 40,202 plurality. The other candidates on the State ticket fell with their chief. Black was elected lieutenant governor by a plurality of 36,028; Clark, for supreme judge, by 40,762; Africa, for secretary of internal affairs, by 36,944, and Elliott, for Congressman-at-Large, by 40,995.

With a knowledge of the peculiar conditions which then prevailed, and carefully scanning the reforms of that election, it is fairly doubtful whether Pattison was not elected by the direct support of Republicans, as nearly one-half of the Independents of the State voted the Democratic ticket to emphasize their implacable hostility to the Republican nominations of the State.

The Independents closed the battle of 1882 as absolute masters of the political situation in Pennsylvania, and they confidently expected that, with the co-operation they had reason to believe they would command from Governor Pattison, they could enforce a complete reorganization of the Republican party in the State, and the measurable subordination of its most offensive leaders. Why they failed will be told in another chapter.

C.

GOVERNOR PATTISON'S FIRST TERM.

An Administration of Both Successes and Failures—Appoints Lewis C. Cassidy Attorney General—Pattison Assailed on Account of Cassidy—Attacks that Forced Cassidy to Accept—A Legislature Divided Against Itself—Futile Efforts at Reapportionment of the State—Except as to the Judiciary—An Extra Session of the Legislature—The Governor Became Unpopular on Account of This Session—How He Lost His Mastery of the State—The Election of 1884—Pennsylvania Heavily Republican, though Cleveland Elected President.

GOVERNOR PATTISON was called to the chief Magistracy of the Commonwealth under political conditions which would have enabled any sagacious man in politics to hold the divided Republican party in open conflict and overthrow its mastery; but, while Pattison was justly estimated for his stern integrity in public and private life, and had exhibited great ability and unswerving fidelity in the important office of controller of the city, he was without political experience when he entered the broad field of Pennsylvania politics. He was unequal to the duty of shaping the policy of his own administration.

His first serious error was the appointment of Lewis C. Cassidy to the attorney generalship. If the public had known at the time Cassidy was appointed, that he would administer the responsible duties of his office, not only with great ability, but with absolute fidelity, the wide revolt against the appointment would have been measurably or wholly halted, but Cassidy was the Colonel Mann of Democratic politics, and both were ready at times to sacrifice party interests to their own

mutual interests. Both were members of the Pilgrim Club, an organization made up of the leaders of both parties to divide offices and public profits between themselves, and from the day of Pattison's nomination for Governor he was assailed not only by the Republicans generally throughout the State, but by William M. Singerly, in his widely read "Daily Record," as "Cassidy's boy" who would be the nominal Governor, while Cassidy would be the administration.

The Republicans were warranted in thus assailing Pattison, because Mr. Singerly's "Record," the only Democratic organ of Philadelphia, violently opposed him from day to day, and declared that Cassidy would necessarily be his attorney-general, and Samuel Josephs his secretary of the Commonwealth. These assaults upon Pattison were keenly felt in the contest by those who managed his campaign, as Pattison was little personally known outside of Philadelphia.

A month or more before the election, Cassidy called at my office, and expressed his apprehension that Pattison might be defeated by the charges made, not only by the Republican press generally, but by Mr. Singerly's widely read newspaper, that he (Cassidy) would be one of the Pattison cabinet, and prominent in directing the administration. He insisted that I should announce, editorially, on the authority of Cassidy himself, that under no circumstances would Cassidy be called to any public office under Pattison, if Pattison became Governor of the State. In obedience to that direction from Cassidy himself, I announced editorially in "The Times" on the following day that Cassidy had distinctly authorized a public announcement that if Pattison was elected Governor, Cassidy would not be called to any official position under his administration. That announcement was given to the Associated Press, to appear simultaneously in all the

daily journals of the State the following morning. It silenced the objections which had been urged with greatest effect against Pattison's election. It was accepted by all as the absolute truth, as it was given to the public not only on Mr. Cassidy's own authority, but by his own voluntary direction.

What was regarded as the gravest obstacle to Pattison's election was removed by Cassidy eliminating himself entirely from the new administration, but a few weeks after the election Cassidy called at my office, and appealed to me to release him from the promise that had been given to the public through me, not to accept any position under the Pattison administration. He informed me that Pattison desired him to be attorney-general, and that he especially desired the opportunity thus offered him to prove how clean and creditable a record he could make as attorney-general of the Commonwealth. I did not doubt his sincerity and personally regretted that I had no right and no authority to release him from the obligation he had made to the public through me. If it had been a mere personal pledge to myself, I could have done so, but it was a pledge that I had given to the public on his authority, and with it had given the positive assurance that the promise was made in good faith, and would be sacredly fulfilled.

Cassidy was my own personal counsel at the time, but his acceptance of a cabinet appointment after the solemn pledge given to the public with my own positive editorial endorsement would involve "The Times" and its editor in grotesque insincerity, and I informed him that that pledge was made under such circumstances that neither he nor I, nor any other, could release him from its fulfilment. Some time before this interview with Cassidy, Pattison had called at my office, and discussed the question of his cabinet in a



Robert C. Patterson

general way, giving a number of names that seemed to be considered. He named Cassidy among others, and I summarily dismissed his name, and reminded the Governor that Cassidy's public pledge, that was given the widest publicity throughout the State, precluded his selection, to which Pattison made no reply.

I never had another conference with either Pattison or Cassidy about his cabinet or on any political subject, before the inauguration, and when the new Governor sent Cassidy's name to the Senate for attorney general, "The Times" denounced the appointment as an act of bad faith, on the part of Cassidy, to the people of the State, that the Governor should not have permitted, and demanded that his solemnly plighted faith given to the public by Cassidy should be sacredly maintained. This criticism was resented by both the Governor and his attorney general, and the result was political estrangement between the State administration and "The Times" during Pattison's term.

It is due to Attorney General Cassidy to say that he manfully maintained his purpose, expressed to me at the time he desired his appointment to be sanctioned, by administering the office not only with all the masterly legal ability he possessed, but with absolute integrity and fidelity. Not one of the many eminent men who have filled the office of attorney-general in Pennsylvania made a cleaner or better record as law officer of the Commonwealth than did Lewis C. Cassidy.

The appointment of Cassidy was the entering wedge that soon thereafter separated the Independent Republicans from the Pattison administration. The Independents expected from Pattison not only an honest administration of the government, but they expected the Executive to rise above the mere partisan influence in the administration of his office. The senate was largely Republican, and the House largely Democratic,

and it was the duty of the Legislature of that year, as commanded by the Constitution, to pass congressional, judicial and legislative apportionments. The apportionments then existing had been made by the Republicans, and were shaped greatly to the advantage of that party. They had much to lose by new apportionments framed on an equitable basis, and much to gain by allowing the old apportionments to stand.

The Democratic house insisted upon a number of congressional, legislative and judicial districts corresponding to their proportion of the vote of the State, a proposition that was impossible of execution because the party did not have a majority in the counties of the State which would have been necessary to carry out their purpose without violent gerrymander. The Republicans of the State, after much wrangling between the two houses, finally yielded to the Independents of the body who desired to act with entire fairness, and presented a congressional bill that was reasonably fair to the Democrats, and much better than the then existing formation of districts, but it was sternly rejected by the Democrats, and addresses were issued to the public by the Republicans of the senate and the Democrats of the house, appealing their respective causes to the people of the State.

Finding that it was impossible for the two houses to agree upon an apportionment, the resolution for final adjournment on the 6th of June was passed by both branches, but on the morning of that day Governor Pattison addressed them a message, summoning them to meet in extraordinary session, beginning on the 7th of June, for the purpose of passing congressional, legislative and judicial apportionments. Both branches met in extra session on the 7th of June, and, after introducing a number of apportionment bills, adjourned until the 19th. Partisan prejudices were inflamed by

this protracted and bitter controversy, and there seemed to be no prospect of reaching an agreement. On the 11th of July, the Republicans of the senate presented their ultimatum, known as the McCracken congressional bill and the Longenecker legislative apportionment, with a resolution for final adjournment on the 24th of the month.

An arrangement was finally reached on the judicial apportionment on the 30th of July that was signed by the Governor, but the continued struggle on the other apportionments seemed to widen disputing parties rather than to bring them together. The wrangle continued until the 10th of September, when the two houses adopted a resolution directing the appropriation committee to report an appropriation bill to pay the expenses of the extra session, but the Governor returned it with a veto. On the 14th of September the senate decided to meet only on Tuesday and Friday. The house met daily and denounced the senate as revolutionary in its actions for refusing to sit continuously until the resolution called for was completed. Finally, on the 30th of November, the Democrats, satisfied that congressional and legislative apportionments could not be passed, agreed to final adjournment on the 11th of December. On that day the Legislature of 1883 adjourned sine die, making a special session of 189 days after a regular session lasting from the first of January to the 6th of June.

In the apportionment dispute the Governor became alienated from all his Independent Republican support, and at the election of 1883 the Republicans carried their State ticket by nearly 20,000 majority. The Republican State convention had met in Harrisburg on the 11th of July, and nominated J. B. Niles, of Tioga, for attorney general, and William Livsey for State treasurer. The Democrats held their convention

at Harrisburg on the first of August, and nominated Robert Taggart, of Warren, for attorney-general, and Joseph Powell, of Bradford, for State treasurer. Only the friction between the Independents and the Pattison administration to force apportionments satisfactory to the Democrats made it possible for the Republicans to elect their State ticket. The majority for auditor general was only 17,075.

The State administration of Governor Pattison thus lost its mastery over State and legislation by a struggle for partisan advantages that was not only unwise in conception, but blundering in execution. The Legislature at that time had no fixed salary for extra sessions, and the pay was \$10 per day for each member with the usual salary to officers, making the Legislature of 1883 the most costly in the history of the Commonwealth.

Pattison had, with Cassidy as attorney general, William S. Stenger, of Franklin, as secretary of the Commonwealth, a lawyer of great ability, with large experience in politics, as he was thrice elected to Congress in a district naturally Republican. How any administration with two so capable men as Cassidy and Stenger, both ripe in political experience, could have persisted in the blunder of a regular and an extra session of the Legislature lasting nearly a year, is difficult to understand.

In all matters outside of mere partisan interests the Pattison administration was clean, aggressively honest and commanded the respect and confidence of the masses of the people. The Granger element was then a vital one in the State, and Pattison was in sincerest sympathy with its general aims and methods. He thus retired from office at the expiration of his term, leaving an administration that was a failure viewed from a mere political standpoint, but that was regarded by the people generally as worthy of confidence because

of its fidelity to the interests of the people against the encroachments of corporations, and it was that feeling that recalled Pattison to the Governorship four years later in defiance of the ablest political leaders of the State.

Eighteen hundred and eighty-four was a Presidential year, and both parties entered the fight with complete organizations, and the hearty support of their followers. The Republican convention met at Harrisburg on the 10th of April. The only State candidate to be nominated was that of Congressman-at-Large, and General E. S. Osbourne, of Luzerne, was nominated on the third ballot. The Democratic convention met at Allentown on the 18th of April, and nominated General William W. H. Davis, of Bucks, Congressman-at-Large, without the formality of a ballot. Prohibition and Greenback conventions were held, the first nominating A. N. Attwood for Congressman, and the latter nominating James Black.

For the first time the enemies of Blaine, who had defeated him in 1876 and 1880 by diverting Pennsylvania from him, gave up the contest in this State, and the State convention declared in favor of the nomination of Blaine and Robert T. Lincoln for Vice-President. The Republican National convention met at Chicago on the 3d of June, and John R. Lynch, colored delegate from Mississippi, was nominated for temporary chairman by Theodore Roosevelt, now President of the United States, and elected over Powell Clayton, of Arkansas, by a vote of 431 to 387. This was the first time that a colored man had ever presided over a National convention of either of the great parties.

The contest for President was between Blaine and President Arthur, and there is little doubt that Arthur would have been nominated but for the fact that Blaine had been twice defeated in conventions in which his

friends felt that he would have been nominated if fair play had been the rule, and they could postpone his nomination no longer. Arthur was very popular with the people generally, as he had made a most dignified and generally acceptable administration. On the first ballot he received 278 votes to 364 for Blaine. On the fourth ballot Blaine had 540 to 201 for Arthur, with a number scattering when the nomination of Blaine was made unanimous, and John A. Logan was nominated for Vice-President without the formality of a ballot.

The Democratic National convention met at Chicago on the 8th day of July, and I have, in a former chapter, told how the friends of Randall controlled the State convention and placed Wallace at the head of the delegation with instructions to support Randall for President, and I have also given in detail the circumstances which led to the withdrawal of Randall in favor of Cleveland, thereby assuring Cleveland's success. Cleveland's nomination was effected on the second ballot, receiving 683 votes to 81½ for Bayard, 45½ for Hendricks and 10 scattering.

The National contest was a very earnest one, but Blaine made the mistake of assuming the management of his own campaign. Defamation of both candidates became rife long before the contest ended, but while it figured largely in the political speeches and party organs of the country, it is doubtful whether it changed a thousand votes out of the many millions cast. The principal scandal against Cleveland was sent to Blaine, and he committed the error of forwarding it to his National committee, and the chief scandal against Blaine was sent to Cleveland, but he forwarded it to his National committee with positive instructions not to give it publicity.

When Cleveland was most bitterly and malignantly

assailed, the Indianapolis "Sentinel," the leading Democratic organ of the West, astounded the country by bringing out the Blaine scandal with picturesque embellishments. When Cleveland was advised of the publication of the personal scandal printed against himself his answer was: "Tell the truth." Blaine, always impulsive and often unbalanced in judgment, as any man would be who assumed the management of his own campaign for the Presidency, brought suit against the Indiana journal that had given publicity to the scandal. He evidently did not appreciate the lesson that Clay had learned when he declared, after his final defeat for the Presidency, that if there had been another Henry Clay to direct his battle he would have been elected.

That Blaine erred in bringing his suit was later evidenced by the fact that after the election he withdrew it, and never pressed its trial. I well remember the morning the announcement was made of Blaine's suit against the "Sentinel." I was then resting in the mountains, and after breakfast was sitting in front of the hotel with President Arthur, Secretary Frelinghuysen, Judge Strong, William Henry Rawle and one or two others, when the New York papers were brought to us, and all of them were profoundly impressed with the fact that Blaine had committed a serious blunder. The paper that had made the publication was one of the greatest violent partisan journals of the country, and conducted with great ability. Its answer to Blaine was a challenge for a speedy trial and the emphatic reiteration of the details of the scandal. This action of Blaine greatly magnified the importance of the scandal, and made it a serious political factor, while from the day that Cleveland made the simple answer, "Tell the truth," and thus challenged his accusers, the

defamation gradually faded out and ceased to be seriously employed or felt in the struggle.

There was practically no contest in Pennsylvania, as it was not possible to wrest the State from Blaine, and the resources of the party were largely directed to aid the contest in New York. Blaine carried the State by 81,019, leading his ticket some 6,000, as the majority for Congressman-at-Large was only 75,227. The National contest was decided in New York, where Cleveland carried the State by 1,100 majority, and more than enough to have changed the result in favor of Blaine was lost by Blaine accepting a public dinner from Jay Gould and others, and meeting the ministers of New York, where the Burchard incident occurred. He had made his fight and practically won his battle, but on his way home he unfortunately tarried in New York city, and the two incidents referred to cost him vastly more than enough to have reversed the vote of the State and thereby made him President.

CI.

THE GREAT STEEL INDUSTRY.

Steel Was Used Almost Wholly for Edge Tools a Generation Ago—Structural Steel Practically Unknown and Steel Unthought of for Railways—Disston Developed American Steel for His Saw Works; for Many Years Had to Stamp Them as English—America Now Produces the Finest Steel in the World—Colonel Wright's View of the Helplessness of the South—Believed War Impossible in 1861 Because the South Could Not Tire a Locomotive—Advent of Andrew Carnegie—Started at Five Dollars a Week Under Colonel Scott—Became the Great Genius of the Steel Trade—Raised Up Half a Score or More of Multi-Millionaires—He Is Now Among the Half-score of Richest Private Citizens in the World—His Gifts of Millions to Libraries and Education—His Thorough Self-reliance—He Alone Directed the Movements Against the Great Homestead Strike of 1884—The Monuments Reared by Scott and Carnegie.

THE development of the steel trade during the last twenty years is entirely unexampled among the industrial enterprises of the world. I well remember, in the early seventies, when common iron rails for our railroads commanded from ninety to one hundred dollars a ton, and President J. Edgar Thompson, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, made the first experiment in the use of steel rails, at a cost of one hundred and seventy-five dollars per ton, to be used on the multiplied tracks about the Philadelphia station of the company, because the constant use of the tracks wore out the iron rails in a very few years. Steel was then unthought of for railroads and structural steel was practically unknown, but to-day nearly or quite all of the imposing buildings erected have a complete steel structure. Steel was practically unthought of, excepting for edge tools, until the discovery of the Bessemer pro-

cess half a century since, but great improvements have been made in the manufacture of steel, and it is now in universal use for railroads, which are generally laid with steel rails ranging from eighty to one hundred pounds to the yard.

When Mr. Disston, who founded the Disston Saw Works, of Philadelphia, began his work on a very small scale, he informed me that his tools would not have been accepted by the public if they had not been made entirely of English steel, as it was then believed that America could not produce steel sufficiently refined for edge tools. He was a well-trained, practical mechanic in his line, and he finally produced an American steel that was thereafter used entirely in his works, but for many years his product would have been unsalable if not stamped as English steel. To-day, America produces the finest steel in the world, and not only supplies the entire American market, with rare exceptions, but exports a considerable proportion of its product to Germany and other foreign countries.

When the Civil War began in 1861, there was not a pound of steel produced south of the Potomac and Ohio rivers. I remember dining with Colonel John A. Wright at his home at The J. Edgar Thompson Steel Works, near Lewistown, soon after the Presidential election of 1860. The secession of the Cotton States had already begun, and all were appalled at the prospect of fratricidal war. Colonel Wright was then regarded as the most experienced steel manufacturer in the State or country, and I was amazed when he told me to dismiss all apprehension of a war with the South, as the South could not then furnish tires for a single locomotive, and it would be impossible for it to maintain a war for a year when cut off from the many things for which it was solely dependent upon the North. He was right as to the producing power of the South, at

that time, but even without steel the Confederacy managed to maintain a bloody war for four long years, and to-day Birmingham, Alabama, produces cheaper iron and steel than can be furnished in any other industrial center of the world, and exports many thousands of tons annually.

The man who had the genius, energy and courage to develop the steel trade in this country to the highest possible point of perfection was Andrew Carnegie. I knew him well when he was quite a young man and the clerk of Thomas A. Scott. He was exceptionally bright, genial and tireless in industry, and at first thought he was getting along well in the world on a salary of five dollars per week. He had the best of training under President J. Edgar Thompson and Vice-President Colonel Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and was greatly aided by them in making his start as a manufacturer. He finally located near Pittsburg, and there for many years mastered every feature of the steel business, promptly utilized and controlled, if possible, every improvement invented, until he finally became known as the "Steel King" of the new world. There grew up around him a number of men who began the work in early life, most of whom were trained to the thorough mastery of their great business enterprise, the details and profits of which were practically unknown to the outside world. There are to-day, now in more or less active business in the great industrial enterprises of the country, half a score or more of multi-millionaires, solely because of their early association and training with Carnegie. Charles Schwab, whom I recall in his very early manhood as a driver of a two-horse stage up in the Alleghenies, was fortunate in becoming one of Carnegie's boys, and when the United States Steel Company was organized, with a capital of a billion dollars, Schwab became its president with a salary of one

hundred thousand dollars a year. Later, he retired from that position and is now engaged in steel enterprises involving many millions.

Andrew Carnegie is to-day in the fore-rank of the few preeminently prominent Americans, both in his native country of Scotland and his adopted country in the new world; certainly ranks among the half-score of richest private citizens in any country, and it is doubtless whether any, excepting Rockefeller, surpasses him in individual fortune. His love for the people among whom he was born made him return to Scotland, where he has acquired one of the most magnificent estates in the Province, and where he dispenses his charity with a lavish hand. He spends most of his winters in his palatial residence in New York, constructed by himself some years ago, and devotes his spare time to the systematic advancement of education in the United States. He is eminently practical; his money was acquired by the most careful and thoroughly practical methods, and his chief interest in gratifying his benevolent tastes is in teaching all that they must help themselves. His expenditure in this country in the establishing of libraries and the cause of education generally has already amounted to many millions. Hundreds of libraries have been established throughout the country by his generous contributions, all of which teach the highest appreciation of self-advancement by requiring libraries to be generously supported by those to whom they were given. Of all our multi-millionaires, Carnegie is the most generous giver, and he studiously aims to obtain the best practical results to the beneficiaries of his gifts.

Mr. Carnegie possesses, in an eminent degree, the inherent Scotch quality of self-reliance. One of the severest trials through which he passed was in 1884, when the Homestead strike convulsed the nation, and

certainly contributed to, or controlled, the election of the first Democratic President who ruled after the War. He was generously just to those in his employ, but sternly just when his vast industries were halted by what he regarded as most unhealthy control of the united labor of the State. He remained in Scotland during the entire strike, which lasted many months, but absolutely commanded the situation on this side by refusing the concessions demanded. The result was great sacrifice on the part of Carnegie, but when his battle was won he was safe from a repetition of such interruptions in his business, and from that time until his entire great enterprise was absorbed by the United States Steel Company, he rapidly accumulated wealth. While his business was conducted in the most methodical and economical manner consistent with his general business methods, he was always the first in the steel trade to foresee advantages and grasp them, regardless of necessary cost. The result was that when the proposition came to combine the great steel establishments of the country, Carnegie was the most important factor, as he was the great teacher of the trade, and when he finally retired he was one of the richest private citizens of the world. It is worthy of note that Colonel Scott, the great railroad genius of the country, and Mr. Carnegie, the great steel genius of our land, both started in their careers friendless and fortuneless, and they have left the greatest monuments of industrial and commercial progress to be found in the annals of the State.

CII.

QUAY ELECTED SENATOR.

Quay's Senatorial Battle Begun in 1885—His Early Political Relations and How He Stood Toward Senator J. D. Cameron—Quay's Candidacy for State Treasurer—His Turning Down of McDevitt of Lancaster—His Cleverly Managed Campaign and Election—The State Battle of 1886—General Beaver, Who Had Been Defeated in 1882, Easily Chosen Governor—Quay Before the Legislature of 1887—Triumphantly Chosen as U. S. Senator—Soon Becomes a Great National Leader—His Relations to Blaine—State Offices Filled in 1888—How a Democrat Reached the Supreme Bench—The National Campaign of 1888.

QUAY'S battle for the United States Senatorship began in 1885. His purpose was not openly declared, but all in close relations with him well understood that his struggle for the position of State treasurer in 1885 was simply a preliminary skirmish to gain a commanding position whereby he could win out in the Senatorial contest of 1886-87, when he fought his Senatorial battle in the open.

Quay had long looked to the United States Senate with earnest expectations. Very few of his friends knew how nearly he became involved in a direct struggle with Cameron in 1867, when Curtin and his friends discovered that Cameron had Curtin defeated in the Republican caucus. Quay was then a member of the house, admittedly the Republican leader of the body, and was the Curtin candidate for speaker, but was defeated by a combination of the field Senatorial candidates organized by Cameron. The contest for Senator had reached large commercial proportions which Curtin was unwilling or unable to meet, and at that stage Quay communicated to me in strict confidence that he

was seriously considering the question of taking Curtin's place in the Senatorial battle, and playing the commercial game to the limit against Cameron.

Quay was without fortune himself, but he had one friend, who then possessed a large fortune, and could have made a commercial combination in support of Quay that would have stood abreast with the Cameron organization. George K. Anderson was a Juniata County boy, with whose people I was well acquainted while residing there, and when General Irwin, of Quay's county, and largely by Quay's influence, was appointed commissary general at the beginning of the war, I induced Quay to join me in pressing the appointment of Anderson as a clerk under General Irwin, and it was accomplished. Anderson knew that he had obtained his position largely through the influence of Quay, and never ceased to appreciate it.

In the early days of the oil development in Venango County, an oil company was formed chiefly by men in Harrisburg, and Anderson was selected to manage it. He was thus in the oil region at the beginning of the oil fever, and soon commenced operating for himself. He was most fortunate in his ventures, and at the time of the Senatorial contest of 1867 his net income was estimated at \$2,500 a day, and he was able to command probably a million of money. He proposed to back Quay, if they could see any chance of winning out against Cameron. Quay held it under advisement for several days, but finally decided that the double risk of failure and exposure was too great to assume, and he never made himself known as a candidate, but finally arranged with the younger Cameron to move the unanimous nomination of Cameron after he had received the votes of a majority of the caucus. That was the beginning of Quay's relations with the Camerons.

Anderson became ambitious for political advancement himself, and I simply repeat his own statement to me when I say that he spent \$70,000 in a contest with the elder Delamater for the Republican nomination for State senator in Crawford County. Delamater was also a man of fortune, and doubtless was compelled to expend a large amount of money. He defeated Anderson in his first attempt to reach the Senate, but Anderson was nominated to succeed Delamater, and served a senatorial term. Finally, as his revenues from oil gradually diminished, his generous nature made it difficult for him to diminish his lavish gifts and expenditures, and the result was that he became hopelessly bankrupt, and the last time I saw him he borrowed a small amount of money to pay his expenses to Washington to accept an appointment in Arizona, or New Mexico, where he died soon after entering upon his official duties.

The Legislature to be elected in 1886 was to choose a United States Senator to succeed Senator Mitchell, of Tioga, and Quay decided that he would make his battle for the Senatorship at that time. He did not at first intend to be a candidate for State treasurer, and James McDevitt, of Lancaster, was practically slated for the office by Quay and his friends very early in the year, but Quay saw that he had little hope of winning the Senatorship in the Legislature of 1887 unless he could place himself in the position of supreme command of the party. He did not want the office of State treasurer, as it would have been practically under his control if McDevitt had been chosen, but he was Napoleonic in his methods and decided that if he could obtain a nomination and election as State treasurer in the face of the independent sentiment that had erupted and overwhelmed Cameron and himself three years before,



Lewis C. Cassidy

he would be absolute master of the party organization, and thus command the Senatorship.

Mackey was dead; the younger Cameron had just been re-elected to the Senate by the Legislature of 1885, and was the nominal leader of the party in the State with Quay as lieutenant. Quay knew the danger of provoking a sudden and desperate revolt among the Independents by proposing himself as a candidate for the only office to be filled in 1885, but he perfected his plans with the sagacity that he always exhibited in his many political struggles.

My first knowledge of his candidacy for State treasurer came from himself before his name had been publicly mentioned in any quarter. He called at "The Times" office and frankly told me that he had decided to be a candidate for State treasurer himself. I was greatly surprised at his announcement, as I apprehended that he would at once rekindle the Independent revolt, and that his name on the ticket would inflame it to huge proportions, but he well understood the peril that confronted him, and before he permitted his name to be announced as a candidate for State treasurer he personally visited a large number of the leading Independents, and after full conference with them, in nearly every instance he either obtained their assent to his candidacy or so mollified them as to prevent anything like a spontaneous eruption against him.

The result was that when his name was publicly announced as a candidate for State treasurer most of those interested in politics were amazed to learn that no general protest came up from the Independents, and that only in exceptional instances were feeble protests called out against him. It was indeed surprising that an Independent movement, embracing a large number of the most intelligent and influential Republicans of the State, that had made open battle against

Quay's mastery only three years before, as a rule either actively or passively assented to his candidacy for State treasurer, when his would be the only name on the State ticket.

The only trouble he had in his contest for nomination was from McDevitt, his own friend whom he had originally slated for the position and who took the bit in his mouth, and resolutely refused to decline in favor of his chief, but even with McDevitt in the field Quay was nominated on the first ballot in the convention that met at Harrisburg on July 8th, by a vote of 196½ to 27 for J. H. Longenecker and 15 for McDevitt, with 12 votes scattering.

The Democratic convention met at Harrisburg on the 26th of August and nominated Conrad B. Day, of Philadelphia, as Quay's competitor. The Greenback party nominated N. C. Whitney and the Prohibitionists nominated Barr Spangler. Quay looked well to the organization of his party, and in an off year, as it was, a party that has organization and discipline can be most effectively handled. He understood the whole State and left no means unemployed to secure a substantial victory for himself. The result was his election by a majority of 43,516.

He had thus won his high position as political master of the party by a very large majority from the people, and with the State treasury as his base for political operations during the following year it was not difficult for him to shape the new Legislature by timely attention to nominations and generous support to his friends in doubtful districts and have it substantially at his own command.

The triumphant election of Quay for State treasurer blazed the way very distinctly for the renomination and election of General Beaver in 1886. He had been defeated by the Independents four years before, not

because of personal objection to his qualifications or character, but solely because he was the candidate of Cameron and Quay, and as the people had just given Quay a large majority for a most responsible office in a square contest, the nomination and election of Beaver were practically assured. The Republican State convention nominated Beaver by acclamation, and Senator William G. Davies, of Bradford, who had been one of the Independent senators in 1881 and was defeated with Beaver in 1882, was also renominated for lieutenant governor without a contest. Senator A. Wilson Norris was nominated for auditor general, and General Thomas J. Stewart for secretary of internal affairs.

The Democrats had a bitter struggle in their convention over the nomination for Governor. In a former chapter I have related the circumstances of Senator Wallace announcing himself as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor, and that Randall had in personal conference assented to it, but their factional followers were always averse to anything like unity between them, and they forced the issue of separating Randall and Wallace in the struggle, and Randall, being then dominant in the party, defeated Wallace's nomination and made Chauncey F. Black the Democratic candidate. With him were nominated Colonel R. Bruce Ricketts for lieutenant governor, William J. Brennan for auditor general and J. Simpson Africa for secretary of internal affairs.

As the Independents had acquiesced in the election of Quay there was no visible ground for revolt against the nominations of Beaver and Davies, and excepting in a few individual cases the old Independents fell in under the party flag. Beaver entered the campaign and fought it out heroically from start to finish, visiting every section of the State and speaking sometimes at

several meetings in a day. Black was then just in the prime of intellectual and physical vigor, and stumped the State from Lake Erie to the Delaware, but it was a hopeless battle from the start. The Republican party was practically united and gave a very cordial support to Beaver, while the Democrats were somewhat disintegrated by the Granger element that forced Black into the support of a State policy that chilled a considerable Democratic element in business and financial circles.

The Prohibitionists nominated Charles S. Wolfe, who was the free lance candidate for State treasurer several years before, and a natural and able kicker, but even with the regular Prohibition nomination he polled little more than half the vote he had received when an Independent Republican candidate for State treasurer. The entire Republican ticket was elected by substantially the same vote, with over 40,000 plurality, and the Republican Legislature was carried with 34 Republicans in the senate to 16 Democrats, and 135 Republicans in the house to 67 Democrats and one Greenback and Labor.

Governor Beaver was inaugurated with imposing ceremonies, as the Republicans emphasized their appreciation of restoration to authority in the State, after four years of Democratic rule. He called a strong cabinet about him, consisting of Charles W. Stone, of Warren, as secretary of the commonwealth, W. S. Kirkpatrick, of Northampton, for attorney general, and Daniel S. Hastings, as adjutant general.

It was not disputed by any that Quay had an overwhelming majority of the Republicans of the Legislature pledged to his election for United States Senator, but he was ambitious to have his nomination as nearly unanimous as possible, and he very adroitly introduced a district system of Legislative conferences in different

sections of the State, to which the Republican senators and representatives of the district were invited, and in each of these conferences it was proposed and earnestly urged that they should cast a united vote in favor of the candidate preferred by the majority.

In each of the districts thus mapped out Quay had a clear majority; in nearly every instance the plan was successful, and the result was that Quay was nominated in the Republican caucus on the 4th of January, 1887, by a vote of 154 to 9 for Galusha A. Grow. In the Democratic caucus Senator Simon P. Wolverton was nominated as the Democratic candidate, receiving 46 votes to 14 for Wallace, 4 for Robert E. Wright and 3 for James F. Comley. The vote in the senate for United States Senator was 33 for Quay, 14 for Wolverton and 3 not voting. In the house, Quay received 133 to 66 for Wolverton, 2 not voting.

Quay thus carried to triumphant completion the policy he inaugurated in 1885, when he announced himself as a candidate for State treasurer, and when, as he told me when conferring on the subject at the time he informed me of his purpose to be a candidate, he felt that he must either take the risk of a defeat for State treasurer, or lose the control of the organization of the State. He said he was fully convinced that he must make a battle for the State treasurer, or surrender the party sceptre, and he added that he preferred to fall fighting to being relegated to a secondary position in party control. From the time of Quay's election to the Senate in 1887 until his death, he wielded absolute mastery in the Republican party of the State.

Eighteen hundred and eighty-seven was an off year in politics, and with the triumphant election of Quay as State treasurer in 1885, of Beaver, as Governor, in 1886, and Quay as United States Senator in the Legislature of 1887, Quay's domination of the party in the

State was conceded by all. There were a few Independents who criticised Quay's methods and autocratic mastery, but there was no popular demand in the party ranks for revolt, and Quay entered upon his new career as a National Legislator with the most serene political conditions as his environment.

The country was enjoying an unusual degree of prosperity. The National treasury was overflowing with surplus revenues, as the Cleveland administration had severely halted improvident appropriations, and the Democrats, with a united Republican party confronting them, accepted the situation in Pennsylvania as utterly hopeless for them. Chief Justice Mercur had died early in the year, and Henry Williams, of Tioga, was appointed to succeed him. The Republican State convention unanimously nominated Judge Williams for election, and William B. Hart for State treasurer, and the Democrats nominated J. Ross Thompson, of Erie, for the supreme court, and Bernard McGrann, of Lancaster, for State treasurer. There were no Congressmen or Legislators to elect to inspire interest in local contests, and the political battle of 1887 was a perfunctory one, as the Democrats understood from the beginning that they had no prospect of winning. The result was the election of the Republican State ticket by over 40,000 majority.

The year 1888 developed Senator Quay as a great National leader. He had served only a single session in the Senate, but he was speedily recognized as a very important political factor, and he at once assumed a potential attitude in the direction of National party affairs. Blaine had been defeated in 1884, and he was undecided as to his candidacy for 1888. Blaine was a fatalist, and was profoundly impressed, after his defeat for the nomination in 1876, that he was fated never to reach the Presidency. I remember his

saying soon after his defeat at Cincinnati that he had the largest measure of popular following and yet believed that, like Clay, he could never reach the Presidency.

Quay was not an ardent supporter of Blaine for the nomination in 1884. His fellow Senator, Cameron, had just married into the Sherman family, and Quay and Cameron decided to take the initiative in Pennsylvania, where they had absolute control, and select an instructed delegation for Senator Sherman for President. Had Blaine been a positive candidate, the selection of a Sherman delegation in this State would have involved a contest, but while Blaine would doubtless have very willingly accepted the nomination if he had reasonable prospect of election, he hesitated to allow himself to be considered as an aspirant, and Quay and Cameron had an easy triumph in carrying the delegation for Sherman. Quay placed himself at the head of the delegation, and selected Adjutant General Hastings to present Sherman's name to the convention in behalf of Pennsylvania. Quay and Cameron were both very earnestly enlisted in the Sherman cause, but General Alger had made serious inroads upon Sherman's support in the South, and the National convention at Chicago, after several days of balloting, finally gave the nomination to General Harrison, of Indiana.


Two State offices were to be filled in 1888—supreme judge and auditor general, and the Republicans nominated Thomas McCamant for auditor general and James T. Mitchell, the present chief justice, for the supreme court. The Democrats nominated Henry Meyer for auditor general and J. Brewster McCollom for the supreme court. As the contest was regarded by the Democrats as hopeless, they had much difficulty in selecting a candidate for supreme judge. It was offered to Judge Arnold, Samuel Gustine Thompson,

who later filled the position by appointment, and a number of other prominent members of the bar, but all declined, and when the convention met there were several aggressive candidates for the nomination who lacked the character and attainments necessary to make an acceptable ticket for so dignified a position.

Finally Judge McCollom's name was presented without his knowledge, and the assurance given by close friends that he would accept, and he was placed on the ticket. Soon after the nomination had been made, Judge Trunkey of the supreme court died in London, making two vacancies to be filled, and under the Constitution the people could vote for but one candidate, thus assuring the election of both the Republican and the Democratic candidates.

While the contest of 1888 was very earnestly fought in the debatable States the Democrats of Pennsylvania, knowing that they could not give the State to Cleveland, confined their efforts largely to the Congressional and Legislative districts. The Republican majority for electors and State officers was about 80,000, but McCollom, Democrat, was elected supreme judge along with Mitchell, being chosen as the minority candidate, as provided by the supreme law of the State.

The Republicans realized when the National campaign of 1888 opened that they had a desperate struggle before them, and that under all ordinary conditions the most successful and efficient party management would be likely to win. It was this condition that called Senator Quay to the chairmanship of the National committee, and there is little doubt that New York was given to Harrison, in the face of a large Democratic majority for the State ticket, solely by Quay's strategy and his combinations with Tammany. New



Andrew Carnegie

York decided the election against Cleveland and in favor of Harrison. Quay was undoubtedly the chieftain of the struggle, and he was at once recognized throughout the entire country as one of the most accomplished leaders of the party. He was thus recognized until the day of his death, and the story of his career from that time until his life work was ended will furnish another most interesting chapter in the annals of the Commonwealth.

CIII.

QUAY AND WANAMAKER.

Aftermath of the 1888 Election—How Wanamaker Became a Great Political Factor—Personal Choice of President Harrison for Postmaster General—Appointment Distasteful to Cameron and Quay—His Masterly Administration—He Acquires Powerful Influence in State Politics—The Contest for Governor in 1890—Delamater Made the Republican Nominee—Pattison Renominated by the Democrats—Ex-Senator Wallace and W. U. Hensel—Hensel's Important Position—Pattison Re-elected—Harrity and Hensel in Pattison's Cabinet—J. D. Cameron Re-elected to His Last Term in the Senate—The Bardsley Defalcation—How Quay Counteracted Its Effect.

QUAY'S management of the National campaign of 1888, in which he wrenched victory from the very jaws of defeat by his skilful political movements in New York city, the citadel of Democratic power, made him suddenly and universally recognized by his party as its most accomplished political leader. It is entirely safe to assume that but for Quay's sagacity and heroic methods in managing the contest in New York, Cleveland would have been re-elected President, as Cleveland was the only man on the Democratic ticket who did not receive a majority in the Empire State. Harrison carried New York over Cleveland by 14,373 plurality, and at the same election Hill was re-elected Governor by 19,171, Jones, Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had 22,234 plurality, and Gray, Democratic candidate for court of appeals, had 3,425 plurality.

It was the most expensive National campaign ever conducted in the country. The business men, especially the manufacturers, contributed more generously

than ever before or since to defeat Cleveland and overthrow the Mills tariff that was framed on the basis of revenue with only incidental protection. Philadelphia manufacturers contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars, and John Wanamaker and Thomas Dolan were in the forefront in giving and obtaining the unusually large contributions which were poured into the treasury of the National committee, and that was handled exclusively by Quay himself.

Quay was never accused of economical methods in either public, political or private affairs. He knew that only by having an immense campaign fund at his command could he make a successful deal with certain Tammany leaders who were quite willing to crucify Cleveland, and to either restrain Democratic frauds or neutralize them by imitating Democratic methods. He was the sole manager of the political movements in New York which controlled the National contest, and to him was universally accorded the credit of having won the battle that made Harrison President.

Just when Quay seemed to have reached the very zenith of fame and power as a political leader, he brought to the front by his own achievement the one man who, in all Quay's struggles in Pennsylvania, was able to lock horns with him, greatly endanger his power from year to year, and finally defeated him for re-election to the Senate. That man was John Wanamaker. He was untrained in the political methods of the time, but he was an ardent Republican, had fairly won his position as a prince of merchants, was in hearty sympathy with a large religious element of the State, and was a master in all movements which commanded his efforts. He was singularly keen in perception, fearless in action, able and adroit as a disputant, and no man in the State more thoroughly understood the great business and industrial interests of the entire country.

He very warmly espoused the cause of Harrison, as between them there was the most cordial religious as well as political sympathy, and they were certainly in sincere accord in the desire to elevate the political system of the government and purify our political methods.

The first cloud that came upon the then brilliant political horizon of Senator Quay was the announcement by President Harrison of John Wanamaker as Postmaster General. It did not meet the approval of either of the Pennsylvania Senators, as neither Cameron nor Quay was in sympathy with Wanamaker's ideal political theories. It was President Harrison's own appointment, and when the Senators were consulted on the subject, they assented to it chiefly because they saw that they could not offer substantial objections to Wanamaker's promotion, while it soon became evident that Harrison intended to make the appointment and that objections would be unavailable.

I had Senators Cameron and Quay with me at dinner alone a few days after the inauguration of Harrison, as I desired to learn the actual political conditions, and found them both at that early day thoroughly disgruntled at Harrison. Quay told of his first visit to the President, when he expected to receive the most fervent and grateful congratulations on his achievement, but he was greatly disappointed and almost dumfounded at Harrison's statement that Providence had been on their side and gave them the victory. Quay, the son of an old-school Presbyterian preacher, had as severe a religious training as Harrison himself, but he had learned the lesson that when elections were to be won, as a rule, religious services and religious methods were not among the most effective. Quay spoke of the President's expression of gratitude to Providence for his success in wresting New York from the Democracy as the utterance of a political tenderfoot. To use

Quay's own expression: "Providence hadn't a damned thing to do with it," to which he added that he supposed Harrison would never learn how close a number of men were compelled to approach the gates of the penitentiary to make him President, where he could return thanks to the Almighty for his promotion.

Wanamaker entered the cabinet as Postmaster General, and it is admitted by all that his record in the management of the Post Office Department has rarely been equaled and never surpassed in any of the important qualities of statesmanship. His administration of his department was clean from beginning to end, and he was progressive even beyond the point to which he could bring his party. He conceived and drove the entering wedge that doubled and has finally quadrupled the service of the postal department to the people of the entire country, and I doubt whether the President had in any of the members of his Cabinet a man of clearer judgment on any of the many intricate questions which are presented to the Government for solution.

While he was thoroughly in accord with the President in his convictions as to an ideal civil service and the integrity of elections, he understood much better than did the President that our political system could not be revolutionized in a day, and that men in power must deal with existing conditions on broad and liberal lines. Beyond selecting a postmaster for his own city of Philadelphia, who was not acceptable to the political leaders, he accorded to the Senators and Representatives of the party in the State their full measure of control of the patronage of his department and of the Government. He carefully avoided forcing any issue with the Senators and Representatives, and while all knew that his own individual ideas of administering the Government were at variance with the dominant meth-

ods, they had no reason to complain that he had needlessly obstructed their plans.

While Harrison was not heartily supported by the party because he obtruded his ideas and political convictions offensively at times, Wanamaker commanded the respect of the leaders generally, and did much to prevent growing estrangement between party leaders and the administration. Harrison was severely conscientious, and a stranger to the art of popularizing himself. He was universally respected, but the best commentary that could be made upon his position as a political leader is given in the fact that while he had served six years in the Senate with men who were in active politics when he was nominated for President, there was not one of his associate Senators who came to the front to struggle for his nomination. No man ever entered the Presidential office with higher ideas of unfaltering devotion to public duty, but Wanamaker, with equally high ideals in politics, possessed consummate tact and never undertook to amend or overthrow the political organization because it did not accord with his views in its political methods.

Wanamaker greatly strengthened himself with the party in his State and commanded the respect of the entire country for his administration of the Post Office Department, and retired without ever having committed a breach between himself and the Republican Senators and Representatives of the State. Thus, Quay's exceptionally brilliant achievement in forcing a Republican Presidential majority in a State that elected all of the other Democratic candidates, brought to the front Wanamaker as a Cabinet officer, whereby Wanamaker was trained for the desperate struggles he made later in the State to overthrow Quay's mastery.

Eighteen hundred and eighty-nine was an off year, with no State officer to elect but a State treasurer.

The Republicans nominated Mr. Boyer, who was later speaker of the house and superintendent of the mint, and the Democrats nominated Mr. Bigler, of Clearfield, son of the ex-Governor. The Democrats were generally discouraged and had little incentive to make a vigorous contest, and they were defeated by over 60,000 in the State. There was not a ripple on the surface indicating opposition to Quay's domination of the party in Pennsylvania, but in 1890 a Governor and other State officers were to be elected, and Quay committed the error, so often exhibited by political leaders, of attempting to force the nomination of a candidate for Governor against the undoubted sentiment of the party.

The contest for Governor in 1890 was between Senator Delamater, of Crawford, and Adjutant General Hastings, of Centre. Delamater had been prominent as a Republican senator, was generally regarded as a rich banker and understood to be a favorite of the Standard Oil Company, that was then at war with a large element of oil producers in the State. In all of Quay's political career he never allowed himself to get out of touch with the Standard Oil corporation, and in some severe emergencies it proved to be a very important factor in his achievements. Delamater was not wanting in ability, nor was he vulnerable in character, but he was not the choice of the Republican people, and his nomination had to be forced by the power of the organization.


Hastings had made himself very generally and popularly known to the people of the State by his heroic efforts at Johnstown after the terrible disaster that almost effaced the town and sacrificed thousands of lives. He was sent there by Governor Beaver to see what could be done to begin the work of restoring transportation and rehabilitating the desolated city. Hastings found that the work required heroic direction,

and he assumed the responsibility of leading the great work of gathering the dead for sepulture and gradually restoring a number of the homes. He labored night and day, giving up every comfort and greatly endangering his health, and thus made himself very gratefully known to the great mass of the people of the State.

He entered the contest for Governor without any aid from the Quay organization, but long before the convention met it was clearly evident that Hastings could be defeated for the nomination only by the most absolute and despotic command of the Quay leadership. I saw Quay alone two weeks before the convention met, and found him greatly exercised about the nomination for Governor. He then realized that the nomination of Delamater would alienate a large portion of the Republican people from his fellowship, but he did not believe it possible for the Democrats to defeat any candidate the Republicans might nominate. I told him that I thought the wise thing for him to do was to adjust himself to the manifest wishes of his party, to which he replied that he very much desired once to have a Governor of his own.

He forced the nomination of Delamater by the sheer power of the party organization, and Hastings, who was young enough and shrewd enough to understand that the future belonged to him, came promptly to the front and led the fight for Delamater's election. He thus made himself solid with the Republican people of the State, and from that time until the convention met four years later, it never was possible for the party leaders to get even an organized movement against Hastings as a candidate.

The nomination of Delamater led to open revolt, and the Democrats saw their opportunity. They were not then led by mere political traders who care only for personal honors or advantage, but by those who



Matthew S. Quay

thoroughly understood the political conditions and knew how to adjust the party to give it the promise of victory. Governor Pattison had left the Executive office at the end of his first term with a strong Democratic element opposed to him, but there was universal confidence among all the people in his public and private integrity, and the Granger element was a powerful factor in politics at that time.

The man who managed the Pattison nomination and election was William F. Harrity, of Philadelphia. Harrity had been chairman of the city committee in Philadelphia, where he held the Democrats in complete organization, and achieved repeated victories by association with the reform Republicans. When the contest for the Democratic nomination for Governor was in doubt between Senator Wallace and Governor Pattison, Harrity decided the issue by accepting Pattison as the candidate because he believed that Pattison was the most available. He was not at variance with Wallace, but the reform Republican element that was in revolt against Delamater was not in sympathy with Wallace, while it was in very hearty sympathy with Pattison, and looking to the legitimate party interests he accepted Pattison because he believed Pattison could be elected.

Harrity, Hensel and Black were measurably estranged from Pattison during his first administration. Hensel and Black were ranked as friends of Randall as against Wallace, and when Harrity decided to support Pattison they refused to go along with him. Hensel and Black had their respective delegations in Lancaster and York instructed for them for Governor, and when the convention met at Scranton they joined Wallace in opposition to Pattison. When it became apparent that Wallace could not be nominated, Wallace, Hensel and Black decided to make a combination to nominate

Silas M. Clark, of Indiana, then a judge of the supreme court. The three joined in a telegram to Clark at Indiana simply asking him to not answer any despatches received from Scranton during the sessions of the convention, and a despatch in which three great leaders of the party joined was respected by Clark. Wallace assumed that he could deliver his followers to Clark. It was arranged that he would go into the convention, withdraw his name and nominate Clark, and that Hensel and Black should follow, declining and declaring for Clark.

After fixing their programme they separated late in the night, and an hour or two later Wallace returned to Hensel's room, roused him up, and informed him that he could not deliver his followers to Clark, and that his withdrawal would make enough of a break to Pattison to give him success. After a few minutes of awkward silence Hensel said: "Well, Wallace, what are you going to do?" To which he answered, "I am going to let my name go before the convention and take my licking. What are you going to do?" Hensel answered, "I propose to pack my satchel in the morning and return home." Pattison was nominated, receiving 200 votes, with 132 for Wallace, 12 for Robert E. Wright, 12 for Hensel and 11 for Black. Although specially invited, Wallace and Hensel refused to appear before the convention after the nominations were made. As a tub to the opposition whale Black was again nominated for Lieutenant Governor.

Hensel's position in the party was one of unusual importance. He was not a place-hunter, but was conspicuous for his devotion to honestly organized Democracy. He had tried to nominate Clark for Governor in 1882 when Pattison was first nominated and elected, and he was then tendered the nomination for Congressman-at-Large that meant an election, but he took the

floor in the convention and declined in favor of Mortimer F. Elliott, who was nominated and elected. He was made chairman of the State committee by the country candidates against the protest of Pattison, Cassidy and the immediate friends of Pattison, but he managed the contest with such consummate skill, with Harrity's aid as chairman of the Philadelphia city committee, that all confessed his eminent ability and unfaltering fidelity.

While opposed to Pattison's nomination in 1890, he delivered a number of addresses in important centers of the State in support of Pattison which attracted more attention than any of the many other leading speeches. His address in the Academy of Music in Philadelphia was one of the ablest of the political deliverances of the time, and when Pattison was elected, it was only natural that Harrity should be tendered the secretaryship of the Commonwealth, and the Governor was quite willing to yield to Harrity's wishes to have Hensel his associate in the cabinet. Their appointment to the cabinet was simply the logical result of the battle they had won, and both made exceptionally creditable records as State officers, records which are models of intelligent and thoroughly honest administration. Harrity was so highly appreciated as a political leader that two years later he was invited to accept the chairmanship of the National Democratic committee, and he conducted the Cleveland campaign of 1892, winning the last victory of the Democracy in our National contests.

A successor to Cameron in the Senate was to be chosen by the Republican Legislature elected at the same time that Pattison was chosen Governor, and there was an evident disposition on the part of some of the Republican senators and representatives to rebel against the Quay-Cameron domination of the State by defeating

Cameron's election. The result might have been doubtful but for the fact that Cameron was openly hostile to the Force bill then pending in Congress, by which some of the radical Republican leaders assumed that they could control elections in the Southern States.

I have stated in a previous chapter how Cameron and Quay visited me in Philadelphia a short time before the meeting of the Legislature, and how it was then arranged with Governor-elect Pattison and Harrity, then prospective secretary of the Commonwealth, to come to the support of Cameron for the Senatorship if the Republicans organized against him on the ground of his opposition to the Force bill. It soon became known that the Democrats would make any sacrifice to sustain a Republican Senator who was opposed to the Force bill, and Cameron's election was thereby made absolutely safe. The Republicans saw that they could not defeat him, and they gave him an almost united party vote, but there was much smothered hostility to the Quay-Cameron domination, as they were accused of losing the Governor to the party in the State by defying the wishes of the Republican people.

Eighteen hundred and ninety-one was an off year, but the defalcation of John Bardsley, treasurer of Philadelphia, whereby the State and city lost a large amount of money, involving Republican Auditor General McCamant and State Treasurer Boyer, suddenly threw the Republican leaders into confusion, and threatened the party with defeat. Pattison was Governor, and his stern integrity made him hew to the line in bringing the financial officers of the State to accountability. He summoned the senate in special session to pass upon the question of dismissing the auditor general and State treasurer for complicity in the embezzlement of State money.

The senate was strongly Republican, and most of its



John Warramaker

members regarded the preservation of the Republican party as of paramount importance, and they were most willing to find some way of escaping judgment upon the State officials. The legal acumen of Rufus E. Shapley opened a way for them by insisting that their alleged offenses were indictable in the courts, whereby their dismissal could be accomplished as the logical result of conviction. His argument was one of masterly ability in support of the theory that the senate could not usurp the place of the grand jury and the criminal courts where offenses were committed by public officers. The senate welcomed the back door of escape that was offered them, and without passing upon the merits of the case, dismissed it for want of jurisdiction, but the people of the State were greatly aroused, and Quay's mastery was very seriously threatened.

Quay well appreciated the peril that confronted him, and when his State convention met he had an elaborate platform adopted in which Postmaster General Wanamaker was highly commended for his "clean, business-like and comprehensive administration of postal affairs." It also commended the Republican officials of Philadelphia for the prompt conviction of John Bardsley for embezzlement, and demanded that the proper officials should "prosecute to conviction any and every guilty official without regard to politics."

He knew that he could not propose any candidate for auditor general who was active in political affairs and command the confidence of the people, and he nominated General Gregg, the greatest of Pennsylvania's living soldiers at the time, for auditor general. Gregg had never been in politics, but his nomination was an absolute assurance to the people of the State that the office would be administered with absolute integrity and fidelity. With him he nominated J. W. Morrison for State treasurer, a man of high character

and admitted ability. The Democrats nominated Mr. Wright, a man of blameless reputation, for auditor general, and Mr. Tilden, a prominent business man, for State treasurer, but the nomination of Gregg saved the party, as it placed a man in the one important position in the State where profligacy or fraud in the use of State funds could be halted. The result was the election of the Republican State ticket by over 58,000 for auditor general, and 54,000 for State treasurer. Quay thus saved the party and his political mastery in the State by giving the people an auditor general who would certainly halt every attempt at the misappropriation of the funds of the State.

CIV.

PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS 1892-1895.

Quay and Cameron Not Heartily for Harrison—But He Was Renominated—Cleveland a Presidential Candidate for the Third Time—Tammany's Intense Opposition to Him—Local Pennsylvania Interests—Quay's Second Election as U. S. Senator—General Hastings Elected Governor in 1894—His Relations with Quay Not Very Cordial—Democratic Opposition Not Formidable—Old-Timers Recalled to Public Life, Especially Galusha A. Grow—Governor Hastings and the State Committee—Organized Action Against Quay in Philadelphia—Penrose Sacrificed for Mayor—Creation of the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

EIGHTEEN hundred and ninety-two opened with generous promises to the Republicans. The country was enjoying a more than ordinary degree of prosperity, as our manufactures had been greatly quickened by the McKinley tariff bill of 1890, although it had been repudiated overwhelmingly by the people in the election of a Congress soon after its adoption, when the Democrats reached highwater mark in their majority of Congressmen. Harrison was universally respected and there was very general confidence in his public and private integrity. He was not personally popular with the leaders of the party, but the Republican people had faith in him and demanded his renomination.

While Harrison was in some measure an element of weakness on the Republican side, Cleveland appeared in the early part of the campaign of 1892 as a much greater element of discord in the Democratic party than was Harrison with the Republicans. The Democrats of New York elected a solid delegation to the

National convention instructed and publicly pledged to make aggressive opposition to the renomination of Cleveland, and as New York was regarded as the pivotal State of the contest, the Republicans were very sanguine of success.

Senators Cameron and Quay were not cordial supporters of Harrison. Their relations with the President had been rather severely strained during the entire period of his administration, and as Blaine seemed to be the only competitor, they had no more love for Blaine than they had for the President. The attitude of Cameron and Quay on the Presidency was clearly indicated by the fact that the Pennsylvania delegation in the Minneapolis convention, where Harrison was nominated on the first ballot, receiving 535 1-2 votes to 182 1-2 votes for Blaine, 182 for McKinley, 4 for Reed and 1 for Lincoln, gave 42 to McKinley, 19 to Harrison and 3 to Blaine.

The Democratic National convention met at Chicago, and Cleveland was nominated on the first ballot. After several days of very stormy sessions, in which the entire New York delegation bitterly denounced and opposed Cleveland, he received 617 1-3 votes to 114 for Hill, 103 for Boies, 362 for Gorman and 16 2-3 for Stevenson. The campaign of 1892 presented the singular spectacle of both candidates for President being nominated against the wishes of the leaders of their respective parties, but the dominant sentiment of each party behind the leaders had controlled the nominations. Notwithstanding the intense opposition of the Tammany leaders to Cleveland, from the time the campaign fairly opened until election day, Cleveland steadily grew in strength and Harrison visibly weakened, it resulted in Cleveland's election by a large popular and Electoral majority, with a Democratic majority of 3 in the Senate over Republicans



William F. Harrity

and Independents, and a majority of 80 in the House.

While Quay was not an enthusiastic supporter of Harrison, the Legislature to be chosen that year would be charged with the election of his successor, and he gave special attention to the State contest, resulting in a majority of 63,747 for Harrison in the State, and substantially like majorities for Judge Dean, Republican, over Judge Heydrick, Democrat, for the Supreme court, and for William Lilly and Alexander McDowell, Republicans, over George A. Allen and Thomas P. Merritt, Democrats, for Congressmen-at-Large. His special care of the senatorial and representative districts was exhibited in gaining an increased Republican majority on joint ballot in the Legislature, the senate standing 33 Republicans to 17 Democrats, and the house 134 Republicans to 70 Democrats, giving the Republicans 80 majority on joint ballot.

No organized opposition was developed against Quay's re-election, and on the 17th of January, 1893, he was elected to his second full term in the Senate, receiving 33 votes in the State senate, to 14 for George Ross, Democrat, one for William Mutchler, Democrat, one absentee, and one present but not voting. In the house the vote was 132 for Quay, 66 for Ross, one for William F. Harrity, one for John Dalzell and four absentees. Quay's nomination in the caucus was made on the first ballot, the vote being 146 for Quay, 14 for Dalzell, one for Gobin and three absent.

Quay's election by practically a unanimous vote of the party in the Legislature, and without any serious attempt at organized opposition to his leadership, apparently made him more strongly entrenched in supreme authority over party affairs in the State than he had ever been before, and the off year contest of 1893 gave him a largely increased majority, as Jackson, the party candidate for State treasurer, was elected

over Osborne, Democrat, by 135,146, and Judge D. Newlin Fell, Republican, was elected supreme judge over Samuel G. Thompson, then serving by appointment of Governor Pattison to fill a vacancy, by substantially the same majority.

In 1894 Quay was compelled to face a political condition in which he could not be absolute master. His party leadership was undisputed, but the Republican people of the State wanted General Hastings for Governor in 1890, when Quay forced the nomination of Delamater, who was defeated. Hastings had made the fight on the stump for Delamater, came out of the contest greatly strengthened, and Quay could not defeat him for the nomination in 1894 without resorting to such violent methods as would have again defeated the party. He was literally compelled to accept a candidate for Governor whom he did not want.

There was no open estrangement between Quay and Hastings, but Quay knew that Hastings was human, and did not forget the fact that Quay had crucified him four years before. Quay's only course was to fall in with the support of Hastings, and while their relations were apparently close and friendly during the campaign, each distrusted the other, and both felt that the time was not far distant when an open issue would arise between them. Quay accepted the situation and gave Hastings the nomination practically without a contest. With Hastings were nominated Walter Lyon, for Lieutenant Governor, Amos H. Mylin, for auditor general, and General J. W. Latta, for secretary of internal affairs, with Galusha A. Grow and Mr. Huff, for Congressmen-at-Large.

The Democrats nominated William M. Singerly for Governor, by a unanimous vote, with John S. Rilling for Lieutenant Governor, David F. Magee for auditor general, W. W. Greenland for secretary of internal


affairs, and Mr. Meyer and Mr. Collins for Congressmen-at-Large, and he entered into the contest with great enthusiasm and high hopes of success. He traversed the State in a special car, saw the people of every section, and when he returned home a week before the election, he was absolutely confident of his success. It was his first experiment in contact with the enthusiasm of country political assemblies, and he informed me three days before the election that he certainly had more than an even chance to be the next Governor of the State, and he was dumfounded when a majority of nearly a quarter of a million was rolled up against him, with substantially like majorities for all the Republican candidates.

The contest of 1894 called back into public life a man who for more than fifty years has been intimately connected with National affairs, and who rendered most conspicuous service to his party and to the country. Galusha A. Grow was made a compromise candidate for Congress in the Wilmot district in 1850. Wilmot had been renominated for a fourth term, but the old line Democrats had bolted against him, and nominated another Democratic candidate. Ten days before the election Wilmot agreed to withdraw if Grow was taken in his place, and he was accepted and elected as a regular Democrat. He was re-elected in 1852 on the Democratic ticket, and in 1854 was elected to a third term as an anti-slavery Democrat. In 1856 his anti-slavery convictions brought him into the most sympathetic relations with the Republican party, and he was elected to a fourth term as a Republican, and was returned as a Republican by the same district in 1858 and 1860. In 1862 a new apportionment had been made, giving him the district of Luzerne and Susquehanna instead of his old district of Susquehanna, Bradford and Tioga, and in the Republican slump of

1862 he was defeated after having served twelve years consecutively in Congress.

Mr. Grow has many important monuments to his statesmanship to make his name memorable. He was the author of the free homestead law, and battled many years before he achieved success. Even when he had accomplished the passage of a very crude homestead bill by both branches of Congress, it was defeated by the veto of President Buchanan. He was so highly respected that when Congress met in 1861, just when the Civil War had spread the shadows of the angel of sorrow over the entire land, he was elected speaker of the House, and he was the acknowledged leader of the loyal forces in the popular branch of Congress. He accomplished the final passage of the homestead law that has given free homes to tens of thousands of our people, and his slogan in the political battles of those days was free soil, free homes and free schools.

Had he not been retired from Congress by an unfortunate Congressional apportionment, that attempted to give an additional Republican district, he would doubtless have continued to preside over the House during the entire period of the war. He was not a political manager in the narrow and meaner sense of the term. No man could better master a broad wise policy for the party in State or Nation, but he was a stranger to the arts of modern politics, and for many years was not in favor with the dominant power of the Republican party in Pennsylvania. After filling a vacancy for one year, he was nominated for Congressman-at-Large in 1894 chiefly because Quay believed it to be wise to make that concession to the anti-machine element of the State. Grow had been the independent bolting candidate for Senator in 1881, and had been turned down several times in struggles for the Governorship or the Senatorship. Quay exhibited his usual sagacity in



W. U. Hensel

thus calling Grow back to the political life he had honored years before, and so acceptable was Grow's service in the National Congress that he was renominated and re-elected to four consecutive terms as Congressman-at-Large, ending his last service in the councils of the Nation on the 4th of March, 1903, just fifty-two years after he had first appeared there, and the two periods of his service aggregated twenty-one years, a continuous service of twelve years beginning in 1851, and a continuous service of nine years beginning in 1895. He was one of the Republican leaders whose skirts were never stained by personal graft or political dishonesty, and his ability as a disputant, with his genial personal qualities, commanded the mingled respect and affection of all who were brought into intimate relations with him.

The Congressmen-at-Large were elected simply because of a new apportionment that gave Pennsylvania two additional members, and the Legislature failed to add the additional districts. But for the fact that an apportionment had been passed by the Legislature to fill our entire delegation by separate districts in 1902, there is little doubt that Mr. Grow would have been continued as Congressman-at-Large as long as his advancing years left him equipped for the performance of its duties. Although well passed the patriarchal age when he retired from his long and conspicuous Congressional service, he was one of the most active and efficient of all our Representatives, and he stood out with singular eminence as one of the great men of the past who live with continued usefulness in the present. By the tidal wave that carried the Republican ticket to overwhelming victory the Democratic strength in the Legislature was almost annihilated, the Senate standing 43 Republicans to 7 Democrats, and the House 117 Republicans to 27 Democrats.

While Governor Hastings did not precipitate a factional war with the Quay power of the State, it soon became evident that the relations between the Governor and the Senator threatened the party with internal disturbance. Several times they were on the point of open breach during the first month of the administration, but the sore was temporarily healed by the interposition of friends and compromised, but later all masks were torn off on both sides, and Hastings decided to lock horns with Quay to wrest the party mastery from the old Senatorial leader. When the estrangement between the two leaders had passed the point of compromise, Quay adopted the heroic method of publicly announcing himself as a candidate for the position of Chairman of the Republican State committee some months before the meeting of the State convention that would have the power of appointment.

Quay's announcement was met by the public announcement of Governor Hastings that he would be a delegate in the coming State convention, and would be a candidate for president of the body. It was the custom of the party for the president of the State convention to appoint the chairman of the State committee, after consulting the candidates on the State ticket, but the president of the convention is only a servant of the body, and subject to its orders on all questions of party policy. In 1865, when Cameron, by adroit management, secured the president of the convention that had a majority of Curtin delegates in it, Cameron expecting thereby to get possession of the State organization by naming the chairman of the committee, the convention, on motion of Thaddeus Stevens, elected John Cessna chairman by resolution of the body, and Senator Welsh was, in like manner, made chairman of the Democratic State committee by the Reading convention of 1860.

The arrangement to bring out Governor Hastings as an open candidate for president of the convention, with a view of controlling the State committee, was made in Philadelphia at a dinner given to the Governor by some of his special friends, who were hostile to Quay. Late in the night after the dinner adjourned, one of the guests came to the editorial office of "The Times," and informed me that Quay was now beaten for chairman of the State committee, as Governor Hastings had agreed to announce himself as a candidate for the presidency of the convention, and that he could not be defeated. I reminded him that the president of the convention was not supreme in the matter of selecting the chairman of the State committee, and that even if Hastings won the presidency of the body, it would be in the power of the convention to elect Quay or any other person to the position of chairman, but it was believed that Hastings, who was then just at the beginning of his administration, could not be defeated, and the organization against Quay was earnestly extended to every section of the State.

It was recognized on all sides as a fight to a finish between Quay and Hastings, and both exhausted their efforts to win. Quay was not then in specially easy circumstances, but he plunged into the fight, strained his credit to raise money, and personally visited all of the strong counties of the State. While Hastings had occupied a strong position before the people as Governor, he was outclassed by Quay in a contest that depended largely upon skilful and desperate political management. The result was that Quay astounded the Governor and his followers at the convention by coming to the front with a decided majority of the delegates and giving himself a triumphant election as chairman of the State committee. It was a very close struggle to Quay, but he realized the fact that he had to choose

between winning the battle against the Governor, and confessing that his leadership in the State was subordinated to the domination of a superior power.

The murmurings of factional discord were heard immediately after the election of Hastings, and they took shape in organized action against Quay's mastery in Philadelphia early in 1895. Charles A. Porter, then senator, and David Martin, since senator and secretary of the Commonwealth, were in absolute control of the Republican organization in the city, and they gave the first sign of aggressive hostility to Quay's leadership. Boies Penrose, then a member of the State senate, was apparently slated, with the consent of leaders generally, as the candidate for mayor at the February election, and a card signed by a thousand prominent citizens, and occupying a page of the leading newspapers, was published, supporting Penrose's candidacy.

For a time all seemed to be serene, and Penrose's nomination and election were accepted as assured, but several weeks before the meeting of the convention Penrose was publicly and violently assailed in various religious quarters, and the friends of Penrose became convinced that the scandals were inspired by Martin and Porter for the purpose of compelling the retirement of Penrose. Quay, Penrose, Durham and their adherents in the city had been gradually drifting away from the Martin-Porter leadership, and it soon became evident that Martin and Porter had decided to defeat Penrose in the convention, but they did not permit the name of the man to take his place to be known until the morning of the convention, when they gave orders for the nomination of City Solicitor Warwick, and the order was obeyed. This was the first skirmish against Quay in 1895, and it was logically followed by his contest with Governor Hastings.



Daniel H. Hastings

When Warwick was nominated by Martin and Porter, without having been even suggested as a candidate at the primaries, Quay was ready for open revolt, and in a moment of forgetfulness he rose in the United States Senate and made a personal attack on Martin. The Democrats, believing that in the disturbed condition of the Republican party they could elect the mayor, asked ex-Governor Pattison to accept the nomination, but he refused unless he was assured of the support of the Quay and Durham element of the city. Mr. Harrity presented the situation to me and asked me to go to Washington and confer with Quay directly on the subject. I did so and spent the evening with Quay at Senator Cameron's house, where the matter was fully discussed. Cameron took no part in it, as he declined to be involved, but Quay, after going over the whole question very fully, instructed me to advise Harrity that Pattison would be supported by him and his friends against Warwick.

I telegraphed Harrity at once, and it was that assurance from Quay that made Pattison accept the nomination. There had been severe business and industrial revolution in the country that was charged to the Democratic tariff bill, and the discussions of the Democrats in Congress against sound money disgusted the business men of Philadelphia to such an extent that it was found impossible to make them participate in a revolution that would give Philadelphia a Democratic mayor. Quay and Durham were thus finally compelled by conditions which they could not control to give a passive support to Warwick, who was elected by a majority of 61,309. But for the assurance given by Quay, which at the time he made in perfect good faith, Pattison would not have accepted the nomination for mayor.

Quay regarded Penrose as having been crucified to

gratify factional interests, and it was that rejection of Penrose for mayor by the Martin-Porter leadership that made Quay finally accept Penrose as his candidate for United States Senator, and to fight one of the most desperate battles of his life to make Penrose his Senatorial colleague.

The superior court of Pennsylvania had been created by an act of the Legislature of 1895, and under the act providing for the election of the seven judges, each voter could vote for but six, thus giving the Democrats one member of the court. The Republicans nominated present President Judge Rice and Judges Beaver, Willard, Wickham, Reeder and Orlady, all of whom were elected, and Yerkes, Moorehead, Noyes, Smith, Bechtel and Magee were the Democratic candidates, of whom Smith received the highest vote and became the seventh member of the court. It was originally given final jurisdiction in cases not exceeding \$1,000, but later that jurisdiction was enlarged to \$1,500. Since the enlargement of the jurisdiction it fairly divides the business of the higher court, and has enabled the supreme judicial tribunal of the State to give due deliberation to the many important questions presented for its final judgment. Of the judges originally chosen Reeder and Wickham died in service, and Willard, William W. Porter and Mitchell, the last two having been elected to fill vacancies, resigned, leaving as the present court President Judge Rice with judges Beaver, Orlady, Porter, Henderson, Morrison and Head.

CV.

WANAMAKER VERSUS QUAY.

Wanamaker's Ambition to Be U. S. Senator—Aspiration Hopeless Without Quay's Aid—Negotiating With Quay—An Agreement Reached—How a Rupture Came—Wanamaker as an Open, Aggressive Candidate—The Contest for the Party Nomination—Penrose Nominated and Elected—The National Politics of 1896—Gubernatorial Battle of 1898—Quay Forced to Accept William A. Stone as Candidate—The Wanamaker Opposition of That Campaign—The Battle Fought in the Legislative Districts—Quay Prosecuted for Misappropriating State Funds—Fight for U. S. Senator in the Legislature—The Famous Deadlock of 1899—Quay Acquitted in Criminal Trial and Appointed U. S. Senator by Governor Stone.

EIGHTEEN hundred and ninety-six was Presidential year, and it opened with apparently quite serene political conditions for Senator Quay. His triumph over Hastings in 1885 in his struggle for the chairmanship of the State committee made Quay and Hastings respect each other sufficiently to understand the necessity of pooling their political issues, and the Governor was one of the first to fall in with Quay's idea to strengthen himself in the State and country by Pennsylvania presenting his name to the National convention as its candidate for President.

A United States Senator was to be chosen by the Legislature elected in the fall of 1896, as Cameron was weary of Senatorial duties and honors, and was not in hearty accord with his party on the silver issue. It was understood early in the year that Cameron would not be a candidate under any circumstances, and a number of aspirants were in the field, most of whom were among Quay's lieutenants, and he decided to let the contest for Senator progress without interference

on his part until the time came when he could decide intelligently how best to direct the final outcome.

Ex-Postmaster General Wanamaker was ambitious to be United States Senator, and openly expressed his wishes to his friends on every suitable occasion. He did not want the care and worry of dispensing patronage, but with his wonderful adaptability during his four years as a Cabinet officer, he made himself an unusually intelligent master of all the problems of statesmanship, and felt that he could render his State some service and wear the Senatorial honors with credit to himself. He had frequently discussed with me the question of becoming a candidate for Senator, and I was anxious to have him succeed. Some time in the early months of 1896 I told him that he could never hope to be Senator without the aid of Quay; that Quay had absolute control of the organization of the party in the State, and that meant a decisive advantage in the nomination of Senators and Representatives, and there was no reason why he and Quay should not be in entire harmony.

Quay wanted the control of National and State patronage to maintain his organization, while Wanamaker would be more than willing to have the vexations of local contests for appointments go entirely to his colleague. He wanted to be a Senator, and to be free from the tide-water Senatorial duties of wrestling with political aspirants throughout the State. Wanamaker's ambition was to make his mark in intelligent and practical statesmanship, and he was entirely willing to unite with Quay on the basis of Quay running the party organization with Wanamaker as chief contributor for the necessary expenses.

After full discussion of the subject Wanamaker requested me to go to Washington and present the matter to Quay. I did so, and found that the only obstacle

to entire harmony between Quay and Wanamaker was Quay's apprehension that Wanamaker, if he reached the Senate, might become ambitious to control the organization himself and supplant Quay. I insisted that Wanamaker had no such purpose, and that if he had, he could not accomplish it for want of practical knowledge of modern political methods; and after discussing the question for an hour or more, Quay finally decided that he and Wanamaker could harmonize on the basis of Wanamaker becoming Senator and Quay to retain control and mastery of the organization.

Quay made an appointment to see Wanamaker in Washington the following day, and I telegraphed Wanamaker that Quay's secretary would meet him at the train and take him directly to Quay's committee room. I did not remain in Washington, and had no knowledge of what transpired between Quay and Wanamaker until the morning after Wanamaker had returned, when I called upon him and inquired whether their conference had been entirely satisfactory. He informed me that they had agreed on every question of detail. Wanamaker was to contribute the necessary means for Quay to maintain his organization in the State, and Quay at the proper stage of the contest was to make a combination to elect Wanamaker to the Senate. I told him that I wished no further information as to their arrangements, and left entirely satisfied that, with the active or passive support of the people in the party that Wanamaker represented, Quay could control the organization on any lines he chose to adopt.

That condition continued for six weeks or two months without any public knowledge of the agreement between Quay and Wanamaker. Finally, it became necessary for Quay to organize a movement in one of the important counties of the State that needed campaign

funds, and Quay 'phoned Wanamaker stating what was required. Wanamaker promptly answered according to Quay's suggestion, but unfortunately named a third man who would conduct the business transactions with Quay, and the man named was at that time regarded by Quay as not especially friendly to him. Quay's suspicion was immediately aroused, and he petulantly answered that the arrangement was off, and closed the 'phone.

It was a mistake on both sides. Wanamaker should have brought in no one between Quay and himself, although he named a man who would have been incapable of treachery to either. Quay erroneously-assumed that Wanamaker was shifting the responsibility to another, thus declining to assume his share with Quay, and placing Quay in the hands of a third man who would have opportunity to betray him. Wanamaker promptly advised me of the unfortunate breach, and exhaustive efforts were made to restore the old relations between them, but Quay openly declared his distrust of Wanamaker's fidelity, and thus came the breach that not only precipitated upon Quay a most desperate struggle for the control of the Legislature, but renewed the struggle for Governor two years later, defeated Quay for re-election to the Senate, and was responsible for his prosecution in the criminal courts.

Wanamaker became an open and aggressive candidate for United States Senator, with Mr. Van Valkenburg, now editor of the "North American," as his chief lieutenant. The war was carried into every senatorial and representative district where it was expected to elect Republicans. Van Valkenburg resided in Tioga County, had been one of Quay's lieutenants, was thoroughly familiar with Quay's political methods, and he proved a most formidable leader against the Quay

organization. A number of senatorial districts were deadlocked, and finally required the expenditure of thousands of dollars to accomplish nominations. Wanamaker contributed lavishly, as it became necessary thus to strengthen his lines and hold them against the equally or more lavish expenditure of the Quay organization.

A fearful crop of scandals and some criminal prosecutions grew out of this extraordinary contest for the control of the party nomination, and the election of candidates after having been named by the party, but the prosecutions were finally adjusted because mutual interests dictated the necessity. Quay had a decided advantage in the struggle because he had the organization of the party, that often counts even against a popular majority, and Quay captured a majority of the Republicans of both senate and house.

When the Legislature came to the election of the United States Senator, a test vote in the house caucus gave 93 for the Penrose representatives and 71 for Wanamaker's, and in the joint Republican caucus, on January 5th, Penrose received 133 votes to 75 for Wanamaker, 1 for J. B. Robinson and 1 for Cameron. Wanamaker bowed to the mandate of the party, and his friends made the nomination of Penrose unanimous. Penrose was elected on the 19th of January, receiving the votes of 42 senators to 6 for Chauncey F. Black, Democrat. In the house the vote was 168 for Penrose, 33 for Black and 1 for Wanamaker. While Penrose was elected by nearly a unanimous vote of the Republicans of the Legislature, the factional feeling was intensely embittered, and it continued until it reached its culmination two years later, when Quay was defeated.

There were some very severe complications in the contest of 1896 affecting the disputing factional leaders. Martin and Porter were in command of the organiza-

tion in Philadelphia, and they were bitterly hostile to Quay. As they had lately crucified Penrose as a candidate for mayor, they were much less willing to have him as United States Senator. They asserted their mastery in a rather violent manner by nominating Coroner Ashbridge, later elected mayor, for sheriff over Alexander Crow, Jr. Crow represented the Quay and Penrose interests with Durham as the active leader, and they decided to overthrow the Martin-Porter control by defeating the candidate for Sheriff.

A conference was had with Harrity and his friends, who then controlled the Democratic organization in the city, and they finally agreed to make Crow their candidate for sheriff if he ran as an Independent. The programme was carried out, and after a contest of unusual bitterness, Crow defeated Ashbridge by 18,995 majority at the same election that gave McKinley, the Republican candidate for President, 113,139 majority. This defeat of the Martin-Porter domination, followed by the election of Penrose, was soon followed by Quay, Penrose and Durham capturing the organization of the city, and practically retiring the Martin-Porter element.

Quay had absolute control of the Republican State convention and received a very cordial endorsement as Pennsylvania's candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. The only opposing element in the convention was that controlled by Magee, of Pittsburgh, who with others refused to support Quay. The ballot in the National convention gave 661 1-2 for McKinley, 84 1-2 for Reed, with 61 1-2 for Quay, 58 of which were given by Pennsylvania, 2 by Georgia, 1 by Mississippi and one-half by Louisiana.

In the early part of the struggle for the Presidential nomination it looked as if Quay might have some chance, as the contest between McKinley and Reed was aggressive and bitter, but some weeks before the



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convention met Vermont led off for McKinley against Reed, and was followed by broken delegations in one or two of the other New England States, which practically retired Reed, and McKinley's nomination was conceded before the convention met. Quay's organization carried the State for McKinley by 295,070 plurality, and Galusha A. Grow and Samuel A. Davenport, Republicans, were elected [Congressmen-at-Large over Dewitt and Allman, Democrats, by a like majority. Eighteen hundred and ninety-seven was an off year with only a State treasurer to elect, and James S. Beacon was Quay's slated candidate, and he was nominated practically without a contest and elected over Brown, Democrat, by 129,717 plurality.

In 1898 Quay was confronted by the most formidable opposition that he had ever met in any of his many desperate struggles to maintain his mastery. William A. Stone, then a Representative in Congress from Allegheny, with a gallant record as a soldier, had made an aggressive battle for the Republican nomination for Governor. He was not originally slated by Quay, but the strength he developed and the devotion he had exhibited for Quay in all his conflicts led to Quay accepting Stone as his candidate. Wanamaker was smarting under the defeat he had suffered for Senator two years before. He felt that the power of organization rather than public sentiment had given success to his opponent, and a conference of the anti-Quay men was called to meet in Philadelphia, attended by a number of leading representative Republicans, at which, after a conference with Wanamaker, it was decided that he should take the field as a candidate for the party nomination for Governor.

Not only was a determined fight made against Quay's candidate for Governor, but the war was also carried into the Legislative districts and defeated

Quay's re-election to the Senate. Wanamaker entered into the campaign with great earnestness and enthusiasm, and delivered a series of public addresses, which for ability and skill have rarely if ever been surpassed in our State. His addresses were carefully reported and published in most of the daily newspapers every morning, and they exhibited a versatility and a masterly grasp of both general and local political problems that greatly enthused his friends and astounded his opponents.

Special attention was given to the Legislative districts, and a number of the Quay candidates were defeated in close districts by the Independents, under the lead of Wanamaker, either supporting third candidates or voting directly for the Democratic nominees. The Republican ticket consisted of Stone for Governor, General J. P. S. Gobin for Lieutenant Governor, General J. W. Latta for secretary of internal affairs, and Grow and Davenport for re-election as Congressmen-at-Large. The Democrats nominated George A. Jenks, one of their ablest men in Western Pennsylvania, for Governor, with William H. Sowden for Lieutenant Governor, Patrick DeLacey for secretary of internal affairs, and J. N. Weller and F. B. Ians for Congressmen-at-Large. The campaign was fought with great earnestness on both sides, and Wanamaker was again outclassed in locking horns with the Quay organization, and Stone won an easy victory for the nomination.

While there was no organized opposition to the Republican State ticket, a furious battle was fought out in the legislative districts, and the Democrats were greatly encouraged by the aggressive attitude of Wanamaker. The result was the election of Stone by 117,906 plurality, but the Independents gave the Democrats considerable gains in the Legislature. On joint

ballot the Republicans had 164, Democrats 84, and the Fusionists (anti-Quay) 6.

The anti-Quay men, under the lead of Wanamaker and his lieutenants, confronted Quay in the Legislature in his struggle for re-election to the Senate. So inflamed had factional passion become between the Quay and anti-Quay forces of the State that it led to the indictment of Quay on the charge of misappropriation of State funds. That indictment was pending when the Legislature met, and the demand was made at Harrisburg that no man under indictment for the misappropriation of public funds should be considered as a candidate for Senator until acquitted by a jury.

This prosecution was a political blunder, as the result proved. Every dollar of State money had been accounted for; there was no allegation that the State funds were not intact, but he was charged as technically guilty for having State funds deposited in certain banks whereby he could obtain loans for his own individual benefit. With Quay indicted in the Philadelphia courts, and a powerful political element demanding his conviction and disgrace, as well as his defeat as Senator, the Legislature was halted in the re-election of Quay.

The Senatorial caucus met on the 3d of January, and was attended by 108 of the 164 Republican members. Over 40 Republicans who had refused to attend the caucus held a meeting on the following morning, and agreed that they would not vote for Quay until the courts had settled whether he was innocent or guilty of the charges against him. The executive committee of the anti-Quay members framed an address to the Republicans of Pennsylvania. The Democrats nominated George A. Jenks, their late candidate for Governor, for Senator over Chauncey F. Black, by a vote of 65 to 14 and a resolution looking to fusion with the

anti-Quay Republicans was defeated. Quay had sufficient control of the Democratic leaders to prevent the Democrats from uniting with the Wanamaker forces.

The first ballot for Senator was taken on the 17th of January, when the senate gave Quay 27 votes to 12 for Jenks and 3 for Dalzell, with 1 each for Hull, Charles Emory Smith, Erwin, Stewart and Stone. In the house Quay received 85 votes to 70 for Jenks, with 13 for Dalzell and 33 scattering. On the following day a joint ballot was had and Quay received 112, Jenks 84 and 52 Republican votes scattering. The Legislature was required to ballot in joint convention daily until the election of a Senator, and the ballots proceeded from day to day with no substantial change. On many days there was no quorum voting, and one day, on the 25th of March, only ten votes were cast.

But for Quay's control of the Democratic leaders, Wanamaker would have been elected, as the Democrats could have furnished him the full number of votes required with the aid of his Independent followers; but although Wanamaker's battle had given many of the Democratic members their election, Quay was able to hold their leaders and thus prevent the success of his opponent. I saw him frequently during the struggle, and he was hopeful of success in some way until Magee broke away from him a short time before the final adjournment. Magee really desired Quay's election and did not then wish to be made United States Senator himself, but hoped to succeed Quay six years later.

I heard Quay on more than one occasion express his purpose to throw his forces to Magee and elect him Senator whenever it became entirely clear to him that he could not succeed himself. He doubtless would have preferred Magee if he had accepted the contingency, but he never was willing to confess that he was defeated, and a short time before the final adjournment of the

Legislature Magee informed me that there was no chance of Quay's election, and that he had decided on the following Monday to vote for some other candidate, who might be elected. I was to dine that evening with Magee and some others, at the house of a friend, who was warmly attached to Quay, and I informed Quay that Magee was about to leave him and strongly advised him to withdraw from the contest and to confer with Magee at once on the question of electing some compromise candidate. He accompanied me to the dinner, although not an invited guest, and at once retired with Magee to the library, where they were alone for a considerable time.

Quay insisted that he was not finally defeated, and Magee insisted that his election was impossible. Instead of agreeing, they simply agreed to disagree, and dined and spent the evening pleasantly together without further referring to the subject. Magee's defection made Quay's battle an utterly hopeless one, and extraordinary efforts were then made to force the Democrats into a fusion. Mass meetings were held in Harrisburg and in Philadelphia at which impassioned speeches were made against Quay's election, and resolutions passed declaring that no man under arrest for conspiracy to use the State moneys should be elected to the Senate.

The anti-Quay men voted for Dalzell most of the time. On April 4 they gave 51 votes to Judge Stewart, who had led the Independents in 1882. On the 13th of April the anti-Quay Republicans held a meeting and addressed a letter to Senator John C. Grady, a leading Quay man, suggesting a conference to reach a compromise candidate, but that was followed by a meeting of the Quay supporters, to whom Quay addressed a letter appealing to them to stand by him, stating that "to temporize with those persons who for

three months have prevented the election of a Senator in Pennsylvania would extricate them from the abyss into which they have plunged. Instead of making their treason to the party odious, their treason would be made respectable, and treason made respectable would become fashionable." Quay thus continued as a candidate, receiving a decreased vote, and the last ballot was taken on the 19th of April, without material change in the vote, and on the following day the Legislature adjourned finally.

Quay's trial had been in progress for a week or more before the final adjournment, and on the 20th of April, the morning after the final adjournment, the trial was ended by his acquittal. It was one of the notable trials of Philadelphia, at which such prominent lawyers as Watson, of Pittsburg, and Shapley and Shields, of Philadelphia, conducted the defense, while Rothermel, then just inaugurated as district attorney, conducted the prosecution, exhibiting a measure of ability and dignity that at once ranked him among the foremost members of the bar of the city.

Within an hour after the verdict of the jury was rendered acquitting Quay, Governor Stone announced Quay's appointment to fill the vacancy. It was considered by many that the Governor's authority to appoint under the circumstances was more than doubtful, but Quay accepted his commission, and promptly applied to the Senate for temporary admission as his own successor. His struggle before the Senate for admission, and for the re-election that he accomplished two years later, must be deferred for another chapter.

CVI.

QUAY RE-ELECTED UNITED STATES
SENATOR.

The McCarrell Bill of 1899 and the Quay Trial—Democrats Divided by Bryanism—A Faction of Them for Quay—Quay Appointed Senator by the Governor, but the Senate Refused to Admit Him—The Grounds for His Exclusion—A Memorable Political Controversy—Senator Hanna's Position—A Great Humiliation to Quay—The State Convention and the Quay Battle in 1900—Wanamaker in State Politics—Overwhelming Republican Triumph—Quay Re-elected by the Legislature of 1901—A Famous Declaration by Him—Death Ends His Career Before His Term Expires.

IN addition to the absorbing question of the election of a United States Senator in the Legislature of 1899, the house was convulsed for several weeks by the battle over what was known as the McCarrell bill, that proposed an important change in the criminal jurisprudence of the State. In the trial of important cases the district attorney then possessed the right to stand aside jurors without peremptory challenge, while the defendant had only the right of limited peremptory challenge, thus giving the prosecution an indefinite right to challenge beyond that possessed by the defendant. Senator McCarrell presented a bill repealing that feature of the common law in criminal trials, and giving the Commonwealth and the defendant a precisely equal number of challenges in the selection of a jury.

It was well understood that the measure was proposed for the benefit of Senator Quay, whose trial was to come on very soon thereafter. The bill passed the senate, but most of the Democrats finally united with

the Independents of the house, and the bill never reached final passage in that body. Various earnest efforts were made to secure its passage, but when it came up in the popular branch on second reading on the 19th of February, the house voted to postpone action until the 21st of March by a vote of 93 to 92, with seventeen Democrats voting with the minority. It was assumed that by that time the Quay trial would be over. It is worthy of note that the Legislature of 1901 passed what was practically the McCarrell bill.

The Democrats of the State were greatly demoralized, and were an easy prey to the power of the Republican State organization. While the Democratic Legislators could not vote directly for Quay for Senator against the Democratic candidate, there were more than enough of them actually in the interest of Quay to make fusion against him impossible. An earnest effort was made at an early stage of the contest to bring the Democrats into the support of Wanamaker, who could have commanded the solid vote of the Independents, and a number of the leading Democrats were very much interested in aiding to accomplish it, but they found, after a careful canvass of their forces, that if the Democrats abandoned Jenks and accepted Wanamaker as their candidate, thus leaving the Democrats to choose between two Republicans, the entire Quay contingent would vote directly for Quay and thus secure his election.

The demoralization of Bryanism told fearfully on the integrity and vitality of the Democracy of the State. The Democratic State convention of 1896, that met for the election of delegates to the National convention, made a most emphatic deliverance in favor of sound money by declaring that the gold standard must be maintained in our monetary system. After the nomination of Bryan and the adoption of the free



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silver platform, the same convention, consisting of the same members, that was reconvened for State purposes, nearly unanimously adopted a resolution against sound money and in favor of the free coinage of silver. This action of the party drove a number of the ablest and most trusted leaders of the party from its fellowship. It was this demoralization that widened and deepened in the Democratic ranks that enabled Quay to accomplish his re-election in the Legislature of 1901.

The old Congress had expired by limitation on the 4th of March, 1899. Quay had no opportunity to present his commission and demand his seat in the Senate until the session of the new Congress met. The question of admitting Senators by appointment of the Governors of the States on commissions which had more or less evidence of irregularity, had been considered several times in the Senate, and had been apparently decided both for and against the right of Quay to be admitted. In other words, it seemed that the Senate had been influenced rather by its desire for the admission or rejection of a particular Senator than by any very sacred regard for the constitutional provisions affecting the case.

Quay was known to be personally very popular in the Senate, not only with most of the leaders of his own party, but also with a number of the prominent Democratic leaders. His most devoted personal friend in the body was Senator Vest of Missouri, one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders. They were almost inseparable, and no one other man so often sat with Quay at his dinner table. Under ordinary circumstances there is little doubt that Vest would have taken the lead in favor of Quay's admission, and thus enabled him to win out in his fight, but, unfortunately, Senator Vest had made a most exhaustive, and indeed an unanswerable, speech in a former contested case, where a

seat was claimed by appointment, and it was not possible for him to do otherwise than vote against Quay's admission.

I personally know that it was one of the sorest regrets of his public career that he could not aid Quay. His argument had been accepted by the Senate as a clear interpretation of the Constitution, and it told just as effectively against Quay as if it had been delivered in his own case. While Senator Vest could not support Quay, he rendered much service to Quay's cause by helping other Democrats to get into line on the Quay side.

When Quay first presented his commission everything seemed to point to his admission. It was understood that Hanna was in his favor; Hanna had certainly so expressed himself, and it was not doubted that Quay would win by a liberal majority. I did not believe that the Governor had any right under the Constitution to make the appointment, and editorially protested against Quay's commission. The National Constitution authorized the Governor to appoint Senators to fill vacancies occurring during the recess of the Legislature, but this vacancy had occurred on the 4th of March when the Legislature was in session, and continued in session for fifty days thereafter. The command of the Constitution, then, was for the Governor to reconvene the Legislature, but that was summarily abandoned as it was believed that Quay would be admitted to the Senate, and that he would be able to fight this battle for re-election in the next Legislature on the vantage ground of being in possession of the office.

I saw President McKinley two weeks before the final vote was taken on Quay's admission, and was surprised when he informed me that Quay would certainly be admitted to the Senate. He spoke most kindly of

Quay, and complained that the prominent Republicans of the State had appealed to him to deny Quay a voice in the disposal of Pennsylvania patronage. He told me that he had answered such a complaint from a committee a few days before by reminding them that the President could only recognize the action of the party organization of the State, and he reminded them that only a year before Ohio had nominated McKinley for President and Pennsylvania had nominated Quay for the same office, and that a large majority of the Republican members of the Legislature had earnestly supported his re-election to the Senate. Knowing the close relations between the President and Senator Hanna, I did not doubt that Hanna would be in the forefront in support of Quay, but to the utter surprise of Quay and his friends Hanna was absent from the Senate when the vote was taken, and Senator Depew, who was friendly to Quay, declined to vote, announcing that he had paired with Senator Hanna on the opposite side of the question.

Why Hanna had changed his position I have never known, and I believe that Quay never fully understood the cause of the change. It was defection from Quay by Hanna that made Quay the opponent of Hanna in his National leadership, and its far-reaching results may be appreciated when I state that it was that desertion of Quay by Hanna that made Quay, in the National convention of 1900, unite with Senator Platt, of New York, who had a like grievance against Hanna, to defeat the Administration programme in the nomination of a candidate for Vice-President. Quay had no special love for Roosevelt, who was a civil service reformer and generally on a politically antagonistic line to Quay, but the Administration was in favor of the nomination of either Senator Allison or Mr. Bliss, of New York, for Vice-President, as Hanna explained to

me himself, just before the convention met, because it was necessary to have an able and conservative candidate on the ticket with McKinley.

I well remember Hanna's expression when he spoke of the necessity of nominating a man for Vice-President who commanded the confidence of the business interests of the country. Shrugging his shoulders, he said: "You know Presidents die sometimes, and where the—— would we be if Roosevelt should become President of the United States." I saw him in Washington a few months after Roosevelt had become President, and reminded him of the remark to me about Roosevelt at the time of the Philadelphia convention. He then told me that he would give me the sequel of that conversation. In a letter that he wrote to McKinley on the evening after the ticket had been completed and Roosevelt made the candidate for the second place, he said to McKinley: "We have done the best we could; it is now up to you to live." It was the desertion of Quay by Hanna in the contest for Quay's admission to the Senate that made Roosevelt the nominee for Vice-President against his own earnest protest, and thus made him President of the United States. Quay lost his battle for the Senatorial seat on the Governor's commission by the narrowest margin, the vote being 33 to 31, and Hanna's influence and vote alone defeated him.

It was a humiliating defeat for Quay, but he was ever most heroic when threatened with the gravest perils. He decided to carry his cause to the people of Pennsylvania, and in the State convention of the party that met on the 24th of August he was endorsed in the strongest terms. The platform declared: "The Republican party owes a debt of gratitude to her senior United States Senator, Matthew Stanley Quay, who for more than a quarter of a century has stood in the forefront



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of the battle for Republican supremacy," and denounced the action of the Senate for denying Pennsylvania full representation in the body. Colonel Barnett, of Washington, was nominated for State treasurer, and J. Hay Brown, of Lancaster, for judge of the supreme court. The Democrats nominated Representative Creasey for State treasurer, and President Judge Mestrezat, of Fayette, for supreme judge. The Democrats were deficient in organization and utterly hopeless of success, and after a quiet and uneventful campaign the Republican ticket was elected by over 100,000 majority. There were two vacancies on the supreme court, and each voter could vote for but one candidate as directed by the constitution, resulting in the election of both Brown and Mestrezat as the supreme court judges.

The year 1900 was accepted alike by Quay and his opponents as presenting the direct issue of Quay's continued mastery or defeat. Quay's control of the party organization was complete, and he called the State convention to meet as early as the 5th of April to form his line of battle. The Republican platform commended Governor Stone for having appointed Senator Quay, and denounced the United States Senate for having refused his admission and thus denied Pennsylvania full representation. It also specially commended General Elkin for his "masterly and logical argument before the Elections committee of the United States Senate" defending the appointment of Quay.

The following is the precise text of the expression of the convention on Quay himself: "We express our confidence in Senator Quay's leadership, and we believe in his political and personal integrity. A great wrong has been done him which the people will right at the proper time, and therefore we urge and insist that the Hon. Matthew S. Quay shall be a candidate for re-

election to the United States Senate, in which he has so long served the people with such distinguished ability and fidelity, and to this end we pledge him our hearty and cordial support."

Senator Hardenbergh was nominated for auditor general and Grow was re-nominated for Congressman-at-Large, with Mr. Foerderer, of Philadelphia, as his colleague. The Democrats nominated P. Gray Meek for auditor general and Mr. Grimm and Mr. Edwards for Congressmen-at-Large. There was practically no fight made by either side for the respective National tickets, as it was accepted by all that McKinley would carry the State by an increased majority, but a desperate battle was made, with Wanamaker in the lead, for the election of anti-Quay senators and representatives. Quay for the first time in his political career made a public canvass of the State, and delivered a series of speeches of singular pungency on the political conditions of the State, and often embellished them with unusual classic elegance.

Mr. Wanamaker was on the stump, and with his friends made exhaustive efforts to make fusion combinations with the Democrats for the Legislative candidates. Wanamaker, like Quay, was nothing if not heroic. He was as fearless as he was able in expression, and well proved his right to rank not only as one of the ablest of our political disputants, but as one of the most skillful and popular orators. He defined his position in an address at Pottstown as follows: "A Legislature must be elected overwhelmingly hostile to the Machine and all its works, and to its whole corrupt and sinister spirit, in order that the present protection to fraud at the polls shall be swept away by an act enforcing true ballot reform."

Quay spoke at Phoenixville a few days after the Wanamaker deliverance at Pottstown, in which he took

up the candidates and supporters of the fusion Legislative ticket in Chester County, and after stating that the friends of good government had raised a large amount of money to expend in the Legislative contests he said: "One of the candidates upon the fusion ticket is the custodian and dispenser of the fund here, and his recent visits to Philadelphia have a history. In the cause of good government they will bribe piously, they will bribe prayerfully; you can scarcely say them nay. Take their money, lay it carefully out of reach until after the election, then there are laudable charities at hand to the use of which it can be properly donated, and you can consider the propriety of mentioning the donors."

Quay's last speech in that campaign was delivered in Philadelphia, just on the eve of the election, in which he paid his respects to the "Press," The "Times," the "Record," the "Ledger" and the "Telegraph," all of which were opposed to his political mastery. He said: "I have no desire to flutter the cote of these soiled doves of Pennsylvania journalism. They wire in and wire out at the heels of their charmer, everywhere slobbering venom in their slot." He had been severely criticised by those journals, and he withheld his reply to them until the battle was practically ended.

The Republican victory in the State was the greatest that had ever been achieved. McKinley's plurality was 288,433, and the entire Republican State ticket was elected by some 20,000 less. Notwithstanding the organized fusion movement in various sections of the State, the Republicans had the largest majority in the new Legislature that had ever been chosen. The senate had 37 Republicans to 13 Democrats, and the house 161 Republicans to 49 Democrats and 4 Republican fusionists, but when the Legislature met and Quay

lined up the supporters of his re-election to the Senate he found himself without a majority.

The Republican Senatorial caucus was attended by 113 members, being four short of a majority in joint assembly. Quay was nominated, receiving 119 votes to two for John Dalzell and two for John Stewart. Quay said that without the control of the organization of the house it would be impossible for him to succeed in the Senatorial contest. Representative Marshall was nominated by the Quay forces in the Republican caucus for speaker, but a fusion was formed between the Democrats and Independents in support of General Koontz, of Somerset, and but for Quay's control of demoralized Democrats, Koontz would have been elected and Quay defeated.

The Democratic leaders made an earnest effort to hold their forces, but so many Democrats were rotten at the core that it was impossible for them to prevent desertions. Marshall, Quay's candidate for speaker, was elected by one majority, and that was accomplished by one Democrat voting directly for Marshall and several withholding their votes without pairs. Quay thus had the control of the committees and the power of the house, and it was wielded by Marshall with the single purpose of aiding Quay's election.

On the 15th of January Quay was elected for the unexpired term of four years in the Senate, receiving 26 votes in the Senate, with 12 for Guffey, Democrat; 10 for Dalzell and one each for Charles Emory Smith and George E. Huff; Independents. In the house Quay received 104 votes to 44 for Guffey, 24 for Dalzell, 11 for Smith, 6 for Huff, 3 for Stewart and one each for McCormack, McConway, Harris, Tubbs, Olmstead and Swallow, with five not voting. Quay's election was accomplished by one Democratic-Populist senator and one Democratic representative voting directly for him.



Samuel W. Pennypacker

and with two Democratic representatives being absent without pairs. It was a most desperate struggle, and only one of Quay's masterly political ingenuity and skillful control of Democrats of easy virtue could have won out in the fight.

Thus ended Quay's last great battle, when he was the central figure of the contest, and as he had regained his position in the Senate for a four year term, and publicly announced his purpose not again to be a candidate for any office, the factional feeling that had harassed him for many years gradually perished.

On the 14th of May, several months after his election, he was invited to address the State League of Republican Clubs in the Philadelphia Academy of Music, and his speech on that occasion will be cherished as a classic. The opening sentence was: "At three score years and ten the world grows lonely; through wilderness almost desolate the stream of life lies darkly toward the eternal gulf," and that was followed by this utterance: "My political race is run. It is not to be understood that God's sword is drawn immediately against my life, or that my seat in the Senate is to be peremptorily vacated, but that with the subscription of my official oath on the 18th of January my connection with the serious labors and responsibilities of active politics ceases, excepting in so far as I may be committed to certain measures pending in the present Legislature. I will never again be a candidate for or accept any official position. I have many friends to remember; I have no enemies to punish. In this regard I put aside the past."

After referring to the general political conditions of the country, he spoke of the necessity of expansion, and traced the history of nations in the development of our Christian civilization with a beauty of diction and a measure of historic illustration that would embellish

the oration of an Everett. He closed by quoting the elder Cato in the Senate of the Roman Republic. He said: "Think not that Rome is founded alone upon her seven hills and her ponderous and shining marbles. No, but upon the honest purpose, brave hearts and strong arms of her citizens. Think not that, by mere force of arms alone, this Republic attained its present pitch of greatness. No, but by things of a very different nature. Industry and discipline at home, abstinence and justice abroad, a disinterested spirit in counsels, unblinded by passion and unbiased by pleasure." To which Quay added: "Thus spoke the elder Cato in the Roman Senate, and his voice seems wafted down the centuries for our guidance."

Beyond Quay's sudden assertion of political authority in defeating the present Justice Elkin for the nomination for Governor in 1902, and making Judge Penny-packer the Republican candidate, Quay's political career was uneventful from the time he re-entered the Senate until his death. His Senatorial term expired on the 4th of March, 1905, and such were political conditions at the time he fell in the race that he would certainly have been re-elected to the Senate without a contest had he been living when the choice was made. While he had made public announcement several years before that under no circumstances would he be a candidate for, or accept, political position, it was generally understood that he would be elected to succeed himself, and then probably resign to give place to some friend of his own selection. At no time in his long and fretting political career was his party more entirely in harmony with him than in 1904, but his health was sadly broken, and he evidently realized that his life work was finished.

After failing to regain strength in the South and at the seashore, he returned to his home in Beaver, to die

among his loved ones and his loving neighbors. His favorite resort was his library, where he could indulge his love of literature and art, and pore over the classics which had been largely the study of his life. A short time before his death, knowing that the end was near, he had himself borne from his sick room to pay a last visit to the old-time friends in books and art which filled his library, and looking out upon the bright spring day that was garlanding the earth with beauty and fragrance and the promise of future plenty, he said: "It is very beautiful; it is very beautiful." A few hours thereafter the trained lightning announced to every section of the country that Matthew Stanley Quay was dead, and friend and foe bowed regretfully over the grave of Pennsylvania's ablest and most chivalrous political gladiator.

CVII.

REPUBLICAN REVOLT IN 1901.

Political Conditions in Philadelphia Started an Aggressive Revolt—
 Rothermel Rejected by the Party Leaders Because Fugitives, Charged
 With Political Crimes, Could Not Return While he Prosecuted—
 Formation of the Union Party—Judge Yerkes, Democratic Candidate
 for Supreme Judge, Endorsed by the Union Republicans, and Repre-
 sentative Coray Nominated for State Treasurer—The Violent Con-
 test in the City—Colossal Frauds Practised in Philadelphia—Rother-
 mel Returned as Defeated—Potter and Harris Elected by a Large
 Majority—The Revolt of 1901 Made Quay Crucify Attorney General
 Elkin and Nominate Pennypacker for Governor.

REPUBLICAN politics in Pennsylvania had been
 decidedly cyclonic for several years before 1901,
 and there was little promise of Republican
 harmony when the politicians began their movements
 in the beginning of that year. Quay had won out in
 his re-election to the Senate by a very violent manipu-
 lation of the Democrats in the Legislature of that year,
 and there was a large measure of unrest in most sections
 of the State. Two State offices were to be filled—
 supreme judge and State treasurer—and the Republi-
 cans nominated the present Justice Porter, who was
 then serving by appointment, for supreme judge, and
 Harris for State treasurer. Both of these candidates
 possessed high character and qualifications for their
 respective positions, and while there might have been
 some Republican dissatisfaction here and there through-
 out the State, there would have been practically no
 contest for the State offices if it had been a square
 battle between the Democrats and the Republicans.

Peculiar political conditions in Philadelphia started

the revolt of 1901, as like conditions in Philadelphia started the revolution of 1905. P. F. Rothermel, a man of high character and legal attainments, was urged to accept the nomination for district attorney. That position had been filled by such eminent prosecutors as Reed, Cassidy, Mann, Sheppard, Hagert and Graham, and it was deemed a political necessity not to lower the standard of the public prosecutors. Mr. Rothermel, after much hesitation, reluctantly accepted the nomination and was elected by a large majority. His first important case in the criminal courts was the trial of Senator Quay, which he conducted with masterly ability and dignity and he proved that in the discharge of his official duties he was ever faithful to his high trust.

Political complications, involving criminal methods, arose which made Rothermel unacceptable as district attorney. There were fugitives from justice, charged with political crimes, who could not return for trial while Rothermel was the public prosecutor, and a change in that office was an imperative political necessity. It was the decision of the leaders to overthrow Rothermel that led to the revolt in Philadelphia in 1901, that extended into different sections throughout the State. The more violent of the anti-Quay element were ready for rebellion against the State ticket, and the overthrow of Rothermel in Philadelphia aroused the people to aggressive revolutionary action. He was nominated by an independent mass meeting that adopted the name of the Union Party, and that led to the Union State convention at which Attorney General McCormick, of the Hastings administration, delivered the chief speech urging the support of Harman Yerkes, the Democratic candidate for supreme judge, and Representative Coray, the Independent Republican candidate for State treasurer.

Potter had been appointed by Governor Stone, his law partner, and was not widely known throughout the State, although occupying a high position at the Pittsburgh Bar, and Yerkes was well known in the State, having served two terms in the senate, where he was recognized as one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders, and had been for nearly twenty years judge of the Bucks County court. The Democratic organization of the city was under control of the Republican leaders and refused to accept Rothermel as its candidate. Only seven thousand votes were cast for the straight Democratic candidate, but most of the followers of the Democratic organization voted directly for Weaver, the Republican nominee. The contest was one of unusual activity and bitterness, and as both of the political organizations of the city, Republican and Democratic, were practically supporting the same cause, there was little or no restraint upon fraud, and the most colossal frauds ever practised in Philadelphia were exhibited in the returns. Rothermel and Yerkes were returned as defeated in the city by thirty-five to forty thousand majorities. The chief battle was made against Rothermel, and the conclusive evidence of fraud was shown by larger majorities returned against him, in some instances, than there were legal voters in the ward. That he was re-elected district attorney by the honest vote is not disputed by the intelligent, fair-minded men in the city. A contest would have involved enormous labor and expenditure and was not attempted.

Judge Potter developed extraordinary personal strength in Pittsburgh and the western counties of the State, where he was known. He carried Allegheny by nearly twenty thousand majority and nearly all of the western and northwestern Republican counties of the State gave him their full off year majorities. The per-

sonal strength of Judge Yerkes was also greatly felt in Philadelphia and in his own home counties of Bucks and Montgomery, where he was given nearly five thousand majority. The only other counties seriously affected by the Republican revolt were Chester, where the Republican majority was practically wiped out, and the anthracite region, where Lackawanna gave four thousand for the Union ticket, Luzerne twelve thousand, and Schuylkill three thousand. Representative Coray was the Union candidate for State treasurer, and represented the anthracite interests in the Legislature. The Democratic counties, outside of the anthracite region, as a rule, gave no more than the usual off year majorities, and the result was the election of Potter and Harris by large majorities, but the battle left the vital embers of revolution in Philadelphia which, four years later, led to the hurricane of disaster that overwhelmed the organization leaders in both city and State.

It was this admonition that made Quay crucify Attorney General Elkin, who was the generally accepted candidate for Governor and who had won great distinction by his able defense, before a committee of the United States Senate, of Quay's right to a seat by appointment from Governor Stone. Quay was not dissatisfied or distrustful of Elkin, but he felt that it was necessary to place a man at the head of the Republican ticket for Governor in 1902 whose high character and creditable discharge of judicial duties would disarm the disaffected elements of the State. Quay's decision to change the nomination of Governor was not reached until Elkin had practically a majority of the delegates in his favor.

Along with several other gentlemen, I dined with Quay in Philadelphia on the night that he had his appointment with Attorney General Elkin to advise El-

kin to withdraw from the Gubernatorial contest. When the party had reached cigars, after the dinner was served, Quay left and stated the mission upon which he was going. He returned later in the evening greatly distressed, as he had failed to convince Elkin of the propriety of withdrawing, but he was resolute in his purpose to change the candidate for Governor, and by an exhibition of his most heroic political methods he faced a convention that was positively committed to the nomination of Elkin, and accomplished the nomination of Pennypacker. As Pennypacker was invulnerable, he thus weakened opposition to Quay's rule and postponed aggressive action, but it was delayed only for a few years, and when its final culmination came in the overwhelming defeat of the party in 1905, Quay slept the dreamless sleep of the dead.



Herman Yerkes

CVIII.

AFTER QUAY THE DELUGE.

Quay Died Just in the Omnipotence of His Political Power—His Death Developed Antagonistic Party Elements—The Struggle for United States Senator—Offered to Ex-Senator Cameron, Who Suggested Attorney General Knox—All finally Agreed to Support Knox, and the Governor Withheld Proclamation for Extra Session—Knox First Appointed and Then Elected by Unanimous Republican Vote—Revolution Developed in Philadelphia—Estrangement of Mayor and Party Leaders—Independent Ticket Elected in the City—Democratic State Treasurer Elected by Over Eighty-Eight Thousand—Comparative Vote of 1904 and 1905—Justice Stewart Received a Unanimous Vote.

“AFTER me the deluge” might well have been uttered by Senator Quay before his death, could he have had any conception of the political disruption and revolution which were to follow, but when he looked out upon the setting sun from the library to which he was borne for the last time to gaze upon the literary and art treasures he so greatly loved, there was not a cloud upon the Republican horizon. Looking over his political work, as it then appeared, he could have assumed that he and his organization had finally reached omnipotence without peril from internal or external political foes. His party was thoroughly united in every section of the country on its National candidate and policy, and the formidable enemies he had encountered in his many conflicts of the past were then unseen and unfelt in the political movements of the State. Had he lived until the meeting of the Legislature of 1905, he would have been re-elected United States Senator, regardless of his fixed resolve

to retire from public life because of his hopelessly broken health. He would have accepted the unanimous and generally very hearty support of his party for another Senatorial election, but would certainly have resigned soon after qualifying in the special session of the Senate in March, 1905, while the Legislature was yet in session, and dictated the election of his successor.

The death of Quay in the early summer of 1904 brought to the surface various antagonistic elements of the party, which were not visible on the surface while Quay continued as the omnipotent Republican leader of the State. Half a score of candidates speedily developed to contest the vacant seat in the Senate, and many earnest but disagreeing conferences were held in Pittsburg, Harrisburg and Philadelphia to bring about harmonious action on the Senatorship. The plain mandate of the Constitution required the Governor to summon an extra session of the Legislature to choose a Senator, and had the conditions been ordinary, Governor Pennypacker would doubtless have performed that duty. The Senatorship was sought by many, and the various conferences held, looking to harmony, gave no promise of unity of action, and for a time seriously threatened disruption. It is an open secret that after many unsuccessful efforts had been made to reach an agreement on the Senatorship, the leaders, who were then most potent in the selection of a Senator, summoned Ex-Senator J. Donald Cameron and asked him to accept the position, but he peremptorily declined it. Attorney General Philander C. Knox, then a resident of Pittsburg, had not been aggressive in politics and was devoted to his profession, in which he had attained distinction. Cameron sug-

gested Attorney General Knox for the Senatorship, and as Knox was free from all factional entanglements, he was finally accepted by all, and the organization, which was then supreme in the mastery of the party, was thoroughly united in the assurance to Knox that he would be elected by the next Legislature without a contest. Knox greatly preferred to continue in the line of his profession, as he had no taste for, or experience in, political management, but he finally decided to accept the new position when his election by the next Legislature was fully assured.

The Governor was then placed in a very embarrassing position, as the strict letter of the fundamental law required that he should summon the Legislature to chose a Senator, but that involved the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars to accomplish what could be readily attained without the intervention of the Legislature, and the Governor assumed the responsibility, that would doubtless have been questioned under ordinary conditions, of appointing Knox as United States Senator to fill the vacancy made by the death of Quay. Governor Stone had appointed Quay to a vacancy in 1899, when the Legislature had adjourned without choosing a Senator after a protracted and bitter contest between Quay and his political enemies, and the Senate refused his admission by a single vote. The appointment of Knox, however, was in such entire accord with the wishes of the party and its organization that he was admitted to the Senate, on the Governor's commission, without question, and his election for the few weeks of Quay's unexpired term, and also for the full succeeding term, was given by a unanimous Republican vote.

At the election of 1904, Pennsylvania voted Republican by nearly a two-thirds vote. The Democrats apparently ceased to be a factor in Pennsylvania politics.

This was accepted by the Republican leaders as an indefinite lease of absolute political domination, unmindful of the fact that not only in the city of Philadelphia, but throughout the State, there was profound unrest within the Republican household that might be easily provoked to revolutionary action. The first distinct murmurs of discontent were heard in Philadelphia when the leaders, many of whom were interested in municipal contracts involving many millions, first decided to increase largely the property assessments for the twofold purpose of enlarging the revenue without increasing the tax rate, and to empower the city to increase its loans. This movement caused considerable public irritation, and when it was followed by a proposition to extend the lease of the gas works for half a century to bring twenty-five millions of money into the treasury, and thus warrant the completion of the immense contracts for filtration, boulevards, etc., a popular uprising, unexampled in the history of the city, confronted the party leaders.

The public revolt was not so much against the lease of the gas works, for the terms of the lease might reasonably be considered quite as favorable to the city as to the United Gas Improvement Company that proposed to become the lessee, but the fact that the lease was to be made solely to obtain twenty-five millions of money to be expended in contracts which were generally regarded as profligate, and alleged by many to lack the important element of honesty, intensified the already inflamed public mind to the most determined and desperate revolutionary efforts. Mayor Weaver, who was assumed to be in accord with the organization that elected him chief magistrate, became gradually estranged from the party leaders, and they decided



Philander C. Knox

upon heroic retributive measures, involving the passage of what is known as the "Ripper" bills, greatly limiting the power of the mayor, and his threatened impeachment and removal from office.

So general and inflammatory was the revolutionary feeling that it threatened even mob violence to the councils when they were to act upon important measures on which the leaders and the mayor were at issue. The councils finally bowed to the omnipotent sentiment that environed them and gave implicit obedience to the demands of the mayor, unanimously approving the displacement of the friends of the leaders in the mayor's cabinet and the selection of persons who were aggressive in their hostility. The councils even went so far as to repeal the assent of the city to a number of rural railroad franchises, although the franchises had been granted by the State, simply assented to by the city, and issued in full conformity with the law.

A full city ticket for the important officers of sheriff, coroner and city commissioners had been nominated by the leaders early in the year, and when those nominations were made, the election of the men named was regarded as absolutely assured without a contest, but when the revolutionary tempest struck them, the leaders were compelled to withdraw the entire ticket and try to temper the violence of the opposition by presenting new candidates with the cleanest records. The atonement was made too late, however, and an independent ticket swept the city by nearly forty-five thousand majority.

There was but one State officer to elect, that of State treasurer. J. Lee Plummer, of Blair County, chairman of appropriations and Republican leader of the House,

was nominated for State treasurer without serious opposition, and at the time the nomination was made there was not a ripple on the surface of Republican unity. The Democrats nominated William H. Berry, mayor of Chester, who had been chosen by the people of that strong Republican city because of his well known integrity, business qualities and courage in discharging public duties. The death of Justice Dean made a vacancy in the supreme court to be filled by the Governor until next January, and added another State officer to be chosen by the people.

The Independent revolution had just fairly started when this vacancy occurred. The Republicans wisely decided to temper the hostility of the Independents in both city and State by nominating Judge John Stewart, of Franklin, to fill the vacancy in the supreme court. Stewart was as conspicuous in political independence and integrity in the Republican party as Berry was in a much narrower circle in the Democratic party, and the Democrats seized the opportunity to invite the independent Republicans to support a thoroughly independent Democratic candidate for State treasurer by giving Judge Stewart a unanimous nomination for supreme judge. Independent local nominations were made by the City party, the Lincoln party, the Citizens party, and the Independence party, but all, with the exception of the Citizens party, which was confined almost wholly to Pittsburg, united in the support of Berry, the Democratic candidate for State treasurer, and the result was the election of Berry by over eighty-eight thousand. The following table shows the revolution in Pennsylvania by a comparison of the vote for President in 1904 and the vote for State treasurer in 1905:

PRESIDENT—1904.

Roosevelt, R.	840,949
Parker, D.	335,430
Swallow, Pro.....	33,717
Debs, Soc.	21,863

Total vote	1,231,939
Republican plurality	505,519
Republican majority	449,939

STATE TREASURER—1905.

Berry, D.	546,892
Plummer, R.	458,698
Ringler, Soc.	10,390
Drugmand, S. Labor ..	1,622
Scattering	68

Total vote.....	1,017,670
Democratic plurality	88,194
Democratic majority	76,114

It will be seen that the total vote for State treasurer was over one million, being entirely unexampled in any off year conflict, and the manner in which parties were divided up is best exhibited by the following:

JUDGE STEWART'S VOTE FOR 1905.

Republican	515,249	Independence.....	17,808
Democrat	236,540	Citizens	34,160
Prohibition	38,839	Lincoln	116,758

Judge Stewart thus received 959,054 votes, being the only supreme judge ever chosen by a practically unanimous vote. It is impossible to determine the exact Democratic vote and the exact Republican vote polled, in the general confusion of parties, but taking the average Republican vote of 610,394, given for Governor Beaver's re-election to the superior court, and the vote of 305,218, given to John B. Head, Democratic candidate for the superior court, doubtless gives the nearest possible approximation to the strength of the two parties, showing an apparent Republican majority of about three hundred thousand. One of the notable incidents of the campaign is the fact that Judge Stewart and ex-Governor Beaver were both on the Republican State ticket, Stewart for supreme judge and Beaver for the superior court. In 1882, Beaver was the Republican candidate for Governor

and was defeated by Stewart's Independent Republican candidacy for the same office.

Such are the strangely conflicting political records of 1904 and 1905, and it is evident that there must be a reforming of the political lines to enable the Republican party to unite in the support of candidates for Governor, Congressmen, Legislators, etc., at the fall election of 1906. What will the harvest be?

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